Susangerd, Occupation, Liberation (2)

An interview with Ghodratollah Bahari

Ali Takallou
Translated by: Zahra Hosseinian

2015-12-13


 

  • Arriving at Ahwaz, what happened?

 I visited Colonel Ghasemi, commander of Ahvaz army, and introduced myself. I knew him before. He was commander of Battalion 255-Tank in which I had been trained M36 and M4 tanks. He was familiar with my spirit. He didn’t know my other past records, but had known with my spirit from that time I was in battalion for training. “Ghodrat! What are you doing here?” he called my name, “did you escape to Tehran?” I said: “Yes, but I was a volunteer.” He said: “come, it’s good. Go and take a colt revolver. Then stand in front of War Room. Be careful nobody come in armed.”

I took a colt and stood in front of War Room. I allowed no one or those who have not been identified, enter that room armed. At that time, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was then Senior Advisor to Imam Khomeini, had been at War Room.

 

● Where was the place of that room?

Division-92; In front of it, about 20-30 meters away, there was a Division headquarters.

 

● Who else came to the headquarters of the war?

Mr. Gharazi, who I didn’t know him and was the governor of Ahvaz, would come in civilian clothes and go. Later I found out he is governor. Colonel Shahbazi and Mofid would also participate.

 

● Would you tell us their posts too?

Colonel Mofid was chief Information and Operations of Division. Colonel Shahbazi was head of Staff One. One or two of them were died a martyr. Colonel Vatandoust was commander of Esfahan Air Force. Their helicopters were at Ahvaz and he himself was under the command of army commander in the War Room. Because commanders-in-chief have sat in the war room and all are under command; so, there is no need to telephone someone else and ordered for sending helicopters. All of them are done there. High commander, therefore, must always be in the war room for enforcing orders. It was ordered me to stand by in front of the room. There were 200 people inside the room, including Mr. Khamenei, who was representative of Imam; Mr. Khalkhali; Mr. Hadi Ghaffari; Mr. Gharazi, who was governor of Khuzestan; commander of army; commanders of Staff One and two and three were all under the command; Colonel Mofid, who now has become Amir Mofid; and so on. In any case, they all didn’t know me, but the commander of army. Colonel Shahbazi, of course, knew me; because he was the officer of Staff One. I stood in front of the room, but then I thought about and concluded that I didn’t leave my wife and my child in Tehran to come here and stand in front of the room.

I said to army commander: “Sir, I came here voluntary, so if it is supposed just to stand in front of the door, I’ll back to my life, with your permission. I haven’t come here voluntary to just stand. I’ve come voluntary to go to the battalion. It has been written into my letter that to be transferred to the fortress battalion.” he said: “The fortress battalion has involved now and withdrew and Iraqis have taken the center of it.” I said: “ok, so send me wherever the battalion is. Definitely it hasn’t decomposed and has a remainder. Battalion’s guys know me. I can better work with them.” He said: “very well, but don’t go there. Because we can’t go to the fortress with car; you have been captures by Iraqis, if you go. Just like martyr Tondgooyan, who was captured in Shadegan-Darkhoein road. We can’t go from Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, as Iraqis are on the road. We are sending our forces from Abadan road, but until now they have captured some of our cars.”

Knowing me, he said: “so, you do just reconnaissance and directly report to me.” I said: “All right. So, please report my presence.” They confirmed my presence and I began my mission as a guerrilla officer. Gradually I set out my work. I really had gone there to do something, not just watching or to be extras.

