32nd issue of Historical Studies Quarterly


32nd issue of Historical Studies Quarterly has been published. This issue includes 7 articles and the contents of a journal belonging to 1970 which is about the role of clergies in the events of June 1963. In the following lines you can read the abstract of each article:

Violation of Persian Neutrality in WWI and Occupation of Bushehr by British Forces, 8th of August 1915
Abdulkarim Mashayekhi (PhD)

When WWI started and Ottoman Empire joined the Triple Alliance, the British in Persian Gulf involved in a dangerous situation. The operations in Mesopotamia were led from Bushehr and the British were in deep need of control over Bushehr and its affairs. On November 1st Persia declared her neutrality but was violated by repeated British military interventions in Bushehr affairs. The British were well aware that control over Bushehr was equal to control over the whole Persian Gulf region. Consequently the first violation of Persian neutrality happened in Bushehr. The British tried to control Bushehr peninsula by an attempt against Hadj Ali Tangaki, a headman in Bushehr suburbs.
With this situation the British found Bushehr a dangerous site. Ignoring Bushehr meant endangering the British political and economic interests. The general situation in Fars and Persian government position were disappointing to the British. So, they occupied Bushehr in 8th August 1915.

Wahhabi Discourse and Modern Iranian Intellectuality
Seyyed Mahdi Nazemi Qarabaq

The emergence of Wahhabism is an outcome of some historical development and still remaining unchanged teachings. Historically speaking, Wahhabism has had a simple-minded look at wisdom and by standing still at apparent meanings of Quran Verses and the Hadith and insisting on its own interpretation, has condemned the opponents and invited others to accept apparent interpretations by inciting their sentiments. Wahhabi apparent interpretation is not only about the holy texts but also the cosmos. They minimize any kind of relation between human being and the unseen world particularly if Welayat (leadership of Imams) is concerned. The main reason of Wahhabism animosity with Shi'ism, Sufism and philosophy is rooted here.
Expansion of Wahhabism from a sect in Hanbali School into a surface-oriented ultra-jurisprudence discourse in three branches of Traditionalists, Jihadists and moderates has made it more successful. In Iran many Wahhabi successes are outcomes of modernization. History of Iranian Modernity by intellectuals' leadership is full of surface –oriented slogans about wisdom and ignoring the unseen world in order to combat with superstitions. This similarity is promoted among the religious intellectuals and also religious modernists and thus a good fortune becomes available for the Wahhabis to promote their own ideas. Principal similarities between Iranian intellectuals and Wahhabis can possibly provide the necessary basis for the expansion of Wahhabi Discourse and surface-oriented religious ideas in Iran even in districts without any background for Wahhabism.

Book Review: Our Man in Tehran
Adeleh Hajimirzai

ROBERT WRIGHT, Ph.D., is a professor of history at Trent University, specializing in foreign policy. He is the author of the national bestseller Three Nights in Havana, which won the 2008 Canadian Authors' Association's Lela Common Award for Canadian History and is currently being made into a feature documentary. He resides in Toronto with his wife and children. He is the author of five books. He received Lela Common Prize of the Canadian History for his national bestseller, "Three Nights in Havana". He published this book following Harper Collins’s suggestion for a book on the 30th anniversary on the Hostage Crisis in Iran and Ken Taylor’s memories of his work in Tehran as the Canadian ambassador of the time (1978-1980) and his role in this period. Our Man in Tehran: Ken Taylor, the CIA and the Iran Hostage Crisis published in 2010. In response to the news about the book release on the online version of the Globe and Mail daily, Taylor said: “I never expected the story to come out. It had been under wraps for 30 years, and my assumption was that it would be for another 30 years. I didn't expect to be here to talk about it”.  The book narrates two and half years of the activities of Taylor in Iran.  He came to Iran in September 1977, when Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was at his most powerful times, however when he left this country in January 1980; it was the first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution which coincided with the Shah’s exile and fifty- two Americans were in forth month of their captivity. After the Islamic Revolution, Taylor became responsible for the departure of Canadian citizens and also preserving Israeli interests in Iran (Feb 1979). Washington trusted him and he had good relations with William Sullivan, US Ambassador, and Bruce Laingen, US chargé d'affaires and highest official at the time of Hostage Crisis.

