Imam Musa Sadr position about Iran
Translated by Mandana Karimi
2025-2-6
In the June of the same year [1977], I went to Lebanon and traveled to Najaf with a report on the situation in Europe and a letter from Imam Sadr to Imam Khomeini. Of course, again, the Iraqi embassy in Beirut refused to give me an entry visa. Therefore, I flew to Baghdad with the help of Yasser Arafat. The Palestine Liberation Organization gave me a letter of introduction and Munir Shafiq, the administer of Palestine Strategic Studies Center, gave me a testimonial. In that airport, I faced some initial problems, which I have explained elsewhere. In Najaf, when I entered, I first went to the house of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqir Sadr. The agent who had been sent with me from Baghdad, thought I would go straight to Imam's house, because at the airport in the Q&A I had with the high-ranking officers, I mentioned that my point of this travel, is visiting Imam and my aunt. Therefore, the Iraqi agent in Najaf, asked me about the reason for my change of mind, in which I answered, I have not changed my mind, Mr. Sadr's house is my aunt's house. Anyway, after a short delay and his contact with the security officials of the city, when I went to Mr. Sadr's house, the accompanying agent separated from me. Contrary to expectations and the common routine in Iraq, he refused to accept any money. In Najaf, I heard from Imam that the Iraqi agents have objected to his political activities and leading the revolution again. When leaving Iraq, if Mr. Doaei wasn't with me in the airport and didn't know some of the airport officers who were apparently Shia, I would have definitely faced some problems such as controlling the luggage and seizure of Imam's letters and statements and tapes of the Imam's speeches. God knows!
Imam was very pleased with the process of fighting. Ahmad Agha's presence next to Imam had made it possible for him to have reliable communication with Iran... During the few meetings I had with Imam, he asked my opinion about some political figures such as Dr. Sanjabi and Dr. Forouhar. He also asked about the information I had about Gen. Jam, who was living in England at the time. I told him about the flock of the fellows in the Union of Islamic Students Associations in Europe from Eng. Bazargan's soft and non-revolutionary positions. It was clear that Imam was displeased with insulting him. He said "Let me handle Eng. Bazargan's matter." This matter was important to us in the Islamic Associations because the Freedom Movement in abroad, especially its European branch, which was managed under the supervision of Sadegh Gotbzadeh, took a position in line with Imam's statements and sometimes went even faster than the Movement's branch in America.
In a trip, in middle of the April of the same year, Dr. Chamran came to Germany. Eng. Fereydun Sahabi and Dr. Yazdi came from Iran and US too. Meeting's plan was apparently the coordination the activities of Freedom Movements inside and outside of the country. In Freedom Movement members’ meetings, a detailed discussion took place. I participated in those meetings at the invitation of Sedegh Ghotbzadeh. Of course, at that time the process of events had not yet gained the necessary momentum. No one but Imam had proposed removing Shah as a fundamental solution. If the problem was only in the security considerations, it was understandable. But the statements of some of the clergies, especially Mr. Shariatmadari and associates and politicians affiliated with National Front groups spoke of political vision and not tactical expediency. Although at that time Eng. Bazargan in an interview with the Belgium TV -as I mentioned- considered it impossible to solve Iran's problem and crisis with the presence of Shah, but the other politicians’ statements, did not have the necessary clearance for the passionate youth abroad and from those statements you could not infer the negotiation of the monarchy. Eng. Sahabi also spoke about the chaotic economic situation and the pressure caused by the continuation of strikes that could have been problematic for people. Imam Musa Sadr who was aware of the results of the movements designed by him and his friends in Iran and believed that the Iran's society was getting close to its historical moment for fundamental changes, during the negotiations with Hafez Asad, he obtained his readiness to meet the needs of the armed struggles organization and informed it to the late martyr Motahari and martyr Beheshti. I suppose his letter to Imam was about the readiness of Syrian brothers.
Source: Tabatabi, Sadegh, Khaterat-e Siyasi-Ejtema’i Doctor Sadegh Tabataba’I (Political Memoirs of Dr. Sadegh Tabataba’i), Vol.1 Student Movement. Tehran: Orouj Publishing Co. 2008. Pp. 322-324.
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A narration from the event of 17th of Shahrivar
Early on the morning of Friday, 17th of Shahrivar 1357 (September 17, 1978), I found myself in an area I was familiar with, unaware of the gathering that would form there and the intense reaction it would provoke. I had anticipated a march similar to previous days, so I ventured onto the street with a tape recorder I had brought back from my recent trip abroad.A Review of the Book “Brothers of the Castle of the Forgetful”: Memoirs of Taher Asadollahi
"In the morning, a white-haired, thin captain who looked to be twenty-five or six years old came after counting and having breakfast, walked in front of everyone, holding his waist, and said, "From tomorrow on, when you sit down and get up, you will say, 'Death to Khomeini,' otherwise I will bring disaster upon you, so that you will wish for death."Tabas Fog
Ebham-e Tabas: Ramzgoshayi az ja’beh siah-e tahajom nezami Amrika (Tabas Fog: Decoding the Black Box of the U.S. Military Invasion) is the title of a recently published book by Shadab Asgari. After the Islamic Revolution, on November 4, 1979, students seized the US embassy in Tehran and a number of US diplomats were imprisoned. The US army carried out “Tabas Operation” or “Eagle’s Claw” in Iran on April 24, 1980, ostensibly to free these diplomats, but it failed.An Excerpt from the Memoirs of General Mohammad Jafar Asadi
As Operation Fath-ol-Mobin came to an end, the commanders gathered at the “Montazeran-e Shahadat” Base, thrilled by a huge and, to some extent, astonishing victory achieved in such a short time. They were already bracing themselves for the next battle. It is no exaggeration to say that this operation solidified an unprecedented friendship between the Army and IRGC commanders.