I said to commander of army: “If you permit me, I choose guys whom I know and make an organization.” He said: “ok. Do it.” I gathered all military guys that I knew. One of them was Genghis Damyari who had come from Kerman, voluntary. He was staff, not military. I looked for and found him. I found a few others in mosque; Farid Farahmand and Hamid Farahmand, who martyred at operations of 10 Mehr 1359. Unfortunately, six of our guys were martyred in nightly counter-attacking to enemy. We then found out that two of them were wounded and since they couldn’t have returned, were captured; and four of them were martyred. In guerrilla job, when you get injured, you will be left alone, if no one was near to you. I then formed a guerrilla organization. During this work, I met Mr. Gharazi too. In 10th Mehr 1359, we should go for an operation; of course, it was better we wouldn’t go. I was near the War Room and busy talking with my guys. I saw a man in civilian clothes, who sometimes would go and come, has sat down outside the room and was busy talking with commander of army, who had sat down on the platform. The commander called me and said: “Come here. Let’s see what says Haj Agha.” I said: “Who is he?” He said: “he is governor.” I said: “there you are, Haj Agha.” He said: “in fact, let’s see what that Arab wants to say.” I saw a tall Arab with Arabic clothes, who had stood next to the tree. I went toward him and said: “What?" he said: “the enemy has come to the Khoibeh, Bayouz, Darkhowein, and Shadegan and encamped by the water and want us to help them. They say us to bring our youth, so they give them weapons to fight against Iran. I’ve come here to report this information.” Regions of Khoibeh, Bayouz, Darkhoein, and Shadegan are in the form of compound; but some of them are at this side of water, and some on the other. I asked governor: “Who is he and what’s his job?” At that time, the council didn’t make sense. The Arab said: “I’m of the trustees of district.” Then I asked Mr. Gharazi: “Sir! Can we put our trust in him? He lest take us into the mouth of enemy?” he answered: “Yes, this is the person who has been exchanged information for governor-generalship before the war. He is our trustee, an insider.” I said: “Very good.”

That night we went and did an operation. I and seven people were able to pull ourselves back, but six of our friends couldn’t. We clashed at four AM. Then we realized that two of them have been captured and four of them have martyred; Hamid Farahmand was one of them. Morteza kargar was another of our martyrs. He had come from Tehran among civilian forces and wasn’t military. But Hamid Farahmand was of governor-generalship’s forces and governor showed much consideration for him. The governor himself had said that he is familiar with area and I can go with him, if I have problem. So, he brought his brother, Farid. All overtook each other for fighting. I’m serious, they really overtook. That is, this was Iranian soldiers’ love to pass, now that the day of examination has come. In this operation, we moved from 6 pm and clashed at four in the morning. Then, we were helped by helicopters.

● How did you hear about Susangerd occupation?

That night, the 9th Mehr 1359, attacking the enemy, we counter-attacked in Bayouz and Khoibeh. The same time we realized that the enemy has occupied Susangerd. The enemy had crossed the Hoveyzeh and come to Susangerd and had been involved with forces there. They could evacuate forces from Susangerd. Major Ghayour asli had been commissioned to fight with Iraqis and pushed them back. I knew the story so far. This was the first phase of occupying the Susangerd at 9th Mehr 1359, by Iraqis. Major Ghayour asli had gone there at eleventh and Iraqis had pushed them back. That is, Major Ghayour asli had pushed them back once, but was not successful. He had even fought against them until 5 or 6 pm, but had gone to the Allahu- Akbar Mountains, when seen that not be a match for Iraqis. He and his troops accompanied with gendarmerie and the guys of police department of Susangerd had gone to the Allahu Akbar Mountains. After the operation of 10th Mehr, my hand was wounded. It was injured but could not stop my work. It was then I was filled in on. I said to the army commander: “Let me go to Susangerd and do an operation; or at least do just reconnaissance.” He said: “No, wait. Let us to see what will happen.”

It was 10th Mehr 1359; that is, after Major Ghayour asli’s going to Allahu Akbar Mountains, when the army commander commissioned me to go. Karkhe River is between Susangerd and Fouliabad. And there is a place around which was called ‘seyyed’. Iraqis had come to cross from ‘Seyyed’; it means that the enemy had come to Susangerd from the edge of front road, not from the main road.

● From the south of road?

Yes. The roadside, they had come from the south of road. There is a village there from which they had also crossed. In fact, coming from Ahvaz, there is a small shrine that we called it ‘Seyyed’.

