Oral History of Sacred Defense as Narrated by Ahmad Gholampour

The Commander of Karbala Headquarters

Volume 2

Mahya Hafezi
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi

2024-5-9


The second[1] volume of the book Oral History of Sacred Defense which was narrated by Ahmad Gholampour, titled “the Commander of Karbala Headquarter”, was provided by Mohsen Rokhsattalab and finally compiled by Dr. Hossein Ahmadi; the book was published by the Sacred Defense Document and Research Center in 2024 (1402 SH). It was released in 408 pages, 1000 copies, and the cover price of 220000 IRR (~3.5 $).

The book cover has the same uniform layout of this series of books, which are distinguished by the color. All photos, documents, and maps between text pages are annotated and in color. In addition to increasing the cost of printing, it prevents uniformity and eye fatigue. It also gives information to the audience and helps them to visualize.

The first volume was published by Mr. Majid Mokhtari during 32 interview and 15 conversations in 2019. The first volume deals with the narrator's life and activities from his birth to the end of operation of liberating Khorramshahr. In the following, the conversation was entrusted to Pasdar (IRGC’s officer) Colonel Mohsen Rokhsattalab, one of the active narrators who was with commanders such as Hassan Bagheri and Hossein Kharazi. The interviews were conducted in 28 sessions, 12 of which are included in the second volume. After the implementation, typesetting and editing, footnotes and required documents have been added to the text and presented to the center.

Due to the change in the structure of the book, it was decided to hold some supplementary sessions and add to the original text. Dr. Hossein Ahmadi, the final compiler of the text, was in charge of holding supplementary sessions. He interviewed several sessions with the narrator and one session with Mr. Mohsen Nozarian—of active detection forces in Quds Camp and Nosrat Camp— and added them to the text. Although the present text has been adapted to the available documents and resources, in the published work, the narrator has reviewed and confirmed the current text.

The second volume of the book covers events of the imposed war from July 1982 (Operation Ramadan) to February 1985 (Operation Valfajr-9). At this point, the most important posts of the narrator were command of Quds and Karbala camps.

In the preface of the book, we read: In the third volume, the incidents and events of the war will be narrated by Sardar (IRGC’s General) Gholampour and his roleplaying until the end of the war.

 

 

Ahmad Gholampour (right) & Mohsen Rokhsattalab

 

In the introduction, Mohsen Rokhsattalab states, “Sardar Gholampour played a role as the commander of the IRGC's Karbala Camp and Quds Camp from Operation Ramadan until Valfajr Moghadamati (preliminary Dawn), and after martyrdom of Hassan Bagheri and Majid Baqaei in early 1982 (late 1361 SH), he was appointed as commander of Karbala Camp. To the end of the war, he commanded several operations. In the interview sessions, he answered the questions with the same motive of directing the operations in the war and spoke about the events and developments of the war, and did not hesitate to express the weakness and shortcomings of Iran's performance and the failure in some operations.

The book begins with the 16th dialogue and the narration of how to enter Iraq, the upcoming problems and the change in the combat structure and defense organization of the Iraqi Army. The narrator says, in Operation Ramadan, we dealt with the enemy with the same previous mentality and military power; the enemy which after several defeats against our forces, had revived its defense structure and revised its military approach, and by carefully examining the past defeat, it had discovered its weaknesses and our strengths. He goes on to say, “One of the success factors of Iranian forces in the past operations was their ability to identify geography and operate in areas where Iraq was weak.”

In the 17th interview, the narrator mentions history of the construction of barriers in Shalamcheh and he considers the most important problem of Operation Ramadan to be planning without using the enemy's weak points and without having Iran's past geographical capabilities.

The eighteenth section is about operations of Muslim ibn Aqil and Muharram. The general Gholampour explains it was supposed to capture a part of the important heights of the region to dominate Mandali—which was at the opposite side of Baghdad— in Iraq in Operation Muslim ibn Aqil in order to threaten the Iraqi army. This operation carried out under control of Najaf Camp on October 1, 1982, and succeeded. Immediately after Muslim ibn Aqil, Operation Muharram began on November 1, 1982 in Hamrin mountains in the north of Fakkeh and it was guided by Karbala Camp, and finally succeeded. This section also ends with memory of captivity of two soldiers of IRGC.

The 19th section is about Operation Valfajr-1 and scattered operations before Operation Khyber. The narrator discusses how the idea of “fire instead of blood” was formed, which was implemented by Colonel Sayyad Shirazi in Valfajr-1. After the unsuccessful Operation Valfajr Moghadamati and the casualties inflicted onto our troops, it became clear that despite the enemy's fortifications, nothing could be done in that area. Colonel Sayyad Shirazi proposed this plan. His opinion was that the enemy's fortifications would be destroyed by heavy fire and then the infantry would attack. In this way, less casualties will be inflicted onto our forces. Most of the commanders disagreed, but as Colonel Sayyad insisted, they contributed.

In the 20th interview, the narrator talks about selection of Hur al-Azim region for doing an operation and breaking the deadlock to enter Iraq. How to implement Operation Khyber—the first amphibious operation of the Islamic Republic— is the main topic of the 21st dialogue. Speech of Sardar Mohsen Nozarian, the intelligence officer is in the appendix of this section to better explain better the topic of detecting Hur. In the 22nd conversation, the narrator talks about Operation Badr. He says the commanders designed Operation Badr based on the experience of Operation Khyber; Of course, the enemy was alert in Hur and had built many obstacles. In the following, Gholampour mentions that in this operation, divers were used for the first time to break the line.

The topic of the 23rd conversation is failure in Operation Badr. The narrator points to things like vigilance of the enemy after Operation Khyber, creation of obstacles and ambushes in the waterways, and on the other hand, not changing status of our own commands, inappropriate planning, and that size of the selected area did not match with the existing power and capabilities.

In the 24th interview, the events before planning Operation Valfajr-8 have been reviewed. In this section, the narrator states that after intellectual and operational separation of AJA (Islamic Republic of Iran’s army) and IRGC, the commanders of IRGC held a meeting to select a new operational area. Finally, they decided to scout the entire border to check the areas that were capable of carrying out large-scale operations.

The 25th discussion deals with planning, scouting, training, how to pass troops through Arvand River, and use of fire and other related issues. The main topic of the 26th conversation is commanding in Operation Valfajr-8. Explaining situation of the command in this operation, General Gholampour states that the IRGC decided to act independently in the next operations after the failure in Operation Badr.

In the 27th and final discussion of the book, there is a general summary of the topics of Operation Valfajr-8. In the beginning, the narrator says that, according to military experts, a great work was done in Operation Valfajr-8. He further mentions achievements of this operation. He treats the capture of Iraq's missile base in the north of the Persian Gulf, the destruction of a part of Iraq's military power, and the creation of a new front to enter Iraq as the most important military achievements.

After a number of color photos with annotations, there is an index of people, operations, places, and terms in an alphabetical order, which is suitable for researchers of this field.

 




 
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