Oral History of Sar Pol-e Zahab Reconstruction (1)

Farhad Khademi

Interviewer: Abolfath Mo'men

Cultivated but Devastated

When Iraq started the war against Islamic Republic of Iran on September 22, 1980, western Iran including Sar Pol-e Zahab and Ghasr Shirin areas were among the first parts of Iran occupied by the Iraqi Ba’ath regime and the people of these areas became homeless and a number of them were captured, injured or martyred.
When Beit-ul-Moqaddas Operation started and the city of Khorramshar was freed in May 1981, the Iraqi Ba’ath regime evacuated parts of western areas including Sar Pol-Zahab and Ghasr Shirin due to its military inability and extending the defense line as well as pretending to pacifism, and its forces were deployed in the areas looming over the region. With Iraq’s withdrawal, the debate over the deployment of forces and the reconstruction of Sar Pol-Zahab and its villages was brought up. Finally, Hamedan Province was chosen as the assisting province and became responsible to reconstruct Sar Pol-Zahab and its villages.
The following topics have been studied in this research based on oral history method:
- The goals of the reconstruction and the amount of the goals’ achievements.
- The amount of the participation of Hamedan province’s people.
- The amount of the participation of administrative and military agencies, the impediments and problems of the Reconstruction Department.

One of the issues brought up after Iraqi withdrawal from Sar Pol-e Zahab and Ghasr Shirin on June 28, 1982 was the reconstruction of the evacuated areas including the area of Sar Pol-e Zahab which was demolished by the Iraqis and the people of the city and the surrounding villages had left their homes for safer areas.
Farhad Khademi, the person responsible for the sand and gravel manufactory of “Hamedan’s Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation” in Sar Pol-e Zahab says: “… when we entered Sar Pol-e Zahab, it was demolished and nobody lived there…” (1)
With Iraq’s withdrawal, Sar Pol-e Zahab area was supposed to be reconstructed. This significant task was entrusted to Hamedan Province. But before the establishment of a department or an organization for reconstruction, the authorities of Hamedan Province including the then Friday Prayed leader, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani visited the area in order to estimate the inflicted damages precisely. (2)
Then, a department named “The Department of Sar Pol-e Zahab Reconstruction” (DSR) and its villages was established on June 28, 1982. DSR was deployed in Hamedan’s Governorship and started work with the cooperation of Hamedan’s Friday Prayer Leader’s Office, Governor-General Office and Jihad of Construction. Then DSR issued a statement, inviting all voluntary forces and specialists to take part in the city’s reconstruction. The volunteers were enrolled by the DSR temporary office in Hamedan’s Jame’ Mosque. (3)
Then, an account was opened in one of the banks and was given to all the villagers and citizens of Hamedan Province in order to liquidate their cash aids to the account. Till the end of War Week in 1982, the DSR voiced the readiness for enrolling the voluntary forces in 27 mosques of Hamedan city. At this time, popular aids for reconstruction of the war-ravaged area of Sar Pol-e Zahab were sent for the first time.
Head of reconstruction of Sar Pol-e Zahab city, Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian about the formation of DSR says: “DSR members were governor general, Hamedan’s Friday Prayer Leader [Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani], Jihad of Construction, Housing Foundation and those who were involved in the reconstruction of the area. Thus the main DSR was established…the Logistic Department of Sar Pol-e Zahab Reconstruction was established in Hamedan with Mr. Jowkar as administrator and I was appointed as the executive director of Sar Pol-e Zahab Reconstruction and Renovation Department and went to the city along with a number of brothers on October 9th 1982…”
The work was shared between the responsible agencies of the province. In this regard, Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian says: “… the Housing Foundation was responsible for reconstructing rural houses and Jihad of Construction for reconstructing public places of the villages (like mosques, public baths, schools). Hamedan’s governor general office undertook the city’s reconstruction. The governor general appointed me as responsible for the city’s reconstruction. Our problems were more than the rest of the areas in the city since it was on the enemy’s gunshot.” (6)
About this matter, Farhad Khademi says:
“… The city’s reconstruction was entrusted to Urban and Housing Organization, and reconstruction of the villages of Sar Pol-e Zahab to the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation of Hamedan Province which was the assisting province…” (7)
Several groups from the provinces of Azarbaijan, Khorasan and Ilam (Dehloran town) were already active in the area under the supervision of Kermanshah Governor General Office, but when Hamdan Province entered the reconstruction, all the affairs were entrusted to them.
