That black cloud and the bold decision of commanders
Ali Takallou
Translated by Mohammad Bagher Khoshnevisan
2016-05-29
Note: Before retirement, Brigadier General Azizollah Pour Kazem was in charge of the Engineering Unit of the Joint Staff of Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and retired in 2009. At present, he is a lecturer in Isfahan’s Islamic Azad University, teaching holy defense. He is also in charge of the Congress of Commanders and 2300 Martyrs of Khomeini Shahr and the Director General of the Defense Engineering and Passive Defense of the Middle Area of the Defense Ministry which covers the provinces of Isfahan, Yazd, Chahar Mahal Bakhtiari, and Markazi.
*We are going to have an interview with Brigadier General Azizollah Pour Kazem about Moharam Operation during the holy defense and the Iraqi imposed war against Iran as well as his memoirs of the operation.
At first tell us how you were dispatched to the war fronts in the beginning of the operation? Explain us about your conditions, situation and the unit you were serving.
*The direction of the war can be categorized into three stages. The first one was that the then officials, especially popular forces and IRGC concluded that the enemy should be stopped wherever it had occupied our land so that it could not continue advancing. The second stage was to kick the enemy out of the occupied lands. And this was done until the end of Beit-al Moqaddas Operation. And the third one was the punishment and pursuit of the aggressor in its soil which started from Ramazn Operation. In view of the significance of the Iraqi city of Basra, the war commanders in various meetings with Imam Khomeini (God bless his soul) convinced him that this area should be used.
Ramazan Operation started on 14th of July 1982 and in the climax of the hot weather of Khuzestan Province. Due to some reasons and according to existing documentations, after Fat’h-al Mobin Operation, the Americans took the responsibility of Saddam’s war room. Passing through the obstacles created by the enemy killed time since one of the elements used in the operations was the element of surprise. Against this element, the enemy started creating obstacles so that we could not pass and to confront with our armored units. Ramazan Operation was a widespread operation but did not produce desirable result. The commanders were after finding another way, and on the other hand, the foreign media was advertising that Iran liberated its lands but had not the power to continue the war. Thus, Iran concluded to design smaller operations. Then the Moslem Ibn Aqil Operation in Soomar was designed which was successful. The second operation which was designed was Moharam Operation. The Iranian town of Moosian was in the hand of Iraqis. They had been deployed in the altitudes of Hamrin and overlooked the city of Dehloran, and Ein-e Khosh road was in the range of the Iraqis. It means that if we wanted to move from western fronts to southern ones, we had to come to Ilam and then from Ilam to Lorestan and from Lorestan to Andimeshk. But if we could liberate this road, we did not need to pass this long way. The plan for operation was designed. At that time, discussion over the development of the IRGC armored units had been raised. The brigades were supposed to turn into divisions in the units which had set up brigades first, and every division had three brigades.
The town of Khomeini Shahr was the only town in which two IRGC bases had been deployed at that time. At present it has two IRGC resistance zones. Since the forces were scattered in the units and was difficult to be inspected, the commanders agreed with the unit commander Ahmad Kazemi that the forces were deployed in this unit from 15th of August 1982. The IRGC in Isfahan also agreed. The IRGC in Khomeini Shahr appointed me as the brigade commander. But when we decided to launch the units, it became concurrent with Moharam Operation. The first stage of the operation was carried out on first of November 1982. We had come to the area three days before the operation and were looking for the division commander. Another success at that time was that all combatants liked to be part of ordinary forces and to raise a gun and fight. It was also our destiny to take a gun and fight. There was an important point regarding Moharam Operation was the situation of the area. Until that time, our areas were in Khuzestan and in plains. But part of this area was in plains and other part in the mountains. Our unit was Najaf’s 8 Division.
*How were you sent to the war zone for the operation and explain about the beginning of the operation.
*After the Ramazan Operation in southern Iran was unsuccessful, the IRGC and the combatants concentrated on Basra since it was very important. The enemy had created obstacles and they had to change the operational area. They came to Dehloran area since October 1982. The war commanders searched for the entire fronts and concluded that this area was more suitable. When the area was selected, patrols and reconnaissance were carried out. A good work done by IRGC was to control entries and exits of the area, because one of our problems was the fifth column and every now and then, the infiltrating forces collected information and gave them back to Iraqis and when we wanted to conduct an operation, the element of surprise killed. The number of units which were supposed to have an operation in this area was limited. A few divisions from IRGC and the army were supposed to take part in this operation. It was more limited than the operations of Beit al-Moqaddas, Fat’h al-Mobin and Ramazan. They could identify the area soon. Since there was no embankment in that area, the Engineering Unit of Najaf’s 8 Division built an embankment so that the enemy misled. We had a battalion named Fat’h 368 Battalion commanded by Mohsen Rezaee. He secured the area at nights. As soon as the embankment was built, the forces were deployed behind it. The enemy had planted mines in the area. One of the first things the enemy had done was that they had brought a series of 40-50 kg barrels of chemicals. They had planted these barrels and connected them to their trenches via power cables in order to detonate when the Iranian forces came and caused huge casualties. Ten guys prepared. The fervor and passion which had created in the area was due to the mourning month of Moharam. Mourning ceremonies were held at nights. The forces were supposed to move on the night of the 31st of October, and advance toward the enemy’s positions as near as possible, because they wanted to climb the altitudes and lose much of their energy and achieve their goals soon.
