Operating Elements, Key Factors
Maryam Assadi Jafari
Translated by Natalie Haghverdian
2016-04-24
“Recount of war is not easy. Imagining the situation of war is very difficult for young generation. However, this is no reason not to recount it and these stories have to be told not to be forgotten. I swear on my white hair for what I’m going to tell you…”
The memoirs which follow are a proportion of observations of Brigadier General of Nasser Arasteh, supreme advisor of the General Commander of armed land forces, Chairman of War Education of Lieutenant general Ali Sayyad Shirazi and one of the commanders during the Holy Defense who recounts the sacrifice and martyrdom of telecommunication forces in the war; stories of men that we have rarely heard their names.
From Haj Omran to Fav
I move to Kurdistan voluntarily to fight counter-revolutionary forces. I was in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan two months after the imposed war by Iraq against Iran started where I was wounded and sent to Germany for treatment. My eye was cured that even now I have sight during the day. Although I was artillery officer in Kurdistan, I used to go on mission with Special Forces called “Nohead” at the time. I used to fight counter-revolution forces with Ranger Battalion composed of Sepah and military soldiers.
After my treatment when I regained sight with one eye I joined Division 21 of Martyr Hamza and I was appointed as chemical officer. I was in charge of chemical wars and chemical defense and training. In 1983 I joined the army and during the whole war I was successor and chief of army inspection. While I was in war I travelled from Qomeyjeh stream near Fav to the joint border of Iran and Turkey and Iraq which is Ashnuyeh on foot, twice. I visited all army battalions, including maneuver battalions and armored infantry battalions such as artillery and communications support. I would travel to the army headquarter and then from there to brigade and battalion headquarters by car and from there I would go to the troops on foot and from there I would travel to the next unit.
Crossing counter-revolution enclosure
I had categorized our defense by names. In hot defense was when Iraq was in line and we used to exchange bullets. The fire defense was when Iraq would attach and we would defend; also when we used to strike. My visits in the front were during defense and fire defense or our strike and those of hypocrites and Iraq. I had to conduct visits during sensitive events and when the front was calm I had no business there. That’s why I’m well familiar with all units; however my focus was on combat units in the fronts who were either striking or were under attack. Once my immediate presence was requested by Brigadier General Hassani Saadi in the North West Mission in Marivan. Through normal channels it would take two – three days to get there. So I jumped into a Jeep Mule carrying two folding Kalashnikov and couple of grenades tied to my waist with a smart soldier called Mehrtash who was from Isfahan. He was driving and there was Khani warrant guarding us in the back. He was in a chemical attack and passed away. We started the journey from border roads to Dehloran. Parts of the road was still occupied by Iraqis who were not present on the road at the time; from Paveh onwards it was taken by counter-revolutionary forces who couldn’t imagine anyone trying to pass the road. We travelled at night and nothing happened since the enemy didn’t realize that the car was not theirs. Then we learned that since 1979 no one has dared to travel that road and what we did was out of foolishness and not bravery. There Brigadier General Hassani wondered how I’d got there within 9-10 hours and I said: “we took the border road?” He wondered if I knew that road was occupied and I said: I didn’t and I didn’t check with intelligence before I set out. He commanded me not to do that again. Three years after was still that road wasn’t safe until Brigadier general Sayyad Shirazi was sent there to maintain control.
Telecommunication Soldiers, Operators beyond Borders
We had two groups of telecommunication soldiers in the fronts; those who were educated in telecommunication and those who were operators. To me both were the same; even tank radio operators. All of them were in charge of establishing communication between their commander and the soldiers or the headquarters. From this perspective, telecommunication is not combat support anymore.
In fact, there was no difference between the soldiers who were fighting to break the invasion line of the enemy and those who were in charge of establishing communication. During mine sweep, we had engineers and infantry along with privates and telecommunication officer. They used to consider one another as fellow combatants, which is very important. While advancing towards enemy lines to break it the combatants used to advance along with telecommunication officers.
Headless Messenger
At the onset of war we had one telecommunication group; then they were split to two. I’ll mostly refer to communication battalions since I’m more familiar with their operation. When I would go for visit, telecommunication battalion was with my group; hence I have many memories and I witnessed many incidents. I saw a soldier who was a messenger and telecommunication officer. Where wired or wireless systems were not in place or were not to be trusted, we used messengers who would ride on a motorbike and deliver messages to the commanders in trenches.
I saw a messenger who was martyred right beside me. In another incident the messenger on his bike arrived to the levee holding a letter. He stopped his bike to deliver the message. At that time we heard a loud explosion. We took cover. I look over and in a split second I saw the messenger still running but he was headless. He ran couple of steps without his head and then fell. I was the first to witness the scene and got to him first. My fellow combatants were injured. Later we realized that it was a 130 cannonball. His head was fifteen meters away from him.
The most important point is that messengers were carriers of the secrets of commanders and units. We couldn’t get the letter clutched in his hand and we had to forcibly open his bloody fingers. Ordinary people might just watch such incidents but it was lesson of life for me. It shows that bailment was important to him and although he was dead as if there was enough force in his fingers to keep the letter safe. Bailment is the most important training among telecommunication soldiers which was in this case institutionalized.
Helmet! Only support of telecommunication soldiers
All of those who were working with wireless or relay radio or teletype and were involved in repairing them were soldiers and high ranking officers of telecommunication who were trying to maintain communication between units and were innocently martyred. During mission they had no trench and shelter. Soldiers would take cover in forestalls but telecommunication officers while checking wires didn’t have any shelter in forestalls or in the headquarters. They had to leave their unit and travel to the next or to the next forestall while the unit commander or ambuscades or soldiers were taking cover in trenches. The only cover they had was their helmet and their God.