About the control of the city, Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian says:
“The city was handed over to us when those who were from Tabriz left there and we formed an urban department to control the city. We deployed Hamedan’s Basijis (voluntary forces) for this purpose because the people’s fittings had remained in their houses and we had to take care of them so that the strangers could not enter.” (8)
The grounds were provided for reconstruction as the city was handed over and controlled. The first move was begun by mapping, filing a case and indentifying the landowners. However, we used the experiences of the previous groups in this regard… those who had come from Tabriz had taken photos from the demolished houses and formed and classified files. These files were handed over to us. ” (9)
DSR started work while the inhabitants were not there. The landlord just came and specified the limit of the building. (10)
In this stage, the authorities shoulder to shoulder like the workers were involved in the activity honestly, and did not pay any attention to dangers of the enemy’s artillery and air attacks.
In this regard, Farhad Khademi says: “Sometimes our session lasted until morning, and the friends showed high self-sacrifice.” (11)
He also said: “In the reconstruction area where I was working in the sand manufactory, the discussion was not that who was boss and ordered. Everybody was working actively like Basijis, for instance we unloaded the sand truck ourselves.” (12) 
The reconstruction was speeded up by using indigenous workers and forces. At first, most workers were from the volunteers and workmen of Hamedan Province (13) but as time went by and the people returned to their area, the participation of indigenous forces increased and many costs including transportation costs lessened.
In this regard, the deputy of Chitsazian, Morteza Ghahramani says:
“We used indigenous workers. We gathered the workers in the morning by bus and brought them to the site and then returned them to their houses in the evening. They were paid wages too. This caused the people to return and settle in the area.”(14)
Chitsazian believes that the people’s presence and supervision in the reconstruction promoted the quality and satisfied the townspeople; “We chose one person from every family as guardian for supervision and provided them all the facilities. We even gave them sugar and tea from DSR. The measure satisfied the people very amazingly.” (15)
In addition to participation of the people of Sar Pol-e Zahab in the reconstruction, the villagers also took part actively in reconstruction by returning to their villages.
In this regard, Khademi says: “… some 87 villages were under the custody of Hamedan’s Housing Foundation which according to figures, they had 3800 families. Most residents of the villages of Boz Mirabad, Sarab Garm Owlia, Sarab Qaleh Shahin and Eliassi had gone to Iraqi Kurdistan. Three Eliassi families out of eighty had just stayed … fortunately we had no problem in the manufactory because the so-called ordinary (inexpert) workers were from the same and neighboring villages. If we brought workers for Hamedan to Sar Pol-e Zahab, we should have taken transportation service for them. Moreover, there were also road dangers, while the indigenous workers came to work themselves and in the morning and returned on foot and we paid them.” (16)
“… One of the problems was to provide sand and gravel. We solved this problem by building a sand and gravel manufactory. When the people wanted to build their houses, they bought sand and gravel from our manufactory and used oak trees for their house’s ceilings. They even supplied fuel for their tractors from the manufactory.”(17)
In an interesting measure to minimize the costs, DSR decided to use ordinary prisoners according to their skills in late 1997.
In this regard, Morteza Ghahramani who had replaced Chitsazian in reconstructing Sar Pol-e Zahab since early 1983 says:
“… After some time, we found out that we incurred losses in reconstruction, so we decided to find a solution for minimizing the costs; thus, we used the ordinary prisoners of Tehran, Hamedan and Khorramabad provinces. At that time, Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili was the head of Judiciary. When he came to the area and faced this scene, encouraged us to continue this method. He said, “You have done the best thing and at least it would prevent from financial losses through this method.” But a number of people opposed such method. We paid the prisoners according to their skills.” (18)
The behavior of DSR authorities with the prisoners was so fraternal and trustworthy that a lot of works were entrusted to them while no guard watched them.
In this regard, Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian says:
“… the prisoners were doing their work freely without any guard. They even went to see their families in Hamedan on Thursdays and Fridays without any control while the bus driver was among the prisoners. We just trusted God. Even when we wanted to supply bitumen from Shiraz, we chose one of the prisoners and sent him to Shiraz along with a truck and one million Tomans (Iranian money equal to 10 Rials). All believed that he would not come back anymore, but he returned on time.”
