Susangerd, Occupation, Liberation (3)‎

An interview with Ghodratollah Bahari

2015-12-29


‎● Which day at seven o'clock in the morning?‎
Eleventh of Mehr 1359, we moved by helicopter toward the enemy. A number of Green ‎Beret forces were also in the helicopter and we met them accidentally. Their commander ‎was a First Lieutenant who became Colonel and then an adviser. We came and reached to ‎Susangerd-Hamidieh road, where we saw Iraqi tanks have mired. They surrounded by ‎water and their crew have fled. We didn’t have anything to do with the mired tanks. They ‎were also no problem for helicopters.‎
Our helicopters had shot some cars. One of Iraqi’s cars which were full of ammunition ‎had left safe. Near Susangerd, the helicopter came down and dropped off us on the north ‎side of the road which was dry. For dropping off the troops, helicopter turns around itself ‎and raises dust. At the same time, troops get off. They lie down on the ground as soon as ‎getting off, so if enemy is seeing, not finds out how many have lain down and how many ‎have come. The enemy knows that the troops have got off, but not know how many they ‎are. We all got off, including green berets. Their commander was first Lieutenant parsa. ‎Lieutenant parsa along with his troop went toward the tanks which had been by the road ‎and its crew had left, so that, if someone was found, captured them. ‎


 
● How many were they?‎
They were eight and we were eleven, including myself. We moved to the Susangerd. We ‎did not have any clashes. Iraqis cars had been left around. A very nice reportage about ‎stuck cars of Iraqis was broadcasted in TV at the same day. It was the first victory that we ‎had got that night. I mean that the mired tanks whose reportage is available in television ‎and radio. When we got close to Susangerd, about 200-300 meters to it, we saw a ‘Jeep ‎Wagoneer’ with four door open at the road. We got ready for engagement. We went ‎forward and saw that no one is inside the car. Two G-3 had been dropped inside. Nobody ‎was there and all had fled. We found that the G-3 is Iranian’s, because Iraqis had no G-3. ‎But whoever they were, obviously were of fifth column. They had come to inform Iraqis ‎that we're coming, and now they have left their car here, dropped their guns and gone. So, ‎now why? Because they couldn’t enter the town with car. Iraqis had made a revetment at ‎the town entrance, so no car entered. They had barricaded. These members of fifth column ‎had found out that they had to turn this side or that side, had abandoned the car and ‎dropped their guns and gone. We, eleven people, entered the town. ‎


● Which direction you entered the town?‎
From the main asphalted Hamidieh road we entered into Susangerd and still had not ‎been involved with anyone. We got off the helicopter at 7:30 and now it is 8:30 or a ‎quarter to nine and we still haven’t shot anyone and vice versa. I had wondered what their ‎intent was by saying that Susangerd was occupied. We entered Susangerd and went ahead ‎until we reached near a square; close to there the shooting began. We divided in two ‎groups; one group ran toward a dry gutter on the one side of road and took a shelter there ‎by lying down in it, and the other group did it the same on the other side of the road. We ‎saw six tanks in square and a number of Iraqis had stood beside them. Meanwhile, in the ‎center of square, which was circle, there were some flowerbed and platform; and a soldier ‎had stood behind a heavy machine-gun behind the platform and someone give ammunition ‎to him. I mean they were two people who shot us by a machine-gun. But we were in a safe ‎location. All of their shooting would hit the asphalt and ricochet.‎


