On the occasion of the 28th anniversary of acceptance of UN Resolution 598

Clarification of memoirs about the end of war

Maryam Assadi Jafari
Translated by: M. B. Khoshnevisan

2016-7-24

The widespread attack of Saddam’s army on Iranian soil started on 22^nd of September 1980. The Iranian people were on the verge of an unwanted war, waiting for a response by the United Nations. The UN Resolution 497 was issued one week later but its content was to the interest of the aggressor and no mention had been made in it to the necessity of Iraq’s retreat from Iranian soil. So, the Iranian nation found out that there would no hope of international organizations for establishing justice and peace!

The United Nations issued six resolutions including 598 during the eight-year Iraqi imposed war against Iran. In the first stage, the resolution was not to the benefit of Iran and due to the advancement of friendly forces in the enemy’s soil, the UN asked the two warring sides to return to their borders. But in the second stage, the political and military conditions of the war as well as the erosion of the war caused the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to think of the option of ceasefire as well as the acceptance of Resolution 598.  

Since different interpretations and analyses have been carried out in this connection, undoubtedly the studying of memoirs of the Iranian leaders about the issue which has been written in those days can clarify the truth more than ever. Unfortunately, such works are less in number and there is little memoirs regarding the acceptance of UN Resolution 598 and most books about the war have had a transient look at this historic event. But analytical books about the end of the Iraqi imposed war against Iran are more enriched in this regard. However, on the occasion of the 28^th anniversary of acceptance of UN Resolution 598, the website of Iranian Oral History has reviewed the memoirs of political and military figures in this regard and some of them have been highlighted.

Ahmad Agha (the son of Imam) did a great job

In his autobiography, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani who was the Deputy of the Commander-In-Chief and the Majlis (parliament) Speaker on those days has allocated the days of 16^th to 18th of July 1988 to the last days of accepting the UN resolution, and writes, “Saturday 16^th of July: … the members of the board of Directors of the Assembly of Experts came to my office at 10 AM. I left them alone and went to take part in a meeting with a number of lawmakers who had come to be informed of the war’s situation and their duty over the current situation. I delivered a lengthy speech and talked about the war’s problems in order to prepare the grounds for accepting the peace. I raised disturbing issues about the situation but there were other worse ones about which I said nothing. I came back to my office. Dr. Rouhani came in the afternoon. I informed him that Imam Khomeini (God bless his soul) had agreed with the end of the war and we talked about the war’s affairs. Mr. (Mohammad Javad) Larijani came in the evening and I talked about the quality of accepting the UN Resolution 598…”

Sunday 17^th of July, “… I went to the office of Ayatollah Khamenei and took part in a meeting held for hearing and justifying Imam’s view in accepting the ceasefire. Mr. Khamenei as the chairman of the meeting talked briefly and Ahmad Agha read the message of Imam Khomeini (God bless his soul)… it impressed the meeting and some cried. Then, I talked in detail, describing the reason for the decision. Then, Hassani Sa’di and Shamkhani, two of the commanders spoke about the decision militarily, and the ministers of economy, and planning and budget (misters Iravani and Roqani Zanjani) talked about the financial problems of the war. Then, comments and solutions for implementing the Imam’s view were raised. Most of the participants agreed and were satisfied… first, the Imam was not supposed to write anything and he was supposed to agree after we announced the ceasefire, but the plan of Ahmad Agha worked and the Imam (God bless his soul) wrote a message; Ahmad Agha did a great job for solving the probable problems.”

Monday 18^th of July, “I stayed at home until 3 PM. There was no news of clashes with the enemy in the fronts… Haj Ahmad Agha came and we talked about the quality of explaining about the ceasefire. He said that although the Imam considers ceasefire as the only way, he is also upset… Dr. Velayati informed that Mr. (Mohammad Ja’far) Mahalati in New York had given the message of Mr. Khamenei to the UN Secretary General, announcing the acceptance of ceasefire. We were supposed to announce it at 2 PM. The general staff made a statement and it was supposed that the announcement of the UN acceptance was read with the mentioning of the letter of Mr. Khamenei. I arrived in the Majlis at 3.30 PM. The international reaction to the news had just begun… the prime minister informed that the prices of golden coin and rate of the dollar had reduced in the market within a few hours.”

IRGC obeys Imam’s order

Mohsen Rafiq Doust, the then Minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) narrates the day led to the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in this way, “The time we accepted the UN Resolution 598 was when we were asked to present a plan for ending the war. What we were had been asked was not for ending the war; some had turned it into the end of the war; in fact, we were asked whether Saddam could be toppled without Baghdad’s fall? We said no. they said what you want for Baghdad’s fall? The IRGC commander said if you want us to seize Baghdad we need these. They were presented to the Imam (God bless his soul) but since the demands couldn’t be met, it turned into a demand of the war’s end. Otherwise, the IRGC never asked for the war’s end. The IRGC said whatever the Imam orders. We were invited on 18^th of July to take part in a meeting supposed to be held in the presidential office. Almost all military commanders, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister and the Head of the Defense Commission and all of those involved in the war were present in the meeting. Then, Mr. Hashemi and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and Ahmad Agha came. At that time, some knew that the Imam (God bless his soul) was supposed to accept the UN resolution and read his message…”

People rush to fronts

In the book “War as narrated by commander: The lectures of Mohsen Rezaee”, the IRGC Commander during the sacred defense Mohsen Rezaee stipulates, “Some say that the UN Security Council intended to issue the resolution 598 after Fav operation. But some others were of the opinion that we should wait and allow Saddam to do something and if this worked, it would prove that the Iranian operation had been accidental not a development… the world had been so panicked after the Fav operation that in my view if the Iranian diplomacy was strong, we could use this atmosphere and a resolution like 598 imposed on Iraq. But due to the weakness of Iranian political system and low experience after the Islamic revolution, we could not use the diplomacy well… in fact we imposed resolution 598 by force and arms in Karbala 4 and 5 operations and this resolution was not obtained through normal diplomatic negotiations. After the resolution was issued, Iran for the first time offered a statement which completed resolution 598. The UN Secretary General agreed but Saddam disagreed. The statement became a supplementary for resolution 598 in which the recognition of aggressor was preceded on retreatment from international borders and a little relocation had been carried out in the phrases of the resolution.”

He continued, “At first, Iran accepted the UN Resolution 598 conditionally and whenever they talked to Iranian officials, they said, “If the Secretary General issues a statement, we will accept it." It was at this time that some developments happened in the military front and before the UN Secretary General issued a statement, Saddam recaptured the areas we had seized and Iraq came back to international borders. It was at this point that Iran accepted resolution 598 in July 1988. The letters I had written to the political, economic and military officials – including the one I had written to Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani – was among the most important reasons that the UN resolution was accepted. The Imam (God bless his soul) saw the letters and the conditions of the fronts and war and decided that the UN resolution should be accepted… after the Imam stated in July 1988 that I had accepted the resolution and dealt my honor for the sake of God, it impressed a lot in the society and the people rushed to the war fronts and the crucial Mersad Operation completed successfully… at that time, Ayatollah Khamenei who had come to Ahwaz, contacted with Haj Ahmad Agha (the son of Imam) and stated that the commanders say we are ready to attack but Imam Khomeini (God bless his soul) answered that we do not violate from what we have accepted.”