A Rule to Regulate the Relationship between the Islamic Revolution and Al Fateh
Compiled by: Islamic Revolution Website
Translated by: Fazel Shirzad
2023-8-24
At the end of September 1978, the head of the Iraqi Security Organization and a minister came to the Imam [Khomeini] and asked him to refrain from expressing political opinions and sending messages and declarations and any political activities. And he threatened that otherwise he would not tolerate their presence in Iraq. Imam said that he committed to political activity and would emigrate from Iraq. He also sent their passports to the Najaf Security Organization to get an exit visa. The Baathists refused to give exit visas and after a while he restricted the movement of people to serve them. The Imam was practically surrounded. He informed me about this situation. I sent an answer to a passenger. I had identified Syria as the best place for them to stay. I listed the problems and dangers for them in Lebanon and said that if he want to come to Lebanon, the best place is Baalbek. The large Shiite area connected to Syria, which is safe from both the crusaders and the interventions of the Palestinian organizations.
He sent my reply letter from Paris. He arrived in Paris on Friday, October 6, 1978.
Because the situation in Paris went according to wishes, there was no need to move. Almighty God gave the best and most suitable place to that pure servant to guide the affairs of the revolution from there and bring Islam and Muslims to a great victory.
Al-Fatah, who until now paid attention to all the groups opposed to the Shah's regime and helped each of them according to their situation and politics, found a special favor towards me. Arafat and then Abu Jihad invited me to have a meeting with them. Hojjat al-Islam Seyyedhani Fass played an active role in this field. Through a detailed letter to the Imam, Abu Jihad provided the facilities of Al-Fath to him to use for advancing the Islamic Revolution of Iran. He wrote the letter on Sunday, August 10, 1978, which coincides with Taswa 1399 and December 10, 1978, that is, a little more than a month after the Imam's arrival in Paris. And he entrusted Hojjat al-Islam to Seyyedhani to be presented to the imam with me.
On Friday, December 15, we went to Paris and presented the letter. Then, it seemed to me that the imam does not have a clear idea of how to use these facilities and I should give an explanation. I had to reach them alone again and said: "Using these facilities does not mean entering the stage of armed struggle; rather, training, preparation and organization will take months. It is better to start using it and prepare for the day of danger. In addition, Fatah helps any group, even communist groups! This will create problems for us in the future. It is good for your Highness to mention this point in your answer to stop doing such work and not to do any work and interference in the affairs of the Islamic Revolution of Iran except with the discretion of His Highness's representative." I named a few people for this task, and I said: "It is good to appoint a board or a council for this task." He said: "I don't have anyone for this except you." I did not say more about how to answer Al-Fath. Since he did not comment in detail, I refrained from commenting on the details of the matter. The next day, I saw that he had written a detailed letter to Al-Fath. He has also issued a separate order for the administration of this matter on behalf of the servant, so that anyone who sees that order may guess its meaning; but it can't exactly get rid of it, and it can't use it as proof of armed struggle or its preparation. I was amazed by their tact and accuracy.
This rule is the second rule of the government in relation to the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The first one was on 31th October 1978 and it was about forming a five-member committee headed by Bazargan Engineer to manage the oil industry. This one was on the 24th of December 1978, that is, 25 days after that, and it was to regulate the relationship between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and Al-Fath and the Palestinian Revolution, and to prepare and manage the upcoming armed struggle.[1]
[1] Farsi, Jalaluddin, Dark Corners, Tehran, Hadith Printing and Publication Institute, 1373, pp. 413-418.
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As Operation Fath-ol-Mobin came to an end, the commanders gathered at the “Montazeran-e Shahadat” Base, thrilled by a huge and, to some extent, astonishing victory achieved in such a short time. They were already bracing themselves for the next battle. It is no exaggeration to say that this operation solidified an unprecedented friendship between the Army and IRGC commanders.