*Where were you deployed?
*In a school in Dehloran. Then we advanced and set up tents in a plain located behind the altitudes. The Iraqis had no view on it. We deployed there in order to be near the operational area. Some twenty days before the operation, the guys had moved there but I had gone three days before the operation. We deployed in the tents. It was announce on the morning of 31st of October that we had to move. All of the guys were worried. Why? Because all the operations were carried out in the second half of the lunar month when the weather is dark. But this operation was supposed to be launched on the 14th night of the lunar month. The thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth nights of the lunar months are the lightest nights. After these nights, the lightness faded away gradually. The guys were very worried. But the good thing was that all of the Basiji (volunteer) and IRGC forces were obedient. They said, “The order of the division commander is the order of Imam Khomeini, and his order is the order Imam Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance). So we had no problem and obeyed.” But at the same time, we have seen God’s works. When the guys ate their lunch at noon and we started moving, a black cloud appeared in the sky and the weather became so dark that seeing an almost a long distance was very hard. The forces moved and even some of the battalions deployed near the Iraqis and the enemy did not see them. The blessing of God did not limit to this. Before sunset, the rain started falling little by little. The forces got very happy. But at the same time, they feared of the barrels of chemicals because the guys the intelligence operation who had gone for identification had concluded that they were chemicals. They had cut the cables of some of the barrels which were in the mine field. But they failed to cut them entirely.
*It was said somewhere that Iraq had used chemicals, did it mean the same barrels or was it chemical attacks?
*These chemical barrels were used in the first operation. But artillery and aircrafts were used in Kheibar Operation for this. At any rate, the forces started moving and we went into a canal which was near the Iraqis. Some battalions had been deployed around us. The rainfall was intensified before the evening prayer (sunset). Since we had no time to say congregational prayer, we were told to say our prayer individually. It was raining cats and dogs. The deputy commander of our battalion was Mr. Qassem Shiroy who wore glasses. When he was praying, he put his glasses beside himself but the heavy rainfall caused flood and the guys shouted, “Flood! Get out of the canal immediately.” But the flood took his glasses. The forces helped each other to come up from the wall of the canal. We were some 330 and about 130 of them had put aside their boots and guns to pray but the flood took them. Nevertheless, we had no casualty. We had no news of other fronts. There is a famous hill called Ertefa 290. We were supposed to seize the hill in two ways. One was to attack it from the front and the other to circle the hill, because it had a steep slope from the front. Martyr Major General Kazemi had deployed two battalions in order to distract the enemy forces. Several forces had also been deployed to circle from behind and seize the hill.
*Can you tell us now the situation of that hill?
*The situation of the hill was toward Moosian and Ein Khosh.
*Was it located in the west of Moosian?
*Yes, it was. This was the situation where the guys were supposed to do. But when it rained, the guys said, “With this rainfall, the operation is not possible.” On the other hand, the rainfall had washed all the mines and chemical barrels. No mine had been remained anymore. The Iraqis had built trenches for ambush. Since they thought that the Iranians could not carry out operation in this flood, they took the trenches away. The guys were hesitant what to do. The battalion commander contacted the division commander. He said, “Wait. We will inform you.”
*What were your conditions in this flood?
*I had said my prayer sooner; when I put on my boots, I saw that the water was coming up. We helped the guys to come out of the canal. We were among the last ones whom our friends helped us to come out of the canal.
* How much was the height of the canal?
*The height of the canal was some 1.5 to 2.30 meters depending on the slope of the canal. At any rate, the guys went out. At 10 PM, the commander of Najaf Brigade ordered to start the operation according to the order of the IRGC Commander with the code of “Ya Zeinab, Ya Zeinab, Ya Zeinab ((SA)”. It can be really said that two miracles happened in this operation; one was the black cloud and the second one the courageous decision of our commanders. It means that if our commanders had not made that decision that night, it was not possible to liberate the area anymore. I will explain the reason. When this happened, we started moving.
*At what time did you move?
