The Delineation of Imagination and Reality in Memoir Writing

From Nowhere-Land to Utopia

Hassan Beheshti-Pour
Translated by Kianoush Borzouei

2025-11-12


Abstract
In every society, the past persists not only in documents and recorded events, but within memories, narratives, and the collective imagination of the people. What is registered as memory or oral history is often a combination of factual experience and mental reconstruction. Drawing on the concept of imagination in the philosophy of history and memory theory, this article examines, through an analytical–descriptive method, the relationship between historical reality and imaginative representation. Within this framework, the duality of “nowhere-land” and the “ideal city” is analyzed not merely as literary concepts, but as two modes of approaching the past and envisioning the future: one expressing an impulse to escape reality, and the other striving to award meaning to it.
This article emphasizes that, in contemporary Iranian memoir writing, the boundary between imagination and truth is neither eliminated nor denied, but must be recognized, guided, and ethically anchored. A disciplined imagination can humanize history, just as unrestrained illusion can strip it of authenticity.
Thus, this work seeks to connect the discourse of imagination and utopian thought with Iranian historical experience and memoir culture. Instead of simply warning against the distortion of history, it raises a more fundamental question: How can truth be discerned in a world where reality may be endlessly reconstructed?


Keywords: imagination, historical truth, memoir writing, philosophy of history, utopia, collective memory

 

Introduction

History is not just an account of events, but a field where memory and imagination converge. No historian can detach himself from his own mind, nor can any narrator escape the workings of imagination. As Paul Ricoeur asserts, imagination does not stand opposed to reality, but operates within it—for the past is always reconstructed through the horizon of human perception. Thus, every attempt to write history is, in truth, an act of reconfiguring the world, not a mere reflection of it.

In Iranian thought, imagination occupies a dual position: on one hand, it is the source of creation and inspiration; on the other, in the absence of reason, it can devolve into delusion and distortion. A similar duality resides in the term utopia, coined by Thomas Mor from the Greek ou (no) and topos (place), traditionally translated into Persian as nakoja-abad (no-where). Yet at times it has also been rendered as arman-shahr (ideal city). implanted in this translation difference is a conceptual divergence: one reflects an impulse to flee from reality, the other an attempt to construct a better future.

In contemporary Iranian memoir-writing—particularly in narratives concerning the Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War—these two tendencies coexist. Some memoirs drift into a no-place where ideals overshadow truths; others, grounded in sincerity and human recognition, approach a truthful ideal. The dividing line between the two is the boundary between imagination and ethical commitment.

This article seeks to show, through philosophical and analytical reflection, how one may distinguish between constructive imagination—rooted in reality—and destructive illusion. The central question is this: Can imagination be guided rather than suppressed, so that it may illuminate historical truth? The answer requires interlinking the philosophy of history, memory theory, and the ethics of narrative—three domains brought together in this study.

 

1. Imagination and Reality in the Philosophy of History

1–1. Imagination as the Creative Force of Meaning

In modern Western philosophy, especially after the twentieth century, imagination is no longer considered the antithesis of reality. Paul Ricoeur[1], in Memory, History, Forgetting[2] (2000), examines remembering, historiography, and forgetting through a hermeneutic-phenomenological lens. He argues that memory and imagination are two dimensions of the same process: both reconstruct the past, yet with different intentions. Memory seeks to preserve facticity, whereas imagination strives to render meaning. Thus, imagination forms part of the mechanism of historical representation—not its adversary.[3]

Likewise, Hayden White[4] contends that historiography is not a “mirror” of events but a narrative structure in which the historian must inevitably choose, interpret, and connect occurrences. These choices are imaginative, yet they are not distortions if they serve understanding. As White notes, reality acquires meaning only when narrated—and narrative is impossible without imagination[5].

Therefore, imagination is a tool of explanation in history-writing. What is perilous is not imagination itself, but the absence of honesty in employing it. Constructive imagination serves truth; destructive imagination serves illusion and interest.

 

1–2. Imagination in the Iranian Intellectual Tradition

In Iranian intellectual tradition, khiyal (imagination) is not merely a mental faculty but a distinct ontological stratum. Suhrawardi, in the Philosophy of Illumination, conceives the imaginal world (alam al-mithal) as an intermediary realm between the sensible and the intelligible—a locus where meanings are freed from the constraints of materiality yet have not fully entered the sphere of pure abstraction[6]. In the poetry of Rumi and Hafez, imagination becomes a path for unveiling the inner truth of the human being; a bridge between the terrestrial and the celestial.

