Memory of Mehrdad Orang About Operation Mersad
Adjusted by Fariba Almasi
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi
2024-8-2
Operation Mersad started on July 25, 1988 named Operation Forough-e Javidan; it means beginning of the movement of hypocrites (Monafeghin) and crossing the border of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I remind that I had gone to Arak IRGC to do something on this date. Mr. Noormohammadi was the chief of staff of the Markazi district. He saw me in IRGC building’s yard and said, “Brother Orang, the 71st Ruhollah Division has requested reinforcements and we are going to send Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion to the area. Do you take the responsibility for Imam Hussain Battalion?” Dear brother Hajj Ismail Naderi, who was the commander of Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion, achieved the rank of disabled veteran in the 4th and 5th Karbala operations and lost both his legs. After him, dear brother Mohsen Bayati took the responsibility for this battalion for about five or six months at the same time as Operation Valfajr-10, and after that he resigned. The staff of the Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion remained, but practically it did not have a commander and there was no one as deputy. Since I was aware of the beginning of the operation and I wanted to return to the operational areas, I agreed to serve my friends in Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion. Within less than 24 hours, because I already knew the guys and had their list, I called everyone. The next day (July 25) we left for Kermanshah and the western front of the country with 2 buses from Arak IRGC. We did not have Basij forces and we only prepared the officers to move in this short time.
We had taken the address of 71st Ruhollah Division. 71st Ruhollah Division was on Mahmudabad-Paveh Crossroads. Some troops were stationed in Owais al-Qarani. The command headquarters of Divison 71 was also in Mahidasht Headquarters.
When we left Kermanshah to move towards the region, we encountered a heavy traffic jam because the hypocrites had invaded and occupied some of those areas. The hypocrites had clashed with the remaining forces in the area and a number of army forces and some ordinary people who had resisted had been died a martyr. Because of this special fear and terror that prevailed in the region, the hypocrites only advanced from the main road and tried to smash any resistance they encountered on their way. In fact, they had a mission to enter from Qasreshirin and go to Tehran from Hamadan Road in order to capture the capital and overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Due to the terror that prevailed in the area, most of the people were in cars and trying to evacuate the area from every side. There was maybe about 30 kilometers of traffic. The cars that were moving towards Kermanshah and were mostly military were very few compared to the cars that were going to leave the region, to the extent that it can be said that no car was going to Kermanshah at all and all the people were trying to evacuate the region.
We reached the division headquarters around 8:00 PM and announced our presence.
Voluntarily and Basij members had brought themselves to the headquarters of 71st Ruhollah Division to combat the hypocrites. Therefore, the next morning, a significant number of volunteers were introduced to the battalion.
Brother Abbas Hemmati was the successor. I told him to organize Basij forces so that I can go for brother Salimabadi and declare my readiness to carry out the mission.
I arrived in headquarters of Division 71 at approximately 9:00 AM and asked for the brother Salimabadi. I went for him and saw a person standing inside the room wearing hypocrite clothes without shoes. I thought he was of the hypocrite forces who had been captured and the brother Salimabadi himself was going to gather information about him. I greeted Salimabadi and sat down, but I did not greet that fellow because I thought he was one of the hypocrites. Sardar (IRGC General) Salimabadi asked, “What is the situation of the hypocrites now?” He also explained the situation of hypocritical forces in the region. The brother Salimabadi told him, “You go and rest.” “Who was that?” I asked as he left the room. He said, “Hamid Shakeri; he is operations officer in our division.” I said, “I thought he was a hypocrite.” The brother Salimabadi said, “No, the guy has not slept for 48 hours. He was constantly present in the area and reported to us the enemy's activities and movements.” After these talks, I told Sardar Salimabadi, “Imam Hossein Battalion arrived in the area and stationed at the location of the division. The brother Hemmati is also busy with organizing the Basij forces.” He said, “You still stay in the region so that we know about the general situation of the region. Whenever needed, we will deploy Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion. For now, send a message to brother Hemmati via telecommunication to stay in the battalion and organize the forces. Tonight, we are going to make battalion of Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) ready for heliborne. You should be here so that if there is a need to make Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion ready for heliborne too, you will be informed.” That night, Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) Battalion was attacked by a heliborne operation at Islamabad Crossroads. Our troops had conflicted with the hypocrites and had caused serious injuries to them. That night, there was no need for Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion because the battalions that engaged with the enemy had a successful performance. It should be noted that the offer of a heliborne in the region was made by Martyr Sayyad Shirazi because IRGC’s commands did not have a helicopter to carry out such an operation.