● What was your equipment?‎
We just had rifle and RPG, nothing else. For guerrilla mission, we still hadn’t been ‎equipped with mortar shells. In the guerrilla activities, mortar shell-60 is used. Our ‎equipment was not yet complete. As matter of fact, there was no distance between my ‎arrival to Ahvaz and making a group, and until now that we had confronted with a serious ‎clash. We were not still equipped completely, since one would be equipped due to his ‎needs. The lighter your equipment is as a guerrilla, the better. We have clashed. They shot ‎us and we had to shoot them. Our shoot was useless, but theirs was effective, and forced us ‎to lie down in the gutter. We couldn’t move. Dryness of gutter was the only chance. ‎Genghis Daniali, my soldier, had grown up in Ahvaz, but come from Kerman voluntarily. I ‎said: ‘Genghis! Back me up. Cover me, so I can shoot the machine-gunman.’ He said: ‘yes ‎sir, go ahead.’ I went a little ahead; I came to a crossing between the gutter and square. This ‎gutter led to another crossing. There, if I turned, the machine-gunman didn’t see me. I ‎turned to the right side. I peeped and found out that shooting the machine-gunman isn’t ‎possible, because the platforms completely have covered him. I couldn’t shoot him, unless ‎I go behind him and shoot. I had separated from troop and distanced about thirty meters. I ‎would keep dragging myself in gutter and search for a point in which I can get up and see ‎easier and also move more comfortable. Out of blue, I saw the door of a house was opened ‎and an Arab man was looking at me. I raised my head slowly. He said: ‘What are you doing ‎here?’ I said: ‘I’m of Ahvaz army.’ He said; ‘Ahvaz Army?’ I said: ‘Yes.’ He went inside. I ‎said myself they have heard the gunfire noise and clashes and not dare to come out of the ‎house. Perhaps for a moment he had opened the door to see what was going on. I was just ‎in the gutter in front of his house. Less than 10 minutes later, I saw Iraqis were shot from ‎rooftops; I mean that Susangerd natives, those who had stayed in Susangerd and hadn’t ‎left, began to shoot. I don’t know how he informed others? They shot with shotgun, G-3 ‎assault rifle, Vz. 24 rifle, M-1; in fact, everyone opened fire from rooftops with whatever ‎they had. ‎
In a proper opportunity, I swiftly went backward a little more and came out of gutter and ‎reached behind the machine-gunman. That is I crossed the street and went toward the ‎gutter, jumped into it, lay down, settled just behind the machine-gunman and shot him. ‎‎(Now, I have an official letter that shows I have shot him) After I shot him, enemy’s heavy ‎fire was stopped; because its heavy machine-gun had been paralyzed us. Above rooftops, ‎resident of Susangerd had shot some of Iraqis who had stood next to the tanks; rest of them ‎also had fled.‎


● Which direction they fled?‎
Hoveyzeh. They knew their escape route. I quickly got up and asked my troop to go ‎ahead, because they were seeing me. I said: ‘Guys, Run!’ we were able to chase after Iraqis ‎and except two of them that I had shot them before, captured 15 people safely. Maybe they ‎themselves wanted we captured them. Seriously! Some Iraqis had no desire for fighting. ‎But now that they had come and been caught, would prefer to be captured.‎


● Didn’t tanks move?‎
As I said before, we were two groups; one group was inside the gutter, the other one ‎went to chase Iraqis. They kept shooting RPG to tanks.‎


‎ ● Didn’t the tanks fire, during this time?‎
No. it is a good question. One of our goals was that they didn’t get to their tanks. If one ‎of tanks moved, we were finished all. We had clashed with them, so could keep them in the ‎field. The tanks had stopped one after another. We thought that if they get to their tanks, ‎we will be finished. The task of guys, who were into gutter on the other side of street, was ‎just that don’t let Iraqis get to the tanks. And they really did it very well.‎
Iraqis weren’t native, they were aggressor. Therefore, they feared of both natives and ‎military that had entered the town. They didn’t know that we all just eleven people. They ‎thought that a battalion and a division are behind us. If they knew that we are just 11 ‎people, surly they did differently. In fact, their commander should distinguish that those ‎amount of fires have not any support, so they are a few number. We took over them and ‎didn’t let them to reach a decision. Contribution of Susangerd natives was very effective. ‎That is, their contribution essentially helped us to stand. We took Iraqis to the ‎congregational mosque of Susangerd. When we were taking them to the mosque, I said to ‎the soldiers who shot with RPG: ‘stand there. If you saw that Iraqi soldiers want to attack ‎us, don’t let them at all. Why? Because currently we are just 11 military in Susangerd, but ‎the local people who are helping us. We don’t know where the Iraqis have separated in ‎Susangerd.’ This story is completed by next information. After tanks would be stuck into ‎mud, their crews begin to escape. Anyone who would come to the other, say: ‘run, leave ‎the tank and just run. They are going.’ They meant the same helicopter that we and 8 ‎people else were coming. Cobra helicopters also were shot tanks on the road and this had ‎affected their spirit. So, most of them had left their tanks and gone. Iraqi forces had also ‎fled from Susangerd.‎
However, these events all back to the people of Susangerd. We couldn’t be successful if ‎Susangerd people didn’t support us. We took the prisoners to the mosque and said: ‘Bring ‎some fabric for covering their eyes. Also bring some rope to tie their hands.’ In the ‎meantime, we saw that people were bringing other prisons to hand over. Who is this? ‘He ‎is responsible for their petrol stations, he is civilian ...’‎

 

To be continued…‎

Susangerd, occupation, Liberation (1)

Susangerd, occupation, Liberation (2)



 
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