The Sha‘baniyya Uprising as Narrated by Ali Tahiri

Observations of Iranian Journalists

Selected by Faezeh Sasanikhah
Translated by Kianoush Borzouei

2026-2-10

Iraq shares common borders with six countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait—four Arab states and two non-Arab ones. At that time, with the exception of Jordan, none of these countries maintained friendly relations with the Iraqi government. In this context, Iran, Turkey, and Syria—having received the largest numbers of Iraqi refugees—played a particularly significant role. Iran, in particular, which enjoyed deeper religious and emotional bonds with the rebels and functioned as a hub for Iraqi opposition forces, spared no effort in covering the news of the uprising and the savage suppression of the Iraqi people. Evidence of this claim can be found in the extensive reflection of the uprising in Iranian media. Reports by Mohammadi Ali (journalist) and Qadir Chinju (photojournalist) of Keyhan, as well as those by Hassan Khameh-yar, the dispatched correspondent of Jomhouri-ye Eslami, who had traveled to Iraq along with other journalists and photographers from Iranian mass media to report on the war, were published in the press of the time and attest to the width of coverage.

Some journalists, upon returning from Iraq, sought—through extensive dissemination of their eyewitness accounts and the forbidden realities of the alliance forces’ war and Saddam’s army’s widespread suppression of the popular movement—to inform the public by holding press conferences and organizing photographic exhibitions. They also published travelogues, memoirs, and reports accompanied by interviews with ordinary citizens. Even a single example among these accounts suffices to substantiate this claim. Meanwhile, mass media in Syria and Turkey likewise mobilized their capacities to raise public awareness by reporting on the oppression and injustice inflicted upon the Iraqi people. What follows is a condensed version of the narrative of a correspondent from Jomhouri-ye Eslami, which was placed at our disposal and whose detailed report was published in that newspaper at the time:

“In conversations I held with some citizens—away from the watchful eyes of the Ba‘ath regime’s Ministry of Information guides—I clearly realized that they were profoundly tired of Saddam’s adventurism. In the cities of Baghdad, Kazimayn, Najaf, Kufa, and Samarra, whenever people in the streets and bazaars learned that we were a group of Iranian journalists, they welcomed us warmly and, out of sight of Iraqi agents, voiced their dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions and Saddam’s performance… During this mission, most of the news and developments regarding the war, the Iraqi army’s defeat in Kuwait, and the mass uprising of the Intifada were obtained from popular sources.

While traveling to Najaf al-Ashraf via Babil Province, through a section of the Baghdad–Basra highway, we encountered long queues of trucks loaded with military equipment and the belongings of Iraqi soldiers who had fled the Kuwaiti battlefield, halted along both sides of the road like the remains of a defeated army…

On one occasion, incognito and without coordinating with officials of Iraq’s Ministry of Information, I decided to take a taxi from Baghdad to Karbala. Three army officers also boarded the taxi… Along the way, the officers hurled repeated insults at Saddam. One of them said to his companions: ‘What kind of madness is this bastard guilty of?’—referring to the occupation of Kuwait—‘Was eight years of war with Iran not enough that he now had to invade Kuwait?’ Another officer remarked: ‘This war will be the end of Saddam; he will not remain in power for more than a few days.’

The taxi driver asked the officers who they thought would come to power. One replied that it was possible the monarchy might be restored and that Sa‘d, the son of former prime minister Salih Jabr, might assume office. The second officer rejected this view and said, ‘I don’t think so. Reports from southern Iraq indicate that most people and tribes support Sayyid Baqir al-Hakim. In the south and north of Iraq alike, the uprising masses are carrying portraits of Sayyid Hakim and chanting Islamic slogans.’

These statements—uttered by military non-commissioned officers—demonstrate that Martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, despite being far from his homeland, was a widely recognized figure across diverse segments of Iraqi society and enjoyed extensive popular support. And indeed, this proved to be the case. When the Americans heard the slogans and demands of the uprising Iraqi peaple, fearing that control over Iraq’s future might slip from their grasp or that an Islamic Republic might be established there and align with Iran, they permitted Saddam to suppress the nationwide popular uprising with extreme force. Following this American green light, Iraq’s Republican Guard brutally crushed the people using heavy weaponry and helicopters…

During this journey, some Arab journalists asked their Iranian counterparts why Iran did not side against the United States in the war with Iraq or enter into conflict with America, and why Iran supported Ayatollah Hakim at such a time, when Iraq was under American military assault. In response, I explained that the Iraqi regime had been deceived by the United States into occupying Kuwait; the invasion was a trap into which Saddam’s regime had been lured. Less than a week after Kuwait’s liberation, Saddam’s regime raised the white flag before America. All of Iraq’s water and power facilities, communications infrastructure, telecommunications buildings, bridges, and military barracks were destroyed during the American assault. Iraqi officials in Baghdad, seeking to contact their military commanders negotiating with American commanders at the Safwan border near Kuwait, were forced to come at night to the al-Rashid Hotel—where foreign journalists were stationed—and use the satellite phone line of the Palestinian news agency (WAFA) to learn the outcomes of the negotiations. To understand what was transpiring and what issues were under discussion, I tried to remain in proximity to Iraqi officials, one of whom was a former permanent representative of Iraq to the United Nations. From my synthesis of the telephone conversations between Iraqi officials and commanders stationed in Safwan, it became unequivocally clear to me that the Americans had given the Ba‘ath Party regime the green light to crush the Iraqi people’s mass uprising with full force—and so it happened…

In those days, wherever we went, the name and memory of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim cast its shadow. Only days after the uprising began, officials of Iraq’s Ministry of Information asked foreign journalists to leave the country as soon as possible. When we inquired about the reason, one of the guides told me, ‘The situation is extremely unstable, and the Iraqi government cannot guarantee your safety.’ I decided to return to Iran immediately. On the return journey, as we approached the city of Khanaqin, several tanks were stationed at the beginning of the main entrance street and around the military governorate building. A helicopter was also patrolling the city’s skies. The situation was abnormal. I asked a security officer what had happened and what was going on in the city. He replied harshly: ‘What hasn’t happened? Wait a few minutes, and I’ll show you.’ Upon entering Khanaqin, the city resembled a ghost town. Not a single living soul was moving; only the bodies of people who had risen against the Ba‘ath regime the day before covered the streets and squares. The sheer number of corpses was such that they were being collected with garbage trucks, with the victims’ arms and legs hanging from the backs of the vehicles. The security officer who showed us these harrowing scenes identified Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as the one responsible for the Iraqi people’s mass uprising against the regime and government.”^[1]