At the session “Oral History of Crisis” it was discussed:

The Strong Role of Government in Shaping Narratives after a Crisis

Report on the Session Oral History of Crisis – Part 2

Maryam Asadi Jafari
Translated by: Fazel Shirzad

2025-9-16

Note: According to the Oral History Website, the session titled “Oral History of Crisis” was held on Tuesday, August 19, 2025, organized by the Library, Museum, and Document Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The event featured speeches by Hojjatoleslam Saeed Fakhrzadeh, Secretary of the Association of Documentary and Historical Research Centers of Iran, Dr. Mohsen Kazemi, author and researcher, and Dr. Ali Tattari, who served as the session’s moderator. The first part of the report was published last week. Below is a summary of the second part of the session.

Saeed Fakhrzadeh, referring to the efforts in documenting memories during the Iran-Iraq War, said: During the war, when we were recording events, people used to tell us, ‘We don’t trust you enough to speak with you,’ and they were right. At that time, the documentation process was not part of a secure system. Later, a group of narrators was formed, all of whom were carefully selected. They were present even in the most confidential meetings, recording conversations and immediately interviewing commanders after military operations. These interviews have now become one of our richest sources for analyzing the Sacred Defense.”

He continued: In our society, people tend to wait until a book is as reliable as the Qur’an before publishing it. However, in other countries, as soon as they come across data, they publish it—even if it’s wrong! Later, as research progresses, they correct the mistakes in new editions. From my perspective, in oral history, even incorrect data is still valuable data because it reflects a certain truth. Some parts of wartime information are factual and historical, while other parts are shaped by people’s misinterpretations of the war.”

Fakhrzadeh recounted an experience: “I interviewed someone during the war who believed the army had committed treason. I had no way of verifying this, so I just documented his words.

He told me: ‘We were in an area when suddenly the enemy deployed armored units. We were vulnerable because we lacked equipment. We requested reinforcements repeatedly, but they kept saying help was on the way. Meanwhile, under heavy tank fire, our bunkers were being destroyed one by one. Then we were informed that just five kilometers behind us, the army had tanks that weren’t engaging the enemy at all. I went to them and pleaded, “Brother! The enemy tanks are destroying us. Come help us fight them.” They replied, “Our orders are to stay right here.” I said, “Don’t you think this is a strategy to weaken us? This feels like treason!”

The commander responded, “I don’t know what you’re talking about. My orders are to remain here. If I move my unit and we suffer losses, I’ll be held accountable for disobeying orders—and if anyone is killed, I could even be executed.” I finally forced them at gunpoint to bring the tanks forward.’”

After the war, Martyr Ali Sayad Shirazi, as a commander, shared a completely different perspective on the same incident: We were in a region where the enemy deployed its forces. We only had five tanks, while the enemy had forty. We knew that if we engaged in a direct confrontation, we’d lose immediately. If the enemy advanced, we had no backup forces to replace our losses. If they got behind us, the entire operation would fail. So, we decided to bluff—we moved the tanks around to make the enemy think we had significant armored forces in the area, discouraging them from advancing.”

Fakhrzadeh concluded: The frontline soldiers were never told about the bluff strategy to avoid compromising operational security. Both accounts are historically valuable. Even mistaken perceptions are still part of history because they reflect human thought and experience. History is about people and their interpretations of events, whether accurate or not.”

Dr. Ali Tattari summarized the discussion: Some points highlight the urgent need for oral history during crises in a documented and scientific way. For example, if a commander refuses to give an interview, we should not neglect civil society, trade groups, or ordinary citizens—even if the interviews seem superficial. During a crisis, the body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice of interviewees are authentic and unique to that moment. Other historical sources like documents, photographs, and videos exist, but over time, narratives tend to diverge. Capturing interviews during the crisis ensures the data is organic and unfiltered.”

He also raised a key question: How significant is the role of governments in shaping narratives after a crisis? Perhaps it’s better to conduct oral history during the crisis, when there is less state oversight.”

Dr. Mohsen Kazemi offered a different perspective: I don’t focus on whether the data is accurate or inaccurate. Data should be classified—researchers should collect as much public information as possible. Personally, I don’t believe true oral history can be done during a crisis. Tell me of a single example worldwide where deep oral history was collected during a crisis! It’s impossible because sensitive information is classified.”

He elaborated: Oral history is either official or unofficial. Unofficial oral history deals with the deepest layers of reality, often beyond what the state allows. In classical history, first-hand sources were vital, but today, composite sources are more important—those that emerge from a process of reflection and analysis.”

Kazemi emphasized the changing role of individuals in history-making: In the past, only a few scribes documented events, and media access was limited. Today, every person with a smartphone is a potential historian, constantly recording what they see and hear.”

He added: No historical account ever captures everything that happened. Complete objectivity is impossible. Oral history helps uncover the deep data behind events—the underlying causes and philosophies of crises.

Even now, the most sensitive information about the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War remains unpublished.” As an example, he noted: No U.S. president publishes their memoirs while still in office. Even after leaving office, they don’t reveal everything. This proves that deep oral history cannot be fully accessed during a crisis.”

Kazemi concluded by highlighting the need to balance official and unofficial narratives, stressing that even imperfect documentation is better than none: The extensive oral history institutions we have today play a vital role. Without them, we would have far less knowledge about the war.

In the future, these records will help shape our collective understanding.” In closing, Dr. Ali Tattari expressed hope that this series of sessions would continue, fostering more dialogue about the challenges and possibilities of oral history during crises.

End of Part Two.

Report on the Session Oral History of Crisis – Part One