Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 18

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini
Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh
Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

2026-2-22

Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 18

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini
Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh
Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

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Of course. Here is the translation from Persian to American English, rendered in a formal, analytical tone suitable for a historical or political context.

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The miscalculated operation

In late 1980, the main military operations of the Iraqi forces concluded, and the Iranian defending forces achieved the following accomplishments:

- Preventing the advance and neutralizing the impact of the initial attack by our forces.

- Halting offensive operations and forcing our forces to assume defensive positions on many important fronts.

This stage of the war was dangerous and fateful for Iran's Islamic Revolution. This was because the country was not militarily, politically, or economically prepared to enter the battlefield; moreover, the military blow that Iraq suddenly inflicted on Iran was relatively severe. Despite the fact that Iran lost a number of its cities and villages, and vast areas of its territory were occupied by Iraqi forces, the Iranian defenders managed to prevent the fall of important cities such as Ahvaz, Abadan, Dezful, and Shush. The result of this resistance prevented Iraq from achieving its dangerous military objectives. These goals, which were announced by the Iraqi regime shortly after the start of the war, were essentially aimed at overthrowing the revolutionary system and partitioning Iran into smaller regions.

Our operational area stretched from the southeast of Ahvaz to the west of the city of Hoveyzeh. The Iranian defenders in this area, by utilizing natural barriers such as rivers and forests, blocked all paths of advancement for the attacking forces. The Iranian forces flooded this area with the waters of the Karun and Karkheh rivers, which were under their control at that time. The strong current of these two rivers played an effective role in preventing our forces from advancing towards Ahvaz, Susangerd, and Hamidiyeh, often forcing them to retreat. This water barrier left such an impact on the military personnel that they were unable to achieve their predetermined objectives. This same situation gave the Iranian forces the opportunity to strengthen their defensive system and kept our forces occupied with constructing earthen dams and roads. This matter caused them to endure great effort and spend a lot of time. The Iraqi army employed civilian institutions to build roads and dams, as well as combat engineering forces, to prevent the water from flowing towards the troops.

Here, to introduce the title of this section of the book ("The Miscalculated Operation"), I will temporarily leave the battlefield environment and return to the world of politics and revolution.

The Islamic Revolution witnessed political and ideological tensions between revolutionary groups and their rivals—something that usually occurs during any popular revolution. The most significant of these confrontations took place between the supporters of Ruhollah Khomeini and liberal elements led by Abolhassan Banisadr, as well as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq of Iran. The two sides disagreed on many of the country’s current issues, including foreign relations and, in particular, the war and how to deal with it both domestically and internationally. Various factors enabled Iraq to gain a number of political and military advantages in the early days of the war. The most important of these were the revolutionary government’s preoccupation with its own internal instability, the weakness of Iranian Armed Forces due to the transformations and upheavals of the revolution, the mismanagement of Banisadr as the country’s president, and, finally, the outbreak of internal conflicts.

With the announcement of the initial war results, Banisadr’s leadership gradually came under question, and doubts about him began to grow. For this reason, while attempting to remove any suspicion about himself, he also sought to achieve a series of political gains through the war. Among his most prominent views and ideas in this regard was his exclusive reliance on the army for the defense of the revolution and Iran, and his opposition to depending on popular and revolutionary forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Banisadr tried to use his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to implement his theories and objectives. In contrast, the supporters and associates of Khomeini insisted on making use of all available capabilities of the army, the people, and revolutionary institutions. The validity and effectiveness of this approach were demonstrated in the later stages of the war, when the unity and coordination of the army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and popular forces led to major and significant victories on the operational fronts.

Furthermore, a series of issues afflicting the army demonstrated Banisadr's weakness of insight, for the logical reasons detailed below:

- The weakness and lack of preparedness of the Iranian army of that day to confront the experienced and heavily armed Iraqi army, and the need for Iran's regular forces to have a long period of time to organize and strengthen their own combat capabilities.

- The ineffectiveness and idling of the capabilities of the people and revolutionary organizations that brought about the popular uprising and overthrew the Shah. The reality is that sending these capabilities and creative forces to the battlefield did not require a long time. Although this matter was not hidden from someone like Bani Sadr, since he was captive to his personal inclinations and the pressures from those around him, namely the Mujahedin-e-Khalq and other liberals, he evaded the timely dispatch of capabilities and equipment to the front.

Since Banisadr was determined to impose his own views, he rapidly assembled several divisions of the Iranian army and sent them to carry out miscalculated and hasty attacks against Iraqi forces. The outcome of all these actions was the swift defeat of Iranian troops and the infliction of heavy losses in the regions of Susangerd, Ahvaz, and Dezful.

In addition, the waste of manpower and resources that the Islamic Republic of Iran urgently needed at that time, the strengthening of Iraqi morale, the increase of their ambitions toward Iranian territory, and the consolidation of their military and political position were among the other consequences of Banisadr’s actions. In reality, the conditions of that time required that, alongside the government and the army under Banisadr’s command, all revolutionary forces rise up against Iraq’s aggression; and this was precisely what Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers emphasized.

Leaving politics and its twists and turns behind, I now return to the front lines, filled with smoke and gunpowder.

On a sunny winter morning in 1981, precisely on January 5th, I was present at the casualty evacuation headquarters located in the Jofair region. As daylight brightened, the temperature also rose. Calm and security prevailed across the entire front. This pleasant situation continued until 8 a.m., when suddenly the sound of artillery and tank fire coming from the direction of Susangerd towards us was heard. As time passed, the intensity of the sounds increased, to the extent that the fire of the artillery shells was visible to the naked eye.

From that terrifying atmosphere, it felt as though a major attack had begun and the nightmare of death was surrounding us from every direction. We were a group of doctors who did not know what we should do to face the events that were about to unfold around us. In any case, we sensed the danger and had to prepare ourselves in advance. A full alert was ordered. We were waiting for the first person returning from the battlefield to bring hopeful news. Suddenly, a wounded lieutenant colonel arrived. He was the commander of one of the tank battalions of the 43rd Armored Brigade. He had been shot in the back of his leg and was in a deeply humiliated state of mind. After a careful examination, I realized that he had been hit while fleeing. He had been transported to the casualty headquarters by a construction vehicle. I asked him, “Sir, what’s up?”

He said, “At dawn, Iranian forces launched a large-scale and surprise attack from the Susangerd–Hoveyzeh axis, where the 9th Armored Division was stationed, and they have made significant advances.”

After a short while, a number of fleeing soldiers—most of them from the 14th Mechanized Brigade—entered, covered in mud from head to toe. The mass of deserters, the continuous shelling, and the flood of wounded poured intense fear and panic into the hearts of our men. Terrified, they gathered up all their equipment and belongings and prepared to flee. Chaos took over the situation.

I, however, was pleased by this, because I had been expecting such a day—when the Islamic Republic would be able to deliver an appropriate response to the Ba'athist aggression.

To be continued…