Another important issue in reconstruction was the procurement and type of building materials. We tried to keep the city’s main fiber and used again the building materials which had used before in the building and constructions. Most buildings were made from wood except the ones located in the main streets.
“”…we supplied building materials from Kermanshah, Hamedan, and the surrounding areas. We tried to build the houses in their indigenous forms. If they were made from beam, we used beam too and if they were made from timbers, we also used timbers except the two or three-storey buildings which were in the main way…” (20)
“… We supplied plaster from Lorestan and wood from Hamedan. And for a while, we removed sand from a river in the area. But after a while, we stopped it since the area was under the enemy’s sight, Then we brought sand and gravel from Taq Bostan… woods were supplied from Hamedan; or we bought or the people donated. We kept them in the store of building materials alongside the bricks, spars and other materials. The buildings were handed over completely.” (21)
The supply and type of building materials were different in villages. The materials of these buildings were all supplied from the existing woods, stones and the materials of the area. In addition to supplying these materials from Hamedan, and Kermanshah provinces and popular aids, we tried to use other materials remained from the Iraqi bastions.
“… Since there were high quality stones in the area and we could buy cheaper, we started walling with stone. We bought cement from the factory and stored them in a place belonged to Farm Company which had inflicted less damage. We brought sand and gravel from a very distant and dangerous place. Thus, after a while, we built a sand and gravel manufactory between Boz Mirabad and Sar Pol-e Zahab beside Delshir River and lessened the problem partly. We made all the ceilings and doors and windows from wood. All the materials were supplied from the area and Hamedan, but a large part of them were provided from the bastions the Iraqis had left after retreatment… Iraq had used 18mm spars in places like Bamu and Khan Lili. We collected them. The remained barbed wires were also used as fence around the manufactory and other places. Moreover, the Russian-made strong and resistant timbers remained from Iraqis were used for the houses’ ceilings and doors and windows. Thus, we collected a store of woods and spars.”
The collection of building materials from Iraqi bastions had its own impediments and problems and demanded its special watchfulness. Sometimes, mines and explosive traps had been planted around these bastions. We asked the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and the army to help us deactivate them. The demand from military forces was made largely and friendly and was not subject to administrative and military rules. 
In this regard, Morteza Ghahramani says:
“… Our relation with IRGC and army was very good. They fully cooperated with us and this was mutual. For example, one night, Iraq pounded Martyr Shiroodi canal, we moved from Sar Pol-e Zahab with water tanks and helped them. We had a good coordination with IRGC and army.” (22)
Farhad Khademi says:
“… Once, we went to Bamu altitudes to collect building materials from Iraqi bastions, but when we wanted to come back, heavy rain started in a way that we faced problem when we wanted to pass the river with loaded trucks. I could manage to pass the river with Toyota while half of it was under the river. We went to find Haj Tahmasebi who was an IRGC member. I told him that we had been caught and cannot pass the river, while the trucks were full of spars, woods and other materials. The IRGC guys towed the trucks with Happer cars which had been taken as booty from Iraqis and brought them to that side of the river…”  (23)
The Gendarmerie forces who had been deployed in the area were cooperating with DSR among which we can refer to Captain Hassani who was from Kermanshah, the young commander of one of the battalions of Kermanshah’s Division 81 and Major Shushtari from Isfahan. (24)
Iraqi artillery fire and airstrikes against the area was a continuous problem. Many areas which had been reconstructed by Jihad of Construction, the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation or the Urban and Housing Organization, were demolished again by Iraqi jetfighters and many people were martyred or injured.