Yet when this faculty becomes detached from the guidance of reason, it turns into delusion. The distinction between imagination and delusion lies precisely here: imagination creates in order to confer meaning, whereas delusion constructs in order to escape. In the realm of memoir and recollection, the narrator swings between reality and imagination. Every memory, at its inception, is a mixture of remembrance and imaginative reconstruction; however, when the narrator knowingly sacrifices truth to desire or to prescriptive ideological templates, reality is transformed into delusion.

This perspective forges a connection between Islamic philosophy and modern theory of history. Just as Ricoeur speaks of a “reconstructive imagination,” Suhrawardi speaks of the alam al-mithal as a domain in which the spirit may reconfigure reality into renewed forms. From this standpoint, imagination is not the adversary of truth but rather another language through which truth discloses itself—whereas delusion does violence to the integrity of historical narrative and memory.

 

1–3. Representation, Not Reflection

In traditional historiography, reality was assumed to be an external and independent entity that the historian was obliged to “reflect exactly.” However, in the modern view, history is always a form of representation; that is, a narrative constructed through the interaction among the event, the narrator, and the audience. This does not imply the negation of reality, but rather the acknowledgment that historical truth does not come into being apart from language and imagination.

Roland Barthes[7], the prominent French writer, critic, and semiotician whose theories on narrative, language, and cultural structures are foundational, argues that “every narrative, even a truthful one, contains selection and omission.” Therefore, the historian is always engaged in constructing a “plausible world” of the past. Imagination operates in the choice of perspective, in the arrangement of events, and in the selection of words. If this imagination is grounded in ethical responsibility and methodological rigor, the narrative approaches truth; yet if it becomes inferior to political, emotional, or myth-making intentions, it obscures reality[8].

 

1–4. Imagination as an Ethical Medium

From the standpoint of narrative ethics, imagination carries responsibility. As Pascal notes, imagination may be either the “sovereign of falsehood” or the “queen of truth.” Ethical imagination enables one to perceive the Other—to apprehend the suffering and humanity of those within history. Oral history that lacks this capacity degenerates into sentimental display or official propaganda[9].
Here, imagination becomes not a fabricator of lies but a discoverer of neglected truths—of the silenced voices and forgotten experiences of human beings.

 

2. From Utopia to Nowhere-Land — The Iranian Narrative of Ideal and Illusion

2.1. The Two Faces of Utopia

Ever since Thomas Mor coined the term utopia in 1516, it has carried a dual meaning: on one hand, the aspiration to construct a perfected society; on the other, the desire to flee from reality. This duality situates utopia precisely at the boundary between imagination and critique. On one side lies the ideal city: a more humane and possible world built upon reason and ethical principles. On the other, we encounter no-where: an illusory realm that will never exist, yet seduces the mind with its charm.

As Ernst Bloch[10], the German philosopher, in The Principle of Hope[11], and Ruth Levitas[12], the sociologist and theorist, in The Concept of Utopia[13], remind us, utopia remains vibrant and human only when it is understood in relation to the concrete social and historical world; otherwise, it devolves into infertile fantasy. But if utopia is conceived as an horizon of hope,” it becomes a driving force for transformation. Put differently, utopia is alive only when it serves the critique of the existing order and the search for truth—not when it functions as an escape from it.

 

2.2. No-where in Iranian Thought and Literature

In Iranian intellectual and literary culture, the notion of no-where existed long before it was introduced as a translation of utopia. Suhrawardi, in The Occidental Exile, speaks of a realm that is “neither here nor there,” a destination reached through illumination. This no-where is, in truth, an inner geography—a metaphor for the perfection of the soul and the eternal truth.

Yet, in socio-historical usage, no-where assumes a different meaning: a fantastical world detached from historical reality, obstructing one’s sense of time and responsibility. In modern contexts, these two meanings often merge: the mystical no-where that once opened a path toward spiritual release becomes an ideological or political no-place that legitimizes the denial of reality.

Here, imagination becomes severed from its source of meaning and turns into a tool of justification. When the memoirist or historian, instead of recording events, constructs an idealized past in order to legitimize the present, they are, in effect, operating within the domain of no-where.

