Oral History Interview with Mohsen Rezaie – Part 4

Translator: Asghar Aboutorabi

The political and military dialogue about the prolongation of war and the course of its conclusion has been the basis of a debate between Hashemi, as the supreme commander of the war, and Rezaei, as the commander of IRGC. What is discussed in this part is the consistency of defensive war and liberalizing, in comparison to chasing and prolonged war in the enemy’s territory, considering the nature of Iranian military power and its function.

Mohammad Doroodian: Apart from these discussions, the type and quality of our power did not suffice these goals and objectives. Its practical results can be considered as its reason. But you pose reasons for these practical results.

Mohsen Rezaie: I was hopeful until Karbala 5 operation but after that, I resigned. I was disappointed to do anything for the situation arisen a year before war termination. Despair overcame me and I deemed it useless to struggle. I felt a way might be found, if I resigned. Although before that, I believed great measures could be taken.

Gholamali Rashid: You and I went to Tehran after Faw operation. You told me that you had written a letter to Imam and had reminded him that if war is going to be continued, our facilities and military power including troops, equipment and military organization should be tripled. You had predicted that Iraq would attack us and if we were going to prevent him, we should have two or three fold of Faw forces. We went to Hashemi’s house in Tehran too. High council of defense meeting was held there. It was Ramzan [month of Muslims fasting] and Ayatollah Khamenei was present there too.

There you told you are going to meet Imam. You told Ayatollah Khamenei you have decided to put forth this idea and also your resignation. Smiling, he told you that you were better to go and try. He meant that you can go, but your resignation will not be accepted.

After Faw operation you talked about this all the way to Tehran and you told that it was your prediction.

Mohsen Rezaie: I believe great measures could be taken until some specific point.

Mohammad Doroodian: Considering your evaluation and conclusion, there was no way for you to cooperate with army. There are many ifs and buts up to Fav operation too.

Mohsen Rezaie: Yes, but it could be solved. There was a time that the country did not enjoy the proper ability; on the other hand there was a time that the country officials believed this should not be done.

Mohammad Doroodian: You shall have some hypothesis in mind about the capacities of the country if you are going to pose a theory. After a revolution with its special characteristics, what kind of war a country and a society can be engaged in. In all theories that you may pose, you can answer like this, such a country or society can engage in liberalizing and defensive war, but not progressive and chasing war in enemy’s territory for realizing country’s goals.

Gholamali Rashid: That is, he believes with this method of annexation in Iraq, it is not possible to go to Jerusalem. Was it possible to advance this goal through such a method, if we suppose we had gone? Did we advance to Jerusalem by the same forces and divisions of Basij present in war?

Mohsen Rezaie: No, if we consider what happened. But if we could change the situations, yes.

Mohammad Doroodian: “If” is important in analyzing and studying the happenings, but you take this into account and represent the theory. I think you are the only one who can pose this theory. You have solved a part of this puzzle, and have left the other part unsolved. The part that is solved is the defensive war in which Imam invested. You expelled the enemy through invading war. You were its founder, using thought and human and organizational forces.

Mohsen Rezaie: We could be victorious in Kheybar operation.

Mohammad Doroodian: I think we could not, since if we could, we had done.

Mohsen Rezaie: No. we had wrong considerations.

Mohammad Doroodian: They were also a part of our perceptions and ability and this “if”, even If they were wrong. It shows that it was not possible, if it has not happened.

Mohsen Rezaie: You are right, considering that situation, no more could be done.

Gholamali Rashid: Two years later, I found out that no more could be done.

Mohammad Doroodian: So we should not count on “if” in theorizing. But when in the course of actions we should act upon these “ifs”.

Gholamali Rashid: Hashemi believed the country had the capacity for this work to be carried out, but they couldn’t do that.

Mohammad Doroodian: Mr. Rezaie was the commander of IRGC, not its president or leader. This is a part of reality too.

Gholamali Rashid: We are not army commanders who would tell just if you give us facilities we would fight.

Mohammad Doroodian: The number of ifs is growing.

Mohsen Rezaie: I think those political goals you claim we have not reached to, have been reached. But they were not collapse of Saddam.

Mohammad Doroodian: How we concluded the war? Do you mean we reached our goals and ended the war?

Mohsen Rezaie: Until 598 Resolution the war was half ended.

Mohammad Doroodian: No, we ended the war when Khoramshahr was endangered. We did not negotiate then to reach our goals and then conclude the war.

Mohsen Rezaie: This is an important point too. If we consider the acceptance of 598 Resolution as the end of war, it bears a certain meaning. If we suppose the acceptance of 598 Resolution was from our side, it bears a certain meaning too. And if it was accepted by Saddam it takes another meaning, considering the events which happened between these two acceptances.

Mohammad Doroodian: I believe this is not a logical discussion. The meaning of war termination is our acceptance of 598 Resolution, once we accepted the 598 resolution, we are the one who matters here, not Saddam.

