The Unsaid about Ramadan Operation

Interviewing with Ismail Naderi

Ehsan Mansoori
Translated by: Zahra Hosseinian

2015-11-23

The day after the operation (Photo: Sadeqion site)

Note: I made an appointment to visit Haj Ismail Naderi, battalion commander of Karbala-5, who loses his two feet in Shalamcheh, at his house. He has many words to say. He teaches history at the University of Arak. In a rainy autumn day, I was his guest to hear about Ramadan Operation, which left so many talks behind the front line and made its commanders to be confined at their houses for a long time. It was rumored that Iraqis upset pitch in the channels and the Iranian commanders had taken their forces to the channels unknowingly, so they had stuck there and lots of them had died martyred. On the other hand, this Operation was more important because it was after the liberation of Khorramshahr.

 

Mansouri: Why there is a certain mentality about Ramadan Operation?

Naderi: I don’t know what happened that caused such a mentality about Ramadan Operation and some Arak commanders, such as martyr Asghar Fattahi[1] and martyr Rahim Anajafi[2], were charged by some people. The reason is of course was that the general literature of war did not know the concept of ‘missing’. People hadn’t faced so large with missing soldiers. For the first time, people’s minds was confronting with the concept of missing; that ‘your child has been missed and there is no trace of his corpse.’ Until then, either a soldier returned from the front, or was wounded and returned, or martyred or his corpse was brought, or was captured. So, it’s very heavy that one-third of a battalion in Ramadan Operation was missed. It was really a big and sudden shock for people in the cities and families. If, for example, we slowly and over time got to this stage - i.e. we first had 5 missed, then after six months, 10 missed, and then the next year, 30 or 100 or 200 missed, so that the people's minds were familiar with the concept – it was fine. But we had large number of missed soldiers in a situation in which people were joyful after a big victory, and they were in euphoria when shocked. There are always people who take advantage of the conditions, and they did it. Asghar Fattahi and Rahim Anajafi didn’t deserve it. I was dispatched first from Arak for this operation. Previously, I would dispatch from Tehran or Isfahan, because Arak didn’t still had detachment. Araki forces found each other and were organized and I was deployed with the battalion of Arak. Asghar Fattahi became the battalion commander and I was in charge of telecommunications.

 

* What was the name of the battalion?

The battalion name was ‘Nasser Bakhtiari’, because he had martyred recently. We went to Sepanta; a number of Iraqi prisoners, who were captured at the beginning of first stage of Ramadan Operation, were there too. There were ring barbed wires between us and we gave prisoners cigarettes and food and water. We and prisoners used the same bathroom. After that, a camp was built and the captives were separated. But before that time, we and prisoners shared everything.

 

* Where is Sepanta?

It is located next to the rolling mills, Ahvaz output toward Khorramshahr. It was one of the barns of rolling mills. We first were organized and then went to the tactical headquarters of army which was near Hosseinieh, 5-6 km from the Zeid station. We were ready for operation there. At operation night, when loaders and bulldozers opened the earthworks and made a passage for troops’ passing, the losses began immediately. I was a radio operator and all the time was with Rahim Anajafi and Seyyed Ismail hashemi. We had stood near the earthwork toward the enemy to monitor the passage of forces. Every other two or three was shot and fell on the ground and we dragged them out of line. After this earthwork, we should walk a kilometer to reach to the minefield and then enemy line. With these conditions, the troop moved. Rahim was the radio operator there. Asghar Fattahi, Rahim Anajafi, Seyyed Ismail hashemi and Masoud Moradi[3] were chiefs in our battalion. Rahim Anajafi was brigade deputy and successor of Mahdi Zein-eddin, but rather than he stayed behind and controlled the position and location of battalion by wireless, was within it. While normally he could stayed behind. He should sit at PNP and from there controlled the line with the information we gave him. In no operation I didn’t see Rahim Anajafi stayed behind and guide. Command team always went ahead almost fifty meters, in the case there would be problem or ambush. The destruction and information team should normally go ahead, but we go and reached to the barbed-wire barriers and minefield. The enemy dominated there, and due to operation of previous nights, there was no opportunity to open the passageway. It was supposed that the troop lay down and at the same time, destruction unit opened the passageway, cut the wires and neutralized the mines. The enemy had lightened the region as day. We were less than a hundred meters away from the enemy and they saw our movements, unlike often they shot region with angle. The enemy had dug holes in the ground with the depth of one meter to one meter and half, and had put Dshk and heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft on the ground. They shot the ground level, that is twenty-thirty centimeter above the ground, and in the way it remains no blind spot, so that Dshk and machine gun overlapped 5 to 10 degrees. This means that both of them covered full ten degrees, so that there would be no blind spot for forces’ penetration. The division of labor was very accurate. Even a bird also could not pass the ground level. Forces couldn’t go on the ground level. When the foot of soldier was shot, he fell down and his body was targeted. Iraqis had worked very well. The best thing was that our forces lie down and stick to the ground. They were ordered to crawl on their belly and cross the minefield. But whatever they stick to the ground and drag themselves, still they are higher than the level; especially those who had backpack which was contained RPG launcher. Bullets hit the backpacks and ignited the priming of RPG. The shots of Dshk and 23 and 14.5 blow the one himself. Colt shot explodes when hit the RPG priming. It ignites very soon. The reason is that it soon be ignited and can explode TNT and destroy tanks. Bullets hit the backpack, ignited the RPG, shells of RPG exploded and torn to pieces the carrier of it. Two or three of our troop exploded in this way. The rest could not tolerate it. So, they got up to extinguish the fire when they saw these scenes. They tried to fill their helmets up with the soft clay of region and suffocate the fire before it reaches to TNT; but as they wanted to sit down, swiftly getting shot.

