At the session “Oral History of Crisis” it was discussed:

The Role of Recording Oral History During War: Yes or No

Report on the Session Oral History of Crisis – Part 1

Maryam Asadi Jafari
Translator: Fazel Shirzad

2025-9-1

According to the Oral History website, the session “Oral History of Crisis” was held on Tuesday, August 19, 2025, organized by the Library, Museum, and Document Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The speakers included Hojjatoleslam Saeed Fakhrazadeh, Secretary of the Association of Documentation and Historical Research Centers of the country; Dr. Mohsen Kazemi, writer and researcher; and Dr. Ali Tatari, who also served as the moderator. The event took place at the Farvardin building.

At the beginning of the session, Dr. Ali Tatari stated: “One of the programs pursued under the new presidency of the Parliamentary Library is the organization of specialized meetings. Five research groups have been formed under the Research Department of the Library, one of which is the ‘Archive and Museum Studies Group.’ This year’s program also includes archival and oral history activities. Over the past year, this is the third session on oral history we have held. However, it is the first time we have dedicated a session specifically to oral history in crisis, perhaps prompted by the consequences of the recent 12-day war — a subject that deserves thorough attention.

Oral history is a method of producing historical documentation, recognized worldwide as a legitimate approach. Crisis, however, is a broad concept with complex definitions and analyses: we have economic, social, political, cultural, and even personal crises. Yet, considering our field of work, we chose to focus on oral history of crisis with emphasis on war. Both of today’s speakers are experienced experts in the theory and practice of oral history of war. History belongs to the present and the future — it prevents the repetition of past mistakes and serves as a lesson for generations to come. From any perspective, history is a tool employed even in times of crisis. Oral history, as one branch of historical documentation, raises the first question: is it possible to conduct oral history during a crisis, or not?”

The first speaker, Saeed Fakhrazadeh, said: “We have the experience of the 8-year war in our country, during which it was possible to interview people and collect their memories about events of the time. This was done in two forms: one with soldiers, civilians in war-stricken cities, and even Iraqi prisoners of war; and another with commanders — though interviews with them involved two categories: those within confidential military structures (where information could not easily leak out) and those through the media. So, during the war, oral history played a role in documenting parts of the living memory of that era. This shows that carrying out oral history in times of crisis is indeed possible.”

Dr. Mohsen Kazemi then emphasized: “Based on my studies and experience, I distinguish between ‘oral history in crisis’ and ‘oral history after crisis.’ What exactly is a crisis? And is oral history even applicable to it? For something to be considered a crisis, two conditions must exist: it must be unexpected, and it must involve existential threats to being and identity. If not, then it is simply a routine issue; even a disease may not count as a crisis. Natural disasters, however, directly affect our very existence and thus are considered crises. But can you really conduct oral history with someone while their house is collapsing on top of them? That is impossible. Oral history must be done after the crisis.

War is planned; negotiations and exchanges occur during it. That is not a crisis per se. However, war includes moments of crisis within it. Those moments can be studied, but we must ask: can they be studied through oral history? Certainly, during a crisis we cannot conduct proper oral history; at best we may capture only surface-level information. Because in a crisis, the priority is survival. When a person devotes all their focus and energy to defending existence itself, they do not think about oral history. After a crisis, however, the work requires categorization. Oral history is still part of history, and history always carries the veil of contemporaneity. This veil prevents a crisis from being studied within itself. Even after the crisis, we still need time to pass — to move beyond secrecy and prevent the study of oral history itself from triggering a new crisis or other problems. The goal of post-crisis oral history should always be to contribute to a better tomorrow and to help future generations.”

In response, Saeed Fakhrazadeh said: “The definition offered by Dr. Kazemi is one way of defining crisis. But our intended meaning includes unplanned events like floods or the coronavirus. Since our focus here is war, one definition treats war itself as a crisis engulfing society. At times, there may be lulls and moments of calm; at other times, intensity and escalation. But overall, we call that entire period war.

During those years, we faced similar challenges. When a military operation began, we had to stop other work; all journalists went to the frontlines and were distributed among different units for interviews. Before the operation started, interviewees would say: ‘The operation hasn’t started yet — what should we say?’ During combat, they would tell us: ‘Is this really the time to sit and talk? We have no peace right now.’ Right after the operation, they were busy treating the wounded and sending soldiers on leave, and they would say they had no interest in giving accounts — since they had just lost a comrade, suffered a defeat, or achieved a victory.