I would also like to tell you a memory of Jihad soldiers. There was a loader that was supposed to make a levee in Badr Mission. The massive units of Iraqi tanks were very dangerous for the limited tank equipment that we had. Suddenly we realized that the loader diverted and hit the levee. We approached to see what is going on and then we saw that the cannonball of the Iraqi tank has ripped away the driver’s body and only his legs were left behind the wheel.
These soldiers had no shelter and cover. When they would join their communication unit then they had shelter but when they would separate from their unit then they had nothing. Engineering groups were the same as telecommunication. They were innocently martyred. What I mean by innocent is not that they were oppressed but I believe that if someone’s rights are not recognized then he is innocent. They still are not recognized.
Infinite Knowledge of Telecommunication
It might be considered that we owe 30 to 40 percent of our victory to telecommunication; however, without that 30 or 40 percent victory would have not been realized. Hence, we shall not categorize various fields of operation since without communication no operation would have been possible. Leadership and control without telecommunication is not possible in war. For instance, a unit of 9 would be commissioned for combat against counter-government forces. Then we would separate into two groups. Each group had wireless communication kit and one was with the commander. Sometimes we would go places with no connections; even then we were trained to communicate through body language or flags. In war, in every situation, even the smallest unit had a communication means. In no occasions units were relieved of their communication means and sent for operation. Telecommunication staff and officers had trained us to use other means in case there was no possibility of telecommunication. We had learned to use mirrors to send signs. In fact, telecommunication is derived from signs and during war we had acquired this knowledge from those involved in telecommunication. In every war, telecommunication is involved and it can be traced in every victory and every failure, if examined, is due to failure of communication. In every operation, when Iraq would destroy our telecommunication headquarters we were sure that we won’t obtain victory.
Telecommunication and Strategic Coverage of War
Once we were in brigadier headquarters and I told the commander that I foresee an attack by counter-revolutionary forces within a day since they’ve attacked other brigades in the past days. I knew their tactics and I explained it to the commander and I told him which unit will be stricken first.
It was late midnight that we heard the attack through wireless walkie takies. The commander got into his jeep along with soldiers and moved towards the unit under strike. Fortunately, when we got there, soldiers had not lost their defense and we didn’t suffer many casualties. The counter-revolutionary forces left behind some. They had stricken using incendiary grenades and torched the trenches due to which 17-18 soldiers were burnt. Telecommunication trench of the unit had survived which had made it possible for the unit commander to be in touch with brigadier commander to steer the operation. In other incidents of strike, the counter-revolutionary forces had employed their agents and infiltrated the unit and destroyed telecommunication in which incidents the whole units were lost.
When brigades would lose communication with their division, in cases where the commander was not creative and prepared and couldn’t foresee such incidents, that operation was destined to fail. Any unit or division losing communication with its subsidiary or headquarters would have to accept failure. Combatant soldiers need to feel the support of their commander in war and that is the telecommunication which provides this support. When communication is in place soldiers know that their needs would be provided and aid will be there if they’re injured. I have seen no unit surviving without established communication with its brigade or division.
Farther beyond the fronts, telecommunication involved more scientific approach and its operation was more technical and strategic. In brigade headquarters the communication system was very complicated and in some cases they needed to be linked to the office of Imam (the Supreme Leader), which was very complicated since provisions had to be made to avoid interception by the enemy. In the fronts, the key role of communication was felt more but it was more physical.
In military base of artillery there was a piece of wood where 5-6 screws were installed. A power jack had to be connected to them to provide a communication center. The lieutenant in charge was from telecommunication division and the one who would answer the phone and order “Fire!” was also from the same division.
Telecommunication Officers, Strong Believers of God
Radio operators were the eyes and ears of their commander. They couldn’t defend themselves despite the fact that they were carrying guns but they were mostly busy with their communication tools. They were defenseless and their only hope was God.
I believe they were strong believers of God. Even if the commander would take cover, the communication officer would sit beside him to provide a better reception for wireless antenna. It happened to me in Kurdistan when we were attacked and I asked the radio operator to contact base. We had taken cover and when he realized that he doesn’t have good reception he sat and released the antenna. I was pulling him down but he was insisting on sitting. His life wasn’t important for him; the only thing that mattered was my order as a commander to establish communication with our base.
Once I was visiting the forestall post of brigade 30 in Gorgan. While going there I saw two communication officers searching for something in the open. I caught up with them and asked what they were looking for. They said: the forestall communication wire with the unit commander is disconnected. We are looking for it. They had no concern that the enemy might see and attack them. I visited the forestall post and revert back to the commander’s trench. Martyr Nassr Isfahani was with me. He asked: is the wire connected? The commander replied: yes! While talking to the commander disturbing news were delivered. Those two officers while coming back after connecting the wire had been targeted by the enemy and a nearby explosion had torn them into pieces. It took forty five minutes for their bodies to arrive to the unit.
Attack Invitation
Once I was in armored division 92 in Ahwaz in the brigade headquarters with a very active telecommunication trench. Iraq aircrafts bombarded it. Telecommunication and wireless antennas and towers were so obvious as if they were sending and invitation for attack. The enemy aircrafts would first strike trenches where a communication antenna was visible. I witnessed that during the attack to the communication trench all those officers were innocently martyred. Communication officers were frontiers of control and command system since they were trustees of the commander. They had all the codes and were selected among those trust worthy with high knowledge and competence. They used to carry all secrets of their commander and we never witnessed any treason, incompetence and disloyalty. I can confidently tell you that our communication officers during war were the purest, honest, most trusted and innocent and loyal soldiers in war command system.
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