Dismissal of Bani-Sadr
Memories of Ayatollah Mojtahedi Tabrizi
Selected by Faezeh Sassanikhah
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi
2023-6-20
Shortly after start of the imposed war, Imam [Khomeini] (PBUH) appointed Bani-Sadr as Commander-in-chief. After that, he took over command of the war. As Commander-in-Chief of the forces, Bani-Sadr cared somehow the army [(Artesh)]; while not only he did not cooperate with IRGC and did not care it, but also opposed it. I went to the front a few times and talked to several commanders of IRGC; they all complained about Bani-Sadr and said this man does not provide enough ammunition to IRGC. Once when I went to Ahvaz to visit the fronts and meet the fighters, we went to Darkhovin front with Engineer {Mohammad} Gharazi, governor of Khuzestan, and visited Major-General Yahya Rahim-safavi, then a commander of IRGC in the front. Several commanders were present and we talked about the situation on the front until 2 a.m. and listened to complaints of brothers in IRGC about Bani-Sadr. When the meeting finished, as we were returning to Ahvaz, we had not still walked a hundred steps away from tent of brothers in IRGC, we were confronted by Iraqis firing bullets and we were forced to lie down on the ground and declared the shahada (testimony of faith); even though the cannon balls or mortars were exploding near us, we did not have the honor to be died a martyr. I don't remember whether it was during this trip or another trip that when I wanted to return from Ahvaz to Tehran on Friday night, Mr. Gharazi said, “I heard Bani-Sadr wants to come to Ahvaz, and in order to prevent him to give a speech before the {Friday Prayer} sermons, you stay and give a speech before the sermons. This proposal was made in the same guest house of the governorate where Ayatollah Khamenei was also present. I shared the proposal of Mr. Gharazi with Hazrat Agha {(Khamenei)} and he also approved it; so I stayed in Ahvaz and spoke before the sermons.
In the incident on March 5, 1981, which happened in Tehran University, Bani-Sadr weakened all the revolutionary institutions and his agents arrested people and took their identification cards out of their pockets while Bani-Sadr was speaking and said this person is a committee’s guard (Pasdar), is an IRGC’s guard, is a member of Mostazafan Foundation, and so forth; such contents were expressed behind the podium. At that time, the situation in the country was really worrying and the conflict between the president and other officials of the country, especially with martyr {Mohammad} Beheshti (Rezvanollah Allayh, it means may Allah grant him heaven) and other leaders of the Islamic Republic Party, was increasing more and more. Both Agha (refers to Ayatollah Khamenei) and Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani and in general the heads of the Republican Party were disagreed with him. Bani-Sadr published a newspaper called “Islamic Revolution”, in which he regularly wrote articles against leaders of the Islamic Republican Party. The Republican Party also stood up against him and due to these disputes, the country’s foundations were falling apart.
We knew Imam was upset about this situation and once we heard he had threatened to take back what we gave to everyone. At the same time, considering the situation of the country, Imam called for patience, peace and unity. But when it became clear that advices of Imam had no effect, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament) decided to vote for political incompetence of Bani-Sadr. However, since Bani-Sadr was the successor of Commander-in-Chief, they did not dare and were waiting for Imam to remove him from the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, as a result of violations by Bani-Sadr and escalation of tensions, Imam dismissed Bani-Sadr from Command-in-Chief of the forces; on the same day, members of the parliament gathered immediately, and some of them, including Sayyid Mohammad Kiavesh, representative of Abadan, and Dr. Zargar, started fighting and discussed also with me about the matter. Then the bill of political inadequacy was written and signed. The first signature belonged to Mr. Kiavash and the second was mine. Of course, before writing this bill, because it was heard that Bani-Sadr might be removed from the presidency, some of the hypocrites (Monafeghin) constantly called my home and threatened if you take any action for removing Bani-Sadr, we would finish you off. I don't know how they had been found out that we were going to do this. Mr. Kiavash also got signatures from others and the number exceeded one hundred and twenty. Thus, urgency of the political inadequacy bill of Bani-Sadr was introduced in the First Parliament. During those few days, people demonstrated around the parliament and demanded the removal of Bani-Sadr. After approving urgency of the bill, public session of the parliament was held to impeach Bani-Sadro on June 21, 1981. Only Moeenfar gave a speech in support of Bani-Sadr; he spoke very badly and harshly, and then tore up his speech note as a sign of protest and sat down. Majority of the representatives, except for one person who voted against the bill and a few people abstained, voted in favor of the impeachment. In this way, the president was removed from his position and Imam also approved. The result of the approval of the parliament was written for Imam, and the Imam also wrote in a short statement:
In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
After the overwheleming majority vote of the honorable representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly that Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is not politically competent for the presidency, I removed him from the presidency.
Ruhollah Al-Mousavi Al-Khomeini, June 22, 1981
Along with Rajavi, Bani-Sadr escaped by wearing women's clothes and went to France. After that Bani-Sadr fled the country, the presidential election was held and the people voted for Shahid Rajaee (Rezvanollah Alayh), who was a non-clergy but religious, committed, imitating (Taghlid) Imam, and a suffered person and on the line of revolution.
Source: Samira Azimi Galoojeh (ed.) (2021) Memories of Ayatollah Mojtahedi Tabrizi. Interviewed by Morteza Mirdar, Tehran, Cultural and Artistic Institute and Publications of the Islamic Revolution Document Center, p. 96.
Number of Visits: 1982








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