● Before reaching to Hamidieh?

Before reaching to Hamidieh; between Ahvaz and Hamidieh in the Ahvaz-Hamidieh road, a small shrine is located, that Arabs called it ‘Seyyed’. Iraqis had come to bridge Karkhekour River and cross it and come toward Seyyed. Then, after crossing Seyyed and the main road, they go to Fouliabad. Now, why did they want to go there? Because the Ammunition center of 92-armored army of Ahvaz was in Fouliabad. We had an ammunition center in Dokouheh, Andimeshk, in which the ammo for South region was maintained. But the ammo of army was in Fouliabad and its dumps. They had built ammo dumps under the Fouliabad’s hills. It was the ammunition center of army. We had also center ammo in army which was called barracks-2 and it had dump too. They had arranged ammo without spools in the region; means that without their sensitive parts. The enemy had taken Susangerd. They had come to Hamidieh from the south and from the main road of Susangerd. Then they had been stopped by the river. Therefore, they tried to bridge it. They also had been busy bridging to pass and crossed ‘Seyyed’ and the road between Ahwaz and Hamidieh and finally reach to our ammo dumps. At night of 12th Mehr, we were dominant there. It was very important. That is, if they reached to our ammo dumps, we got into much trouble. Giving more information, I should say that you had to eventually have ammo for fighting. Additionally, in this way they could make a U-turn Ahwaz. I asked army commander to let me to go and check on what they are doing. I was allowed to go and do reconnaissance.

It was at mid-night, around one o’clock, when I saw they are busy bridging. Around two o'clock I backed immediately to the barracks. I reported that the enemy is bridging and if they do so, they can explode ammunition dumps at Fouliabad. Amir Mofid, who was Officer of Information and Operations Division, knew it full. “Well now,” he said, “why are you kicking up a racket?” he didn’t know me. I was crying. He again said: “Why are you kicking up a racket, ha?” I said: “Oh, we are losing our country. We must do something.” I tell the truth, I was crying. [Martyr] Vatandoust, who was commander of Air Force, was also got up. He got a little nervous and said: “Sir, where you can take when you are in the water / where you can burn when you are in the fire. Don’t create a lot of noise.” The Army commander said: “what do you want? Say whatever you want, so that I ordered to give you; then move and do whatever you can.”

By the river, we fought with Iraqi forces until 4:30 or 5 in the morning and didn’t allow them to build bridge. Some explosions had occurred. The water also had been stopped on the other side. By several grenades the bank of river has been destroyed and water had flowed in the desert. Probably you have heard the news that the water had stopped the traffic of Iraqis’ tanks. They had built a dam in front of water, so that can divert it toward enemy, but it had been synchronized with our clash. The purpose was to transfer water toward the enemy, so the desert became muddy and enemy cannot move forward and we can fight with them in a certain path, not in the open field. Now, why not fight in the open field? It was because we didn’t have enough forces. They hadn’t yet arrived from Mashhad, Zahedan, and Shiraz, and all were on the way. They all must come by train. They couldn’t come by car. Tanks and cannons of them also must transfer. It takes time to reach Ahvaz. There was just one track and they must displace in station. So it takes time. However, some forces had arrived from Mashhad.

At 4:30 AM, during operation, we were informed that water has diverted toward the enemy. We decided to go at their tanks, which had stuck into mud, so that don’t let them to proceed. We didn’t intend to enter Susangerd. Colonel Vatandoust, who has died a martyr as I said before, said: “I will now send a helicopter for you to go.” Genghis Daniali, Vahid Farahmand, Reza Daniali, Hussein Daniali, and I and several others boarded helicopter-214. Helicopter-214 must be escorted by a Cobra helicopter when it fly off, because it isn’t war one, it is personnel. Therefore it must be accompanied by a Cobra helicopter, so that the Cobra flies in front of 214. It was seven or had passed seven in the morning. It was lightening.

 

To be continued...

 

Susangerd, Occupation, Liberation (1)



 
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