Mohsen Rezaie: 598 Resolution had lost its advantages politically. It had no more political benefit.

Mohammad Doroodian: When it had no benefit?

Mohsen Rezaie: When we accepted it.

Mohammad Doroodian: So why did we accept it?

Mohsen Rezaie: We accepted it with delay.

Mohammad Doroodian: So we accepted something that had no advantage?

Mohsen Rezaie: What made it advantageous were the subsequent events. The succeeding events that pushed back Saddam…

Mohammad Doroodian: If 598 Resolution was disadvantageous, the subsequent events would not happen. Originally, the succeeding events you referred to were the result of 598 Resolution acceptance. An essential question is posed here, why Imam insisted on 598 Resolution and emphasized on a useless matter? This reasoning questions Imam.

Gholamali Rashid: Imam intended to give them no excuse.

Mohammad Doroodian: You mean he insisted on a disadvantageous matter to give them no excuse? Why did he call such a disadvantageous action, as you call it, “drinking the cup of poison”?

Mohsen Rezaie: Yes it was disadvantageous, but nobody asked him, “Why did you not accept it when it should! And now that there is the possibility of entering of Saddam into Iranian soil, you accept it”. Saddam intended to gain more than what he gained through 598 Resolution when he entered Iran, but he could not write the 599 Resolution.

Mohammad Doroodian: No he could not, because some other events happened. These two are inseparable. When we accepted the 598 Resolution, these developments took place.

Mohsen Rezaie: When he could not impose 599 Resolution, we had no choice but accepting 598 resolution. Hence, 598 Resolution was revived and advantageous. Because Saddam was feared.

Mohammad Doroodian: You mean you accepted a disadvantageous matter and he accepted an advantageous one? You cannot reason like that. You claim when we accepted it was useless but when he accepted it, he had no choice but to accept an advantageous subject. There was no other solution for us except that. If there was not 598 Resolution which we could accept, they would smash us with the excuse that you referred Imam had not given them. We saved the state and revolution by 598 Resolution.

Mohsen Rezaie: That was the least. If Saddam succeeded, there might have happened other events.

Mohammad Doroodian: I believe that subsequent events and the following developments are rooted in 598 Resolution.

Mohsen Rezaie: Saddam and we both accepted 598 Resolution. If Iraq could enter Khoramshahr he would stay there until 598 resolution was accepted or 599 Resolution written. When he could not, the 598 resolution was revived. If he could endure in Khoramshahr the 598 resolution had no advantage anymore, that is 598 Resolution was destroyed and revived again in a week.

Mohammad Doroodian: But all of these are about 598 resolution and after that, why does 598 resolution referrers to its preceding, the fall of Faw and Shalamcheh?

Mohsen Rezaie: All what we say is that 598 resolution was a glorious document because it was written in the culmination of our victories, but we used its potential advantages and accepted it in the highest point of Iraqi defeats.

Mohammad Doroodian: You mean we actualized it. I accept this but I think we should not divide it. It is coherent.

Mohsen Rezaie: It was potential first, then it was actualized and we practiced it using our power. But if Saddam was settled in Khoramshahr, it would be useless and abolished.

Mohammad Doroodian: All these are analyzing and studying of 598 resolution and its aftermaths.

Mohsen Rezaie: It is better to conclude that 598 Resolution was written in the culmination of our victories, so Iraqis were obliged to give us some advantages, as they did. Eight paragraphs of this resolution are completely in favor of us, and one or two are two-edged, which we intended to complete them through UN secretary-general declaration. We did not accept it in the culmination of our victories.

Mohammad Doroodian: The problem is exactly here. If our political goals were those you mentioned, we should have taken another route.

Mohsen Rezaie: We were following the correct route but they did not think it would turn out like that.

Mohammad Doroodian: They did not think so, the problem is exactly this.

Mohsen Rezaie: Our friends thought the secretary-general declaration would be issued within 2-3 next months and we would enjoy the outmost possible benefits of 598 Resolution. Iraqis were not inclined to accept this resolution with the least advantages and had some other goal in mind. When the attacks started, this 598 resolution with its least advantages was somehow under question. Imam accepted it, although he knew it may cost his honor. Because, there was no guaranty for the acceptance of Resolution by Iraqis at the same time. There was also a possibility that after the end of war, Iraq would claim, why 598 resolution, and insists on writing 599 resolution. That was a great risk for Imam. But when they were defeated, 598 Resolution was revived and actualized again. This is what is considered by you as the basis of end of war. But when we accepted it, it was weakened and strengthened again. The 598 resolution ended war. Those periods were so hard for us that the name of “the cup of poison” really suited that. But God Almighty returned us our victories and we gained what was put on the table. War prisoners were freed. UN secretary-general insisted on the 90 billion USD of losses, recognized the offender and all we desired was realized.

Mohammad Doroodian: Saddam accepted the 1975 treaty too.

Mohsen Rezaie: Yes

The End
Source: Doroodian Weblog - Part Four