“…We reconstructed the village of Sarab Garm Owlia completely and forty houses became ready to be transferred to the people. The governor and the head of Housing Foundation of Kermanshah and the head of Housing Foundation of Hamedan Province (Engineer Badaqi) and Friday Prayer leader and a number of other authorities were supposed to come to the area and handed over the houses to their owners. But just one day before the promised day, that area was again bombarded and everything was demolished. The area lacked defense system against the Iraqi jetfighters. It was interesting that Iraq had announced that Sar Pol-e Zahab are was a training place for us …” (25)
“…According to the phone contact of the head of Sar Pol-e Zahab Reconstruction Office brother Chitsaz, the Ba’ath-Zionist mercenaries of the Iraqi regime attacked Sar Pol-e Zahab with Katiosha today Bahman 11, 1363 as a result of which one of the brothers, Alireza Rostami dispatched from Assadabad was martyred and some fifteen indigenous workers injured some of whom were treated for minor injuries and were released and some others hospitalized in the hospital.” (26)
In this regard, Morteza Ghahramni has quoted an interesting memory:
“… one day, the cars had gone to collect and take the workers to work that the tires of two of the cars punctured. Haj Chitsazian said, “Keep your way with the punctured tires.” They kept driving with difficulty. The cars faced serious difficulty and reached with half an hour of delay. In this half an hour, Iraq started to pound Sar Pol-e Zahab. If the forces reached sooner, some 20 people would have been martyred or injured. This was God’s will that the forces did not harm.” (27)
The country’s officials were aware that these areas were under Iraqi fire and every moment, it was possible that the area’s towns and villages were destroyed. But the aim was to show that we had the ability of construction and resistance at the time of war. In other words, we constructed and they destroyed (28), in a way that the then president said, whatever you demolish, we will build again (29). In fact, in addition to domestic and foreign propaganda, another aim of the reconstruction was to persuade people to return to their homelands.
“…Our goal was to prove that we were able to reconstruct at the time of war too. Although they destroyed our buildings with their artillery fire and airstrikes, we build them again. This had a good effect in terms of propaganda, in a way that a group from the United Nations along with Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Rajaee Khorasani came to visit the area and the work had a good progress…” (30)
Another problem in the area was the activity of the gropulets and the persons hired by Iraq and Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) terrorist outfit which caused clashes and the martyrdom of people.
“… We collected in one of the nights of the holy month of Ramadan and decided to stay and fast in the city and not to go far from the permitted distance in order not to break our fasting. It was around 10 PM and a sound was heard. Then we found a Satanist group had attacked us. When Ali Chitsazian who was responsible for reconnaissance forces in the area heard the sound of shooting came to help us through the roofs’ houses. After a heavy clash, they escaped… in another case, one of our foremen was abducted by this outfit. But after two days he was released, provided that somehow he handed over Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian, me (Ghahramani) and Shokouhi (from Kermanshah) to them. After release, he told us the whole story. Therefore, due to the dangers threatening him, we sent him out of the area.” (31)
In this regard, Farhad Khademi also says:
“… One day, the head of Kermanshah’s Housing Foundation, the commander of Gendarmerie and the commander of Division 81 of Kermanshah came to the area to inaugurate an outpost in Boz Mirabad. When they wanted to return, we asked them without notice to go from the war front and Dahst-e Zahav to visit the IRGC and army forces in order to become familiar with their problems closely and if possible try to remove their needs and difficulties. This was while a man, who was driving in their way, was captured and taken to Iraq by the anti-revolutionary forces and outfits.
Later, the anti-revolution said, "We had come to arrest the commander of Gendarmerie and his entourage, but since they changed their way, we captured other persons." (32)
"… The intelligence forces in the area had arrested a man who was involved in military activities against the war combatants. He admitted in the interrogation that he was supposed to get 50 dinars in exchange for killing anyone who had worn IRGC uniforms and headband..." (33)
In addition to being backed by state agencies and departments, DSR was also supported by the people. The Friday prayer leaders and the officials of Hamedan province in any occasion invited the people to keep their empathy and to send aids to Sar Pol-e Zahab and DSR in addition to the battle fronts. In December 1982, a coordination meeting in this regard was held in the presence of Hamedan's Friday Prayer Leader, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani, and number of civil and military officials of the province.
In the meeting, Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani said, "You have removed all the problems step by step. Now you should take another step with faith, loyalty and integrity and that is the reconstruction of war-torn areas."
