Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 19

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini
Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh
Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

2026-3-1

Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 19

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini
Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh
Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

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Of course. Here is the translation from Persian to American English, rendered in a formal, analytical tone suitable for a historical or political context.

***

In such difficult circumstances, Dr. Ahmad Mufti, who was more frightened than anyone else, abandoned us while we were treating the wounded. Taking advantage of the brief pause during which the evacuation of the injured had stopped, I set out together with Dr. Sabah Rabi'ei to search for him. Eventually, we found him in a shelter adjacent to the doctors' quarters. He was crouched in a corner of the trench, anxiously smoking a cigarette. I told him, "Come outside. The area is completely safe. Come and help us treat the wounded!"

However, he refused to comply with my request. I said to myself, "By God, I will make a mockery of these cowards." I stepped out of the trench, found an empty barrel nearby, picked it up, and threw it with all my might onto the roof of the trench. Then I shouted, "Bombardment… Aerial attack... Bombardment…"

We mocked him and then headed to the emergency room.

Half an hour later, we witnessed an aerial conflict in the sky over Joffeir village, during which two Iraqi aircraft were pursuing an Iranian fighter jet. The Iranian plane managed to escape the clutches of the Iraqi jets. The Iranian pilot demonstrated remarkable courage and skill both in bombing our troop positions and in evading the Iraqi aircraft.

It was around noon. Columns of wounded, along with news and reports indicating the defeat of our forces, were being unloaded at the headquarters. Among this news was the gratifying report of the injury of Staff Colonel Tal'at al-Douri, commander of the 9th Armored Division, his transfer to the Basra military hospital, and the advance of Iranian forces up to the division's field command post. Gradually, the flames of battle threatened to engulf us as well. For this reason, Captain Jabbar, the medical officer, ordered us to prepare to flee the area. Preparations for departure were made. We were waiting for the order. A few minutes past noon had passed when we suddenly saw columns of heavy trailers carrying several tanks moving towards us. The trailers immediately unloaded the modern Russian-made T-72 tanks from their beds. Shortly after, these tanks headed towards the operational area. When we asked the soldiers, they said: "This convoy is actually the 10th Armored Brigade, equipped with the most modern Russian tanks, and its personnel, who are supporters of the party and the regime, take their orders directly from the Presidential Palace. They are trained to the highest standard."

It is worth mentioning that this brigade had previously been stationed in Basra as a reserve force. Shortly after, the 31st Special Forces Brigade arrived and joined the 10th Brigade. These two brigades, along with the 30th Armored Brigade, were among the counter-attacking forces against the Iranian troops. The remaining personnel of the 9th Armored Division took on the responsibility of supporting our attacking forces. After half an hour had passed, the clash between the two sides began. The Iranian forces consisted of the 16th Armored Division of Qazvin and another infantry division. During the fierce battle that took place using modern tanks and armored vehicles, many armored vehicles were destroyed, and hundreds were killed and wounded. A thick layer of smoke covered the sky so that the rays of the sun could not be seen. Gradually, the sound of fighting subsided, and by 4 p.m., the fire of battle was completely extinguished. With the arrival of a group of wounded soldiers from the 10th Armored Brigade and the Special Forces Brigade, we learned that the Iranian forces had been defeated and that the Iraqis were pursuing them up to the gates of the city of Susangerd. After calm was restored, I gathered information about the battle from the wounded officers. According to the reports of these officers, simultaneous with launching an attack from three axes in the Susangerd and Hoveyzeh area, the Iranian forces had also begun a small diversionary attack towards the positions of the 20th Brigade, located south of Ahvaz. Initially, they achieved successes on the Susangerd axis and, while disrupting the military formation of the 9th Armored Division, inflicted heavy losses on its personnel as well as on the troops of the 43rd Armored Brigade and the 101st Battalion. During this attack, in addition to more than 800 Iraqi soldiers being taken prisoner, countless spoils of war fell into the hands of the Iranian forces. They advanced about 20 kilometers deep into their territory and reached the field command post of the 9th Armored Division. However, they did not succeed in advancing on the Ahvaz route, lost 9 tanks, and a number of their troops were killed and wounded.

On the afternoon of the attack, with the arrival of the 10th Armored Brigade and the 31st Special Forces Brigade, the military situation turned in favor of our forces, to the extent that the Iranian forces retreated, suffering heavy casualties and material losses, and finally the city of Susangerd was besieged. The city of Hoveyzeh was also captured by our forces after the Iranian withdrawal. The results obtained from this battle were as follows:

1-   The destruction of the 16th Armored Division of Qazvin and its supporting infantry division.

2-   The capture of 50 usable Chieftain tanks as spoils of war and the destruction of twice that number.

3-   The siege of the city of Susangerd and the fall of the city of Hoveyzeh to our forces.

4-   Due to their disorganized retreat, the Iranian forces were unable to transport their war booty and were forced to abandon it or destroy some of it.

5-   The Iraqi regime exploited the results of this battle for propaganda and political purposes, and Saddam himself visited the front lines for the first time. All these factors boosted the morale of our forces and gave them greater enthusiasm for the fight.

Although I am a doctor and not an experienced or seasoned military officer, I can express my observations of this battle as follows:

A. The unpreparedness of the Iranian army on that day to launch a swift and crushing attack against the Iraqi army was proven; that failed offensive took place prematurely, due to the incomplete organization of the Iranian army.

B. The Iranian government did not exploit the potential of the civilians living in the operational area on that day. It could have utilized these resources for guerrilla-style operations against the Iraqi forces.

C. The lack of adequate air support for Iran's attacking ground forces. This paved the way for us to repel the attack and left the Iranian forces easily exposed to Iraqi aircraft. Some attribute this to the heavy losses sustained by the Iranian Air Force, as Bani Sadr had maximally utilized this force in the early stages of the war. Of course, the shortage of spare parts and ammunition was also an additional factor.

D. Despite the shortages and a series of mistakes, it was possible to exploit the initial success of the attack and dispatch reinforcements to continue the operation. Unfortunately, however, no plan was devised to mobilize reserve forces, and this was one of the gross mistakes committed by the army commanders and responsible officials.

E. The course of the battle demonstrated the predominance of its political dimension over the military one, because Banisadr hastened to send a congratulatory telegram to Imam Khomeini while the battle was still in its early stages and its final outcome had not yet been announced.

In a word, it can be said that this battle proved the failure of Banisadr's theories regarding the handling of the war, and this very fact destabilized his domestic political position.

To be continued …