Yet, we insisted on conducting interviews in the field. First, because access to individuals after the crisis was never guaranteed: they could be killed or wounded, and then their testimony would be lost forever. For instance, there was a man in Kurdistan who played an important role in battles against Komala and the Democratic Party. We were asked to record his memories. We reached him one evening, and he had been encouraged beforehand to cooperate. We conducted about 7–8 hours of interviews. Suddenly, news arrived that an outpost had fallen; he gathered his team, rushed to rescue trapped comrades, and was martyred. We duplicated that interview and made sure one copy was delivered to his family, since he had spoken about his relatives, children, and friends. Without that timely interview, his story would have been lost.

Second, human memory fades quickly. People remember details best when events are fresh. For example, Mr. Ezzat Shahihi gave an interview right after the Revolution and recounted memories in vivid detail. Later, when interviewed again, he himself said: ‘Refer back to my first interview, because I’ve forgotten many details.’ The closer people are to an event, the more they remember. But over time, as people retell their experiences, they unconsciously edit their stories, moving away from reality toward idealized versions.

Oral history involves stages, one of which is producing raw interviews — just recording conversations, as Harvard’s project did, where interviews were published immediately. Our insistence on oral history is precisely to avoid purely propagandistic, unfounded, or even false narratives. In wartime, psychological warfare requires misleading the enemy or concealing defeats. But the role of the oral historian is verification — cross-checking accounts to ensure accuracy. This is what distinguishes oral history from propaganda. Sometimes oral history projects also require editing and synthesis, which takes time, but the raw interviews remain invaluable.

Oral history can, through meaningful interviews, provide accurate information to society. It is the history of ordinary people and the silent members of society, not only elites and officials. In wartime, ordinary people shoulder much of the burden. We believe the role of the people is not confidential; it is certainly part of the historical record that must be documented.”

Later in the session, Dr. Ali Tatari commented on Saeed Fakhrazadeh’s perspective regarding the importance of conducting oral history during war: “If you record oral history during wartime and broadcast it on national television, who is responsible for analyzing and filtering it at that time? How do we assess its consequences? I agree with several of your points, and I would divide your argument into two parts: oral history of war and general oral history. Conducting oral history during wartime is sometimes necessary — though we must be cautious about its publication.”

Dr. Mohsen Kazemi also continued as follows: “In the discussion of the pathology of oral history, the issue of memory is very important. In fact, one could say that the very philosophy of oral history lies in memory. The oral historian, by relying on techniques, methods, and tools, helps memory become dynamic. Essentially, the task of the oral historian is to fill in the gaps of memory. But I emphasize that we must pay attention to the layers of data obtained through oral history. What is examined in oral history, and what deals with the essence of history and human beings, is precisely this deep information.

Someone who creates a crisis does not himself fall into crisis. Rather, he may face a substitute for the crisis, and that substitute itself can turn into a crisis. The same is true in the discussion of classical warfare. When one turns to the commanders, it is impossible to obtain deep information, because such information involves secrecy and classified data. But what can be collected from the fighters or ordinary people is public information about the war, which is important in its own place and completes the puzzle and network of oral history. However, the kind of information that deals with the very essence of war—though events must certainly be recorded—cannot be addressed by oral history. What happens behind the scenes of decision-making and war policy-making cannot be collected during the war itself.

When we went to Lebanon for the oral history project of Hezbollah and provided the necessary training, Martyr Hashem Safi al-Din summoned us and said: We do not accept these things you are teaching. We are in a war with the Zionist regime, and the information that is to be gathered, considering the grounds for espionage, may harm us. The Islamic Republic has gone through many ups and downs, but only a few periods can be extracted, such as: the 2009 election, the events of 2022, or the events of 1981—each of which was a crisis.

After the martyrdom of Martyr Qassem Soleimani, 540 book titles were published. Some of these books also claim to be oral history. Has all this information really been obtained? No. Much of this information is superficial and journalistic. The essential information is in the hands of the Quds Force, and it is not given to anyone. If the Quds Force itself had an oral history section, it would be different. In general, the identity of movements and the identity of eras become confidential and cannot be disclosed.

To be continued ...