Elsewhere in his remarks, he called on the devoted people of the province to consider Sar Pol-e Zahab's reconstruction as a holy duty and end it with coherence and integrity a soon as possible. (34)
In addition to establishment of the reconstruction department in Sar Pol-e Zahab, other departments were also established in Nahavand, Toyserkan and other towns of Hamedan Province.   In this regard, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) in Hamedan wrote:" The Department of Logistic and Reconstruction of War Areas based in Nahavand has resorted to collect 30 million rilas in cash and the dispatch of 180 trucks consisting of food stuff and the necessary materials to the war fronts since the beginning of its establishment. According to the head of The Department of Logistic and Reconstruction of War Areas based in Nahavand, the department has collected and sent the following non-cash donations – from the villages of Nahavand - to the war front: 230 tons of flour, 372 heads of livestock, one Station Jeep, two trucks of medicine, 1931 kg oil, 22500 kg bread, 2300 kg sugar, 13160 cans of compote, 4360 glasses of lemon juice and other fruit juices, 632 water coolers, 323 kg tea, 219 kg dates, 4220 kg fruits, 125 boxes of cookies, 80 cans of cheese, 3000 glasses of jam, 53000 pieces of gunnysack, 2600 suits, 216 different pieces of gold and ..." (35)
Except food stuff, the people's donations also consisted of the following building materials:
"… In addition to building materials, the issue of wood for the ceilings was also considered. The Hamedan Province did give a great help in this regard especially the villages of Salehabad and Merianj…" (36)
"… The interesting issue was popular donations which also included both building materials and food stuff and money. In one of these donations, a letter from an old woman was attached in which she had written, "I am an old woman who had nothing except this. Excuse me." In another case, a woman who had packed a few eggs inside a bag in a letter had written, "we have just two hens the eggs of which have been collected and sent." Such cases were very interesting and persuaded us to continue our job." (37)
In addition to people's aids, the government employees shared the measure by donating one or some days of their salaries. The personnel of the police stations of Hamedan, Malayer, Nahavand, and Toyserkan donated one day of their salary and handed over to the department of reconstruction. (38)
About the donation of the government employees of Hamedan Province, IRNA wrote: "… The employees of Hamdean's governorship liquidated one to seven days of their salaries to an account for reconstruction of war-torn areas… the total donations are 67 days of the employees' salary." (39)
Despite the people's donations for reconstruction and renovation of Sar Pol-e Zahab, there were still financial problems. This was obvious in the letter of the deputy head of Hamdena's Governorship in Developmental Affairs, Merikhpour to the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of the Reconstruction of War-Torn areas of the Interior Ministry:
"Since the necessary credit for reconstruction of Sar Pol-e Zahab is very more than the popular donations, it is necessary that you allocate at least 50,000,000 Rials for quickening the reconstruction of Sar Pol-e Zahab." (40)
For the final conclusion of the task of  the reconstruction of renovation of Sar Pol-e Zahab and its villages, see a summary of the report by the Department of Reconstruction and Renovation of Hamedan Province released at the end of one year of activity in 1983.  The report has presented a pre-war comparative statistics and the amount of the area's destructions by Iraqi forces:
"… In December 1982, DSR made a precise estimate on the amount of the damages inflicted by the Ba'thi mercenaries during two years of imposed war on the city and the villages of Sar Pol-e Zahab. Then, it started to build four two-class schools, a storehouse, a 15-meter long bridge, and a building for the reconstruction department. It also plowed 1500 hectares of framing lands, and vaccinated and distributed medicines among the people of the area. Moreover, the reconstruction and renovation of four schools, a mosque, the electricity network of four villages and the water pipe installations of the drinking water of 65 residential buildings in Sar Pol-e Zahab are under operation… According to then figures, the area of Sar Pol-e Zahab has 160 villages three of which has less population and the rest no population. On the whole, 106 villages have been demolished completely. 81 village need to be cleared of the land mines. Of 4518 rural houses, 1720 have been demolished completely and 716 houses have been inflicted damages. Before the start of the imposed war, 20 villages enjoyed drinking water, but because the water resources have been contaminated, it is not possible to use them. Also before the war, only 11 villages in the area of Sar Pol-e Zahab had electricity network three of which still have active electricity. Therefore, 28 villages need water pipeline, and five others need electricity network. Also, plans for repairing the connection roads of the villages, exploiting the mines, setting of the health department, veterinary, service station for agricultural machinery and establishing a camp for Jihad of Construction in the area should be considered.