The situation was very chaotic. That is all would get shot. I myself had lay down beside the column on the passageway of minefield, near the end of it. Perhaps I was less than ten meters away from the hole in which Dshks had been set. I said myself if Rahim let me go to crawling toward them, I’ll can knock them out. It was strange that in this 300-400 some column, 4 or 5 one were serving restlessly: Aam Rahim and Asghar and Seyyed Ismail and one who previously was addicted and our guys were uncomfortable with his presence. Only Asghar and Aam Rahim said that ‘Imam Hussain (AS) approved even Al-Hurr. Anyone can come here, that is the Front of Islam.’ No one say anything on his face but he was really great. He had covered his head by a keffiyeh and one by one took injured guys out of minefield and bandaged them. He shouldered one, or took under the arms of another. He did everything he could and finally he also died a martyr. Kurdish pants of Aam Rahim were shot about 20 and had been pitted, but he himself hadn’t been shot.

I and Asghar also weren’t shot. It is interesting to say about the intensity of fire. I had lain down on my belly and stuck at the ground. Wireless was on my back. Aam Rahim said: ‘call Mr. Mahdi Zein-eddin and then ask Hassan Darvish to send tanks or personnel carriers. Guys can’t cope with the fires of ground level. We have to fight them with armor and personnel carrier. Call and give me the receiver.’ I called several times, but I couldn’t communicate. Then I realized that the antenna is on the ground and couldn’t receive the waves. As the antenna was next to my head, I put my finger under it to up it. It placed straight over my head. As you know, Antenna is too long and thin like a knuckle, but was shot and cut. Fire intensity was so high. We weren’t shot miraculously. Everyone who was survived, God didn’t want him to die. It really was like this; otherwise, no one must come back from that battle alive.

Asghar and a group of guys went ahead to reach to the line. They broke the line and stayed there. But holding the line with 15 soldiers is impossible. Aam Rahim said that they back. They even destroyed Dshk and 14.5 by grenades and opened the way, but they weren’t one or two; across the region, there were perhaps 200 holes and 200 weapons which are targeted a group. The cruel enemy used weapons with which aircraft were targeted, but they set them on the ground and used for killing people. When someone had been shot, was exploded completely. Imagine, anti-aircrafts with two pipes used for shooting aircrafts. If the aircraft is shot from 5 km distance, it is destroyed. Now they shot soldiers from 100 meters distance. Well, it’s very hard. That weapon shouldn’t be used for men. It was inhuman. Not only there, but also everywhere was the same. When they saw that weapon is applicable, they always used it. Breaking the line was really wonderful, but no one had remained. All soldiers either had martyred or been wounded. There were no live forces to help Asghar. Mahdi and Darvish came back with motorcycle and said us to withdraw. Although we broke the line, but the rest of units couldn’t reach it and had casualties more than us.