For about 3 days, the guys of Imam Hossein Battalion were stationed in Mahmudabad-Paveh region. Of course, there were other battalions including Karbala Battalion, which was commanded by brother Alireza Davoodabadi and his successor, Akbar Seyyedi, Ruhollah Battalion, etc. I think about 15 or 16 battalions were stationed there and were ready for this operation, some of them such as Qamar Bani Hashem (AS) Battalion and battalion of Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) went into action.
On the third day, brother Salimabadi said to be ready to move. We were supposed to move towards Kerend from a side road and settle in the town of Allah Akbar (which were actually government-leased houses of the army (AJA) forces). It was evening when we left by car from a side road (if I'm not mistaken, it was Karzan Road) and after a long distance (about 12 hours) we arrived at Bivanij Barracks, which belonged to the army (AJA), at 8 o'clock the next morning. Later, it was renamed to Imam Khomeini Barracks later. This barracks was located on the north side of Kerend [-e Gharb] city and the sound of gunfire could be heard from there. It was clear that a number of our forces were in conflict with the forces of the hypocrites. This barracks was located in the hills. Apparently, the hypocrites had fled to the heights and the clashes continued there. There, I told brother Salimabadi by portable transceiver that if needed we should also go to the conflict site, but he refused and said, “the conflict is almost finished over there, you go and settle in the town of Allah Akbar.” We also went to the town of Allah Akbar and settled in a school.
We were precaution troops of Ruhollah Division 71, and our change of location was due to the fact that brother Salimabadi had entrusted security of a part of the Qasreshirin Road to Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion. There, the forces of the hypocrites had entered the town and looted people's property in some cases. Anyway, Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion did not directly conflict with the hypocrites and was only active in the region.
After the successful Operation Mersad, the mission of 71st Ruhollah Division ended in the region, and considering that I had been sent to the region with this battalion, we settled accounts with the battalion staff of the division 71 and returned to Arak. Of course, some of the troops stayed and later formed Seyyed al-Shohada Battalion. It was the first time that a Basiji battalion was formed in Ruhollah Division 71. For a while, the commander of this battalion was brother Gholamreza Sharifi, after that brother Ali Akbar Najafi, and after a month this battalion was disbanded.
With the acceptance of Resolution 598 by Imam (R.A.) and the completion of Operation Mersad, the imposed war ended. Although I didn’t the chance to fight with the hypocrites in Operation Mersad in Imam Hussain (AS) Battalion, but on March 31, 1991, by the grace of God, I had the chance of participating in an overseas operation, Operation Jabal-e Morvarid, as the commander of Imam Reza (AS) Battalion together with 2 battalions of Ruhollah Division 71 against the hypocrites, but since the date of that operation is outside the time frame of the holy defense, I will not go into its details.
Source: Salehi, Alireza, & Moradi, Fatemeh (2022), One of Those 33 People, Arak: Yohanna, p. 293.
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Destiny Had It So
Memoirs of Seyyed Nouraddin AfiIt was early October 1982, just two or three days before the commencement of the operation. A few of the lads, including Karim and Mahmoud Sattari—the two brothers—as well as my own brother Seyyed Sadegh, came over and said, "Come on, let's head towards the water." It was the first days of autumn, and the air was beginning to cool, but I didn’t decline their invitation and set off with them.