A Critique on Oral history of War Commanders

“Answering Historical Questions and Ambiguities Instead of Individual-Organizational Identification”

Mohammad Doroudian
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi

2024-1-22

“Oral history of Commanders” is reviewed with the assumption that in the field of war historiography, applying this method is narrated in an advancing “new” way, with the aim of war historiography, emphasizing role of commanders in creation of its situations and details. At the same time, the oral history of commanders still does not mean producing historical data for documentary historiography and completing its historiography process. As in the written works, oral history data of commanders has not been applied and paid much attention.

According to the mentioned explanations, this question raises that how valid is oral history as a new type of historiography? The answer to this question will clarify that the oral history of commanders, to understand the events and issues of the Iran-Iraq war, to what extent is authoritative, and what role and influence can it have in historiography of the war? There is no reliable and agreed indicator of historical facts in order to validate the oral history of war commanders and officials. This means that no part of the war history has been explained by the commanders and research authorities so that it can be used to validate other works, including the oral history of commanders. However, if there were such works, the oral history of commanders would lose its relevance by emphasizing what has been explained. Because if the realities and historical facts of the war have been clarified, to clarify which historical facts the oral history of commanders will be relevant and necessary?

Given the introduction, the main issue of this essay is to answer this question: To what extent is the oral history of commanders and officials about events of the Iran-Iraq war effective in clarifying the ambiguities and questions in Iranian society, as the goal of war historiography? The mentioned question is based on the assumption that the historiography of the Iran-Iraq war should be explained by answering the questions. In fact, the ability to answer the historical uncertainties and questions in Iranian society means determining the criteria for evaluating and measuring role and position of the oral history of commanders and even other works in the field of war historiography. For example, when Operation Karbala-4 has been questioned due to that the operation was exposed and martyrdom of the troops, and in this way formed the mental and historical belief about this operation, the oral history of commanders even if explain details of the events and performance of commanders and commands, without answering the existing questions and ambiguities, cannot have a role and influence in correcting historical mindsets in this field and war historiography.

Having studied an important part of the oral history of commanders and officials of the Iran-Iraq war, I have come to the conclusion that the oral history of commanders in narrating the war is based on “identification with individual and organizational roles”, and for this reason, it causes “military institutionalism”, I have written about it before. Based on the mentioned explanations, the oral history of commanders, due to its origin and purpose, has not yet been mixed with written historiography, and it is mostly mentioned and cited in political-historical controversies rather than clarifying historical facts. The main problem of the oral history of commanders is that the “narrators” tell oral history of events and details mostly from the perspective of their role and observations on specific issues. For this reason, the oral history of commanders has been mixed with their thinking and performance in the war and has been given the characteristic of creating identity to the individual and organizational role of commanders in the war. In addition, “questioners” also ask questions from an “event-oriented” perspective, and less attention is given to clarification of ambiguities and questions; in other words, in oral history of the war, the existing questions and ambiguities are not the starting point of the questioner and the answerer. For this reason, on the one hand, relatively diverse and voluminous works are produced, which are less welcomed; on the other hand, the questions and ambiguities that must be answered by commanders and officials remain in the society, and it creates and consolidates another history of facts in the new generation’s mind. Continuing such a situation decreases contacts and extent of using the oral history of commanders.

In order to overcome the contradiction in the oral history of commanders as a new type of historiography, I think we should change “approach and method” in choosing the subject and asking questions. This means that the commanders in narrating the war, as during the war who were committed to response the issues and prioritized it over everything else, now also preserve the national heritage of Iranian society with a clear and honest narration of facts of the war. Otherwise, as the existing duality continues, nature of the oral history of war commanders will be challenged.