*It was announced at 10 PM, but the battalion prepared to move at 10:30. Even the battalion commander told martyr Kazemi, “Some of the guys do not have guns.” He said, “Go and take the guns of Iraqi forces.” He said, “They do not have boots.” He said, “Go and take the boots of Iraqi forces.” They had not enough time to supply boots and guns for them. We started moving and reached t three-way. We had to go to the left from the three-way but we went from the right. The battalion of Chahardah Masoum who were from Yazd followed us too. As we were moving forward, the deputy of our company, Mr. Shirawi started crying out. He had a loud voice. He told the battalion commander, “Sir, you are going the wrong way.” He said, “No.” He said, “Believe me; we are going the wrong way. This is different with what I was already told.” The battalion commander contacted with the brigade commander. He said, “You have gone the wrong way. Come back!” we had walked for one or one and a half hour. So we had to come back again. Now, the battalion of Fat’hali Fallah (Chahardah Masoum (AS)) had advanced more than us and reached near the town of Tayeb. He had seen the town’s lights and told Kazemi, “Mr. Kazemi, I have come to a place whose lights are on. Where is here?” he had said, “It is the town of Tayeb. Can you seize it?” He had said, “I can. But it is different in counterattacks. How many battalions can you send for us to stay there?” He said, “No, come back.” He also ordered us to come back. We went back to the three-way and went to the right to bypass the hill. We saw that the water had just gone into Iraqi trenches and they had gone out of the trenches in order to evacuate the water and they had spread their blankets. Some of them did not believe at all that we had come for operation. We took some of them as captives and those who resisted were killed. In this way we could bypass the hill. We walked this long way to bypass the hill while the two battalions which were in front of the hill had reached up the hill. Why? Because there were no Iraqis who stood against us. It was around 3 and 4 AM that the whole hill was seized. A number of our forces continue advancing. We said the morning prayer and the weather became light. Ahmad Mohammadi was in charge of the Engineering Unit of Najaf Brigade who was martyred. His deputy was Abolqassem Tabatabaee who is now a commander in the General Staff of Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There were not enough loaders and bulldozers because there were limitations for the area. He had to go and see if the Iraqis had left behind any loaders or bulldozers. Suddenly he faced with a number of Iraqi forces. They were from the 606 Brigade of Iraq. He along with martyr Assizadeh and Mr. Qassem Mohammadi ordered them to stop. And in this way the entire brigade with its commander were captured. The operation came to an end until noon but the enemy started its counterattacks.
*Can you tell us where you were deployed when you circled the hill?
*we were deployed on top of the hill which was the main point since we could see the whole area. The situation of Hamrin altitude was in a way that it overlooked the Dehloran. It also overlooked Dehloran to Ein Khosh road. The Iraqis targeted from top of these altitudes our forces who wanted to move toward Andimeshk-Ahwaz road. Now, when this operation and two other stages were carried out, we overlooked the hill and did not allow the Iraqis to travel back and forth. There were two rivers in the area, Doyraj, and Meimeh. Three IRGC divisions and a brigade form the army were supposed toward Doiraj River. The depth of the river normally was between 20 to 30 centimeters. According to the plan designed, the combat forces were supposed to put off their boots in order to pass the river and then put them on at that side of the river. But the rainfall and then the flood caused the level of water to come up to 2 to 3 meters. Due to this reason, a number of the forces of the Imam Hossain (AS) Division were drowned in the flood and a high number (more than one thousand) of Isfahani guys were martyred in this operation. Also a number of others from Ali Ibn Abitaleb, Khoram Abad divisions and Hamza Brigade were martyred. But, the number of Isfahani martyrs was higher. It was not possible to hold funerals for more than one thousand martyrs in one stage. In a meeting with the people of Khorasan, Imam Khomeini stated, "Where in the world do you know that the funeral ceremonies are held for this high number of martyrs and in the afternoon of the same day, many people are dispatched to the war fronts." The funeral ceremonies for these martyrs were held in four or five stages.teh second night had been predicted as the second stage and even some of the units had acted as contingency forces. We were supposed to protect the seized positions. Hill 175 was among the ones on which the enemy was maneuvering a lot, because the lateral hill and Hill 290 had fallen. Thus, the second we all were mobilized. The first stage finished in one day. It means that it started on the day of 30th of October and ended on the night of 31st of October at 11 PM. The second stage started at 11 PM on the night of 31st of October and continued until 6th of November 1982. The clashes continued for 4 or 5 days during which Hill 175 was liberated. They concluded that the liberation of the hill was not enough. The hills of 175, 289, 290, 298, 398, and 400 should have been liberated so that the enemy was not able to have access. In the third stage which began on 7th of November, all of these hills were liberated. Zobeidat was also liberated and one of the forces of Imam Hossain Division named Mehrdad Azizollahi who was the youngest combatant was appointed as district governor. He was later martyred. A book has been compiled about him titled "The 14-year old district governor". Mrs. Fatemeh Kiani has compiled this book. The operation was successfully carried out in three stages but the enemy was persisting.
To be continued …
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