It was morning when we returned from region. I fainted in our line above the earthwork because of so much stress and noise of the explosions, when it was lightening. I remember that I collapsed above earthwork this side and I don’t remember anything else.

 

* Why Asghar didn’t stay?

Asghar was sad about going back, but he couldn’t do anything else. It’s impossible to keep the line with just 15 one. None of divisions and brigades had come; therefore, he had to go back. He returned before lightening. Aam Rahim said to Asghar that if he doesn’t back, he’ll be captured, because no one has come for holding the line. Najaf brigade accompanied by a brigade of Division 92, but not the normal one, Najaf brigade with 12 battalions and brigade 92 with its own organization had gone there before. Two brigades went with all their power. The rest of units were unable to reach. Finally, they were forced to withdraw. Now one battalion and one troop had remained that its capturing was easy for Iraqis. That night passed with these casualties.

Fellow comrades took wounded away from the area when they returned. As far as we could, we took every wounded away, so not remain available for Iraqis. But it was in proportion to our ability. A burned tank was there and a large hole in front of it; we put the wounded inside the hole to bring back them tomorrow night. We tried to lie them down out of minefields and Iraqis’ territories not to be shot or martyred due to bleeding and thirsty. We wanted that tank to be their shelter, and tomorrow night will be at our hand. We would take wounded two or three nights and also martyrs up to a week. After all, we've lost a hundred one.

 

* What is ‘missing’?

When we don’t have any trace of a martyr, i.e. there’s no body, we called him ‘missed’. Because the enemy martyred him and his corpse left at their hand.

 

* What were its uses for enemy?

Nothing, we couldn’t bring them this side. The enemy also couldn’t come out of its region. Because it was minefield, in addition, if they came out, we shot them.

 

* Do hundred ones remain from Asghar’s battalion?

In remembrance of Karbala’s 72-people, they were known as 72- people, but they were more than a hundred.

 

*And then?

They returned. After the war, some of their plates and bones backed.

 

* What's the story of pitch?

There wasn’t important. Ismail Hashemi said that there is a channel in front of Iraqis’ line. When Mr. Zein-eddin asked him in wireless that if the channel is passable; he said: ‘it’s Gheel[4]!’ (In fact, this word in the accent of Shazand city means deep.) This word means that the depth of channel is so much that one can’t easily go into it and come out. Later we heard that people say that there was pitch in region, so that it has stopped troops’ going and coming, and they mired into pitch and Iraqis have shot them. We were at that region and didn’t saw any pitch or something like that. The fact is that there was nothing there. The word ‘Gheel’ just means ‘deep’ in the accent of Shazand city. Then this story was dispersed that Iraqis have filled the region with ‘Gheer’. Is it possible that Iraq could do that in such a vast region? With what tools? Reason is a good thing! Where they could bring pitch? If we consider the length of Shalamcheh area to Talayeh at least 80 kilometers and one kilometer for its width, how much pitch it needs? Steep of ground and geographical conditions also should be appropriate. After all, why the hell they should do that? If they wanted to stop our progression, they dug a channel; that of course, they did it. Seyyed Ismail two or three times said: “Here is Gheel!” as no one had heard such a word, they thought that he said “Gheer?" [As mentioned in footnote, it means ‘pitch’ in English] and he repeated: “No, Gheel." Several times ‘Gheel and Gheer’ were repeated and finally they thought there is pitch in region. Then, behind the front line it became ‘pitch’ and troops mired in pitch. While this was not so and the minds of people should really be cleaned. Radio and television, for example, broadcast a program and Seyyed Ismail and commanders of war were invited and clean the minds of people and say that it had been just a mispronunciation.

