The Imposed War Oral History

New Horizons or Multiple Narratives?

Mohammad Doroodian
Translated by: Mohammad Karimi

2015-10-18


The expanding trend in using Oral History, bring about this question: What kind of goals and conclusions does Oral History observe? This question is based on two presumptions: First, using Oral History is followed for completing written history with a cultural-social approach. Moreover, the outcome of imposed war oral history would develop people’s defense approach toward war based on cultural-ideological teachings, and also multiple narratives of war events by the cooperation of all the people who have experienced war.

My goal for presenting this question and its survey is to clarify the pathology of imposed war Oral History and the “necessity” of revising it. As it is clear, the Imposed War Oral History, despite being methodologically “Oral”, however, its approach remains “historical”. With only a clear difference that in Oral History the individual’s relation with the event is narrative. So, political and social factors, individual-organizational motives of narrating an event, just like written historiography, play a very important role. By changing the conditions, the orientation and the subjects of the Imposed War Oral History, just like written historiography will change.

By this explanation and by assuming historical approach toward war, despite having the possibility of recognizing the details of political-military events of war, in time and place, does not have the capability of recognizing the “war problem”, conceptually and methodologically speaking, Oral History has the same vulnerabilities that written historiography has. Moreover, and despite the assumed original aims for Oral History, the resent methods in Oral History for completing written historiography will end in multiple narratives and it will gradually make it difficult to have a historical clarification by using a narrative that is comprehensive and accepted by all.

In written historiography, comparing other subjects, we focus on “events” considering the deeds of Army and Revolutionary Guards during the war, along with some other explanations. Oral History in its best form will present and explain the relation between the individual and the event. Actually, this matter will result in multiple narratives and completing the written history. This consideration is under the effect of Oral History characteristics, and also political –social conditions and individual-organization motives in narrating war.

Despite the original assumed goals for Oral History and considering the possible outcomes, is this outcome an expected and wanted one? Or there should be a revision in present aims and methods of the Imposed War Oral History?

In fact, “individualism” of the Imposed War Oral History, beside “military institutionalism” for reinforcing organizational identity, with the focus on “events” instead of strategic analysis, none would complete each other. However, by creating multiple narratives, understanding war events and subject will become more and more difficult for the war and after-war generations than ever.

Now; assuming the correctness of this pathology of the Imposed War Oral History, what should be done?

October 3rd, 2015



 
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