Baha'ism and Politics; Conflicting Slogans and Attempts
Seyyed Mehdi Nazemi Qarabaq

Baha'i leaders have always stressed on the separation of politics and religion and then insisted that there is no connection between Baha'ism and Baha'is and world politics.
History shows Baha'i leaders have issued this sanction only for Iranian Ulema in order to impede their presence in politics and have never included themselves in it; since they have been actively present in political scenes and activities. Being coordinated with foreign powers, just like a political party, is another historical evidence for the political activities of Babi-Baha'i sects.
Baha'i followers apparently are advised not to enter obvious political affairs, but be active in administrative, business, industrial, agricultural and academic affairs instead. The emergence of people like Hozhabr Yazdani, Habib Sabet, Abd-ul-karim Ayadi, Ein-ul-molk Hoveyda, Dr. Zabihullah Qorban, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Nabil-ud-doleh, Fereydoon Hoveyda, Farrokhroo Parsaa and … are few evidences in this regard.

The Broken Eagle Claws in Desert, "An analysis of US Military Failure in Tabas Desert"
Moslem Tahoori

When the Us Embassy was seized in November 4th, 1979 by Iranian students Jimmy Carter was engaged in a 444 days crisis. Then, Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National Security Adviser were the most effective ones in White House to solve Hostage Crisis. Vance was seeking diplomatic methods and Brzezinski knew the military attempt against the Islamic Republic the only solution. When Vance could not succeed, the US government followed Brzezinski's idea and on April 24th, 1980 ordered Operation Eagle Claw in Iranian soil, Tabas Desert. This operation failed heavily in early stages. Vance who was opposed to military action resigned and Carter was defeated in US presidency elections by Republican Ronald Reagan.
This paper is about to answer some questions by analyzing this period; questions such as: How US airplanes and helicopters could enter Iranian soil without any warnings? Why few days before the US operation, General Baqeri had ordered to dismantle radars and antiaircraft in eastern air force sites? And why Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force Phantoms bombarded the landed US helicopters in Tabas and burned some documents in them and also martyred Mohammad Montazer Qa'em, Yazd Revolutionary Corps commander?

The Role of Ulema in shaping Persian Constitutional Revolution
Mozzafar Shahedi

Certain sources show that Persian Constitutional Movement was shaped, organized and led by Shi'a clergy. It was their old and deep rooted charisma that mobilized people and led them to reach victory. Westoxicated intellectuals and political activists had not a notable influence on people.
Those days reformists hoped that Ulema would take strong steps in order to remove dictatorship and the foreign influence and bring changes into awful social and political situation of the Persia. Two things were obvious: First, only Ulema could mobilize people and second they were aware of new developments in the world. Western powers were also aware of these capabilities.
Documents show at the brink of constitutional movement the clergy were concerned about the necessity for changes in different aspects of the country's affairs and also cutting the hands of foreign powers. Even intellectuals had scheduled their programs coordinated with the clergy's. They even had announced the political and legal changes should be aligned with Islamic resources. At the brink of Constitutional Revolution some believed: "Most of whatever that others have, are extracted from Islamic laws (i.e. they have stolen from us what they are selling us); so something should be done to execute Islamic law among us." In this regard, there is no one except the Ulema who can lead this movement.

No Comment Documents
15th of  Khordad 1342 S.H (June 5th, 1963) and the Clergy

A document written by Iranian students in the US and Canada for the 7th anniversary of 15th of Khordad 1342 S.H uprising that can present the political conditions of that time in 1970.



 
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Memoirs of Commander Mohammad Jafar Asadi about Ayatollah Madani

As I previously mentioned, alongside Mehdi, as a revolutionary young man, there was also a cleric in Nurabad, a Sayyid, whose identity we had to approach with caution, following the group’s security protocols, to ascertain who he truly was. We assigned Hajj Mousa Rezazadeh, a local shopkeeper in Nurabad, who had already cooperated with us, ...
Excerpt from the Book of Oral History of the Army and the Islamic Revolution

Two Narratives on the Events of September 8, 1978

"On September 8, most of the military personnel feigned illness and did not participate in enforcing martial law. I know of a battalion commander who had come from Maragheh to Tehran, only to head to Shahr-e Rey to his sister's house. When his sister asked him why he had come to Tehran, he replied, 'I am a battalion commander enforcing martial law.'

How the Tabriz Army Barracks Were Seized

The major explained the plan like this: "When you first enter, tell him to hand over the weapons. Once he puts the guns on the table, grab them and give them to me, since I’m the military man here. Then, tell him to hand over his pistol as well. He might comply, or he might refuse, possibly even shooting one of you. In that case, I’ll fire back with my Uzi.

Imam Khomeini

Every time there was a message from Imam Khomeini, the people who followed their broadcasting, quickly found people like me to write the message on the screen or placard for them. On the same day when this order of the Imam arrived from Paris, one of the same comrades hurriedly came to the shop in the evening and said that a message from the Imam had just reached us.