The biggest problem of troops at the Ramadan Operation was thirst. It was very hot. For example, after evening prayer, it was supposed that the last thing we do was that to fill our canteen full of ice, nothing else. We smashed and crushed large ice cube and filled our canteen. From Husseinieh to Zeid station was only 4-5 km. Then we got into the cars immediately and went toward the line. One hour elapsed when we settled behind the earthwork, and I had been thirsty. I opened my canteen and sipped a little. It was so hot and bad taste that I spit it out. Because my friends joked a lot, I thought that they’ve changed my canteen or they filled it with hot water when I had been distracted, or they’ve changed it when we all had gotten into that crowded car. I said to Javad Pakpur, who became missed there: “Javad! Give me your canteen.” He said: “don’t have water?” I said: “I do, but it’s warm.” He passed me his canteen. Its water was like my own. I asked another of my friends to give me his canteen; that one was the same. All that ices had become warm and bad taste water in one hour. In difficult conditions of minefield, our biggest need was water. We all need water and there wasn’t any. We were all of a sweat and sands had stuck to our body. Many weakened by lack of water.

Asghar and Rahim not only did their best, but also worked much more than their duties. Because society was not ready to accept this number of missing, the families couldn’t digest their children’s absent. To that time, this situation had not come to their family. Until then, either they were told your child has martyred and this is his corpse, or were told your son is captured and a few months later you’ll receive his letter. Eventually there was a trace. But the families of martyrs who had lost without a trace, i.e. they had martyred but their bodies were lost, and also families of missing one whom we didn’t know if they are martyr or alive, had the most unsettled conditions, and they didn’t know to wait for coming back of their child alive or for their martyrdom. During the war and even until now, 27 years after the war, these families had (and has still) the most unsettled conditions. They still wait for their child return alive and this is very disturbing, very heavy. We had many families like this.

After operation, we didn’t expect that Asghar to be treated like this in the city. We saw that the atmosphere of city is against Asghar and Rahim, so that they didn’t want to stay in the city. They didn’t come out of their houses or stayed in the IRGC’s office all the time. Some crowded in front of IRGC’s office and shouted a slogan or swore. They cursed, but it was clear that they have been provoked, because it hadn’t happened before.

 

*Were they martyrs’ families?

In the name of martyrs’ parents they came. We didn’t know them. The parents that we knew weren’t among them. In the name of martyrs’ parents, siblings and relatives, somebody came.

 

* How many were they?

They were in two groups of 30, 40-some or 50-some. I heard a few number also had gone to Asghar’s and Rahim’s house. It is improbable that they had been martyrs’ families; and if so, they did it by stimulation of others. Then, city was in a certain condition. Some had been rejected by IRGC. Even some had been rejected from the region. Somebody was claimant and supposed themselves bigger than IRGC and army commanders and Rahim and so on. It was not that Rahim or IRGC were claimant; something had been happened that they didn’t want to give them up. It was Bani Sadr case and their support of him. Even Bani-Sadr had gone, but they are still supported him. There were somebody in IRGC who were in agreement with Bani-Sadr, and then they realized that his view is wrong, especially when he fled with Rajavi. Nobody supported him, but there were a few who were difficult.

 

* Are there any still?

Some of them have been died and some are living. Then and previously, this group was very famous and had meetings. They were prominent until early 1360. Well, they had been excluded; so it was very hard for them to see Asghar and Rahim on that position. They would also be effective in this story. It was probable and analysis also showed that maybe these heavy atmosphere and condition, events, and even the large number of missing ones, who disappeared and there was no trace of them, would occur by their provocation.

It was interesting that we didn’t know those who came to protest and didn’t recognize that what relationship they have with each martyr. In fact, a suspected movement had been begun against them.

 

* Did you speak with Asghar?

We talked a lot together. Most of the time, he poured out his heart to me; especially on that situation, when there is so much pressure on him. We didn’t let him to be alone. We said: “Don’t worry, this is an divine examination." Meanwhile, he didn’t think that there is a story behind these events and protesters have been provoked. “Probably certain individuals are behind these events.” I said, “Don’t worry so much. Well, maybe some feel that they have defeated, and want to revenge. They are like foam; neither lasting nor sustainable. Time passes and proves other things.” He soon came out of that situation. Maybe if he was alone, couldn’t tolerate it. But people, like Masoud Moradi, Mahmoud Hosseinkhani, Ghazanfar Davoudabadi, Aam Rahim and… were very effective for helping Rahim to come out of that condition.

He said: “I did my best, but they are lacking fairness.” We said: “We ourselves were beside you. They don’t follow the logic that you say and they will be convinced. They are looking for creating a wave and isn’t important for them that you did your best or not.”

Finally, we could convince him for taking part in Muharram Operation; he came, but didn’t accept any responsibility.

 
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