According to reports on April 18, 1983, ten villages have so far been reconstructed completely and the houses of 15 villages have also been reconstructed and renovated …Also, Jihad of Construction of Hamedan Province has said that 16 public baths, six water projects, and six schools have been reconstructed. Also, seven schools were renovated, a mosque completed, a 20-meter long concreted bridge built, 7 kilometers of back roads reconstructed, 33 kilometers of road renovated, and another 17 kilometers of rural road built, and the operation of the water pipeline of a hospital completed and five villages were canalized. In addition to these main jobs, Jihad of Construction has resorted to cultivate 710 hectares of the area's lands, vaccinated 510,000 heads of livestock and distribute one ton of  sugar beet residual… After one year of activity and the establishment of the Department of Sar Pole- Zahab Reconstruction in Hamedan Province, the following services have been carried out: reconstruction and renovation of 564 residential and trade units and preservation of livestock in 24 villages as well as the production of 16,000 cubic meters of sand and gravel, production of 13700 bags of cement and plaster, making hundreds of bricks, production of 1580 Mallon stone, production of 517 tons of lime and 23,000 pieces of timbers. The plan has been carried out with the help of 4655 human resources and self-help of 7380 local people." (41)
In view of the memoirs of the authorizes, combatants, the documents concerning the reconstruction of Sar Pol-e Zahab and its villages, it can be said that in the first step, "the Department of Reconstruction and Renovation of Sar Pol-e Zahab in Hamedan Province" with the cooperation of  senior officials and agencies and revolutionary institutions was established. In the next step, all the people of the province fully cooperated with DSR and backed by military forces in the area including IRGC, army, and Gendarmerie.
During the trend of reconstruction and renovation, there were problems such as provision, supplying building materials from distant places, the enemy's airstrikes and artillery fire, the presence of mercenaries, MKO terrorist outfit and shortage of amateur and professional workers.  This shortage was removed with DSR research programs and using the local people and the volunteers of Hamedan Province and the prisoners.  For supplying building materials, in addition to state and popular aids, the materials remained in the Iraqi bastions were also used.
The reconstruction's goal was to prove Iran's capability in reconstructing and reclaiming the demolished areas. The propaganda activity in this regard led to the visit of the United Nations' representatives to the area. The main goal of reclaiming the area was to encourage the people to return to their villages and houses. Given the results of the reconstruction and renovation, it can be said that Iran has achieved its goals in reconstruction of these areas and was able to help people to resume normal life and activity.  



1- Interview with Farhad Khademi (Hamedan,  August 11, 2010)
2- Kayhan daily, No. 11645, (August 08, 1982), page 8
3- Jomhoori Eslami daily, No. 964, (September 27, 1982), page 4.
4- Foundation for Preservation of Works and Dissemination of Values of Holy Defence of Hamedan Province, Archive, The record of the Department of Construction of War-Ravaged Areas of Hamedan Province in Sar Pol-e Zahab, Volume 1.
5- Interview with Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
6- Ibid.
7- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
8- Interview with Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
9- Ibid.
10- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
11- Interview with Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
12- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
13- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
14- Interview with Mohammad Sadeq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
15- Ibid.
16- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
17- Ibid.
18- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
19- Interview with Mohammad Sadq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
20- Ibid.
21- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
22- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
23- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
24- Ibid.
25- Ibid.
26- Foundation for Preservation of Works and Dissemination of Values of Holy Defence of Hamedan Province, Archive, The record of the Department of Construction of War-Ravaged Areas of Hamedan Province in Sar Pol-e Zahab, Volume 1.
27- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
28- Interview with Mohammad Sadq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
29- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
30- Interview with Mohammad Sadq Chitsazian, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
31- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
32- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
33- Ibid.
34- Islamic Republic daily, no. 1012, (November 27, 1982), page 4.
35- Islamic Republic News Agency in Hamedan, Bulletin No.85, pages 5-6.
36- Interview with Farhad Khademi, Hamedan, (August 11, 2010)
37- Interview with Morteza Gharamani, Hamedan, (September 8, 2010)
38- Islamic Republic News Agency in Hamedan, Bulletin no.85, pages 5-6.
39- Ibid, Bulletin no.52, page 3.
40- Foundation for Preservation of Works and Dissemination of Values of Holy Defence of Hamedan Province, Archive, The record of the Department of Construction of War-Ravaged Areas of Hamedan Province in Sar Pol-e Zahab, Volume 1.
41- Ibid.

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