Oral History Interview with Mohsen Rezaie – Part Two

The quality and method of transforming Iran’s defensive power to an invasive one and also pursuing war targets and the challenges to achieve them, are not clear cut yet. In this part of interview with Dr. Mohsen Rezaie we have tried to discuss about some basic issues of Iraq-Iran war and have insisted on theorizing it.

Mohammad Doroodian: What is meant by revolutionary war? Is it by means of method or goal?

Mohsen Rezaie: Goals and essence. First the essence and then the goals. When I referred to victory, I did not mean mere military victory, I had political, revolutionary and cultural dimensions of the military advancement in mind too. One could not expand this definition to our defeats, of course. In case of defeats we have never said we have experienced failure because we were acting according to our revolutionary principles. This was not accepted for us. After Badr operation we believed that every operation should result in victory. There should not be any defeat. Thus there is a fine border whether our war was a military or a revolutionary one? Was it annexation or not? We wanted the revolution to be expanded through war.

Mohammad Doroodian: Considering your smartness and mental power, I think your commitment to war does not let you to go beyond this subjects, but if you could ever pass it, future generations would acquire much experiences about war through your mental ability. We could also use your mentalities and perceptions for future wars and to criticize the previous one. You, more than others, have the ability to pay attention to the implication that revolutionary goals cannot be advanced through popular war. Popular wars can only be used for defending or liberalizing.

Mohsen Rezaie: I really believed that revolution could be expanded through war then, and have mentioned it in my analysis and words.

Mohammad Doroodian: But the result of war showed that the revolution stopped in war because for that, great victories and collapse of Saddam were needed. Hence your theory has failed.

Mohsen Rezaie: No, it is not so. You were not the chief decision maker in war.

Mohammad Doroodian: These are the reasons for that. When you are talking about the reasons, you are trying to keep yourself and your distance. But just when this distance is ignored, you can reach a theory and we can take more advantage of it.

Mohsen Rezaie: I think Kheybar operation could collapse Saddam and Basra could be separated and Iraqi regime could have been destroyed, if it was completed successfully.

Mohammad Doroodian: But I think none of the operations done in Iraqi soil had any indication of Saddam collapse, if they were victorious.

Mohsen Rezaie: You should consider who is ruling in Iraq now? They are all those who played along us during war and after khoramshahr freedom.

Mohammad Doroodian: I think these cannot be considered as proper reasons.

Gholamali Rashid: So, name a successful operation. Do you think it is Kheybar? But did Beyt-ol-Moghadas operation have same implications of advancing revolution inside and outside of Iranian borders as Fav operation? Had it the same results as victorious operation of Fav?

Mohsen Rezaie: You should look at them in two levels. May be it is so in micro level, but it is not in global level certainly.

Gholamali Rashid: That was right if we had overcome Saddam.

Mohsen Rezaie: You should consider this point that how a country who was standing against Americans and was not dependent on Soviet Union, had been able to free its territories and also to occupy important parts of Iraqi soil?

Gholamali Rashid: That is true if Saddam had been collapsed and everything would end in the whole region.

Mohsen Rezaie: Our tactics never ended to Baghdad, if you remember, but we advanced to the point to ensure Saddam’s collapse. I mean in this case the whole system would be disrupted. Saddam was really disrupted. He could not be flexible as Americans. If we could persist on our movement, that mount would ruin. The Americans used the same movement factor. I mean Saddam problem was solved by continuation of American army operation round the clock.

Mohammad Doroodian: Are you implicitly approving Hashemi’s guidelines? Criticizing you, he had said, “I believed we should acquire a victory and end up the war, but they did not achieve that victory?” If you justify this, so you are caught in Hashemi’s trap and his guidelines to end the war with a victory. You said that if we had achieved a victory in Kheybbar operation, Saddam would have collapsed. He tells the same. I have myself referred to this in my words too.

Mohsen Rezaie: Why were not we able to do that?

Mohammad Doroodian: The answer to this refers to this discussion which they did not provide us properly, etc. But we should pass over these quarrels. We should look at it in a large scale and you can have this look. But your commitment to your deeds and defending of what you have done does not let you to enter these discussions.

Mohsen Rezaie: That’s not true. Victory in war was really important for us and we believed that we would win but this belief was weakened day by day. For example, in comparison to the last years of war, our power was multiplied two years after freedom of Khoramshahr. As the time passed by, this hope paled. I resigned after Karbala 5 operation, one year before end of war. In my resignation letter, I appreciated country officials. I wrote a letter to Hashemi that read, “now that I am determined to render this responsibility to another person, I want to appreciate you”. I wrote a letter to Ahmad Agha[Imam Khomeini’s son] too and praised his accompaniment. As we reached our golden time of our ability to take grate measures, we saw that we are drooping. Imam Khomeini had reached the same conclusion too. Imam in his letter after my call, which you (Gholamali Rashid and Haj Mohsen Rafighdoost) were with him then, wrote that there is the possibility of a disaster to happen in war if Mr. Hashemi and Ayatollah Khamenei do not contribute. I mean he was the first one who referred to a dangerous fate.

Mohammad Doroodian: I believe if the framework that is present between you and Hashemi is put away and nobody wants to find the culpable, you can contrive a theory about war, considering your abilities. Because of your cleverness, your mental ability and your macro-look, you have the possibility to contrive this theory -which is the result of war martyrs’ blood- through which we can discover the affiliation of war with revolution and it can be found out what kind of wars can be brought forth by revolutions. To me, popular revolutions cannot advance their goals by military victory.

Mohsen Rezaie: The only way to reach this goal is to have in mind the military victories in both levels that have been achieved or could be achieved. In this manner, we have allocated it more effectiveness than in military sense.

Translator: Asghar Aboutorab