 

2.3. The Ideal City as an Ethical Horizon

In contrast to this impulse, the ideal city does not negate reality; it strives to elevate it. The ideal city in the Iranian intellectual tradition has its roots in Farabs’s a Madinah al-Fadilah, in the ethical philosophy of Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, and in the political wisdom of Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasat-nameh. In this sense, the ideal city is bound to truth, not to illusion.

Within the domain of memoir-writing, one may distinguish between two fundamentally different modes of narration:

The utopia of no-where, which portrays the past as free from error, doubt, or pain;

The ethical ideal city, which sustains hope and meaning while remaining faithful to the concrete reality of lived experience.

The ideal city does not flee from truth, nor does it merely repeat it—it searches for an ethical meaning within historical experience.

 

2.4. The Boundary Between Utopia and History

Whenever utopia is severed from ethics, it becomes myth, distancing itself from history. History, without utopia, risks turning into a dry book of events; utopia, without history, dissolves into baseless dreaming.

In Iranian memoir-writing, these two forces remain in constant tension: religious and revolutionary imagination on one side, and the imperative of fidelity to reality on the other. The task of the historian and the narrator is to maintain equilibrium between the two, ensuring that imagination remains in the service of truth.

From this perspective, utopia may be understood as an ethics of the future: the desire for a more humane world, not through negating the past, but through its honest comprehension. Such a view elevates memoir-writing beyond sentiment and proclamation, transforming it into a deeply human and universal reflection.

 

3. Ethics of Narrative and the Collective Memory of History

3.1. Memory as Responsibility

Unlike the document, memory is not produced to prove, but to understand. Every individual, in recounting the past, engages in selection: both what is remembered and what is forgotten carry meaning. Maurice Halbwachs[14], in his theory of collective memory[15], reminds us that memory is always shaped within social frameworks and nourished by shared values and group identity[16]. Therefore, when speaking of “truthfulness” in memoir-writing, we must understand it not as perfect correspondence with external reality, but as ethical fidelity to the experience. The truthful narrator is one who remains faithful to their intention: to understand the past, not to enlist it in the service of justification or self-praise.

In this view, oral history becomes part of the conscience of a community, not merely a record of events. Any distortion, therefore, constitutes a betrayal of a people’s memory.

 

3-2. The Ethical Triad of Narrative

In order to safeguard the boundary between imagination and truth, the narrator and historian must remain faithful to three principles—three virtues upon which every human history is grounded:

 

Scholarly Precision:
This means a commitment to examining sources, comparing narratives, and constant verification. Precision is the very conscience of research—it restrains imagination so that it does not cross into the realm of illusion[17].

 

Moral Honesty:
It means to speak of what you truly know, and to remain silent before what you do not. Honesty is the point where knowledge and conscience intersect. Without it, every truth becomes an instrument of power.

 

Human Sensitivity:
If history is stripped of human suffering and hope, it becomes merely a record of powers and victories. Human sensitivity means hearing the voices of the silenced, seeing the forgotten faces, and emotionally grasping lived human experience.

These three virtues form the clear boundary between ethical imagination and ideological delusion.
Ethical imagination humanizes reality; ideological delusion turns human beings into instruments of narrative.

 

3-3. The Danger of Narrative-Making and Memory-Fabrication Based on Stereotypes

In our society, memoir-writing has at times become an arena of partisan and political competition; each faction attempts to rewrite the past and place its own image at the center of the narrative. In such a condition, reality becomes the sacrifice of expediency.

Yet, as Eric Hobsbawm[18] has cautioned: “A past that is excessively used ceases to function as memory; it becomes an instrument of politics.”[19] Thus, one must distinguish between honest reconstruction and commissioned memory-fabrication. The former seeks to understand the past; the latter seeks to consolidate power.

The conscientious narrator protects their voice against external pressures, because they know that if truth is concealed today, it will return tomorrow in the form of a greater falsehood.

 

3-4. Imagination as Empathy

Ultimately, imagination is not merely a threat to truth—it is an instrument of empathy and of understanding the Other.
Imagination, when ethical, enables a person to transcend the limits of personal experience and to cultivate a sense of shared understanding. As Ricoeur states, “imagination links memory to the future.”[20] That is, we remember the past in order to derive meaning for the present and hope for tomorrow.

In this sense, honest memoir-writing is a moral act—a reconciliation between what we have been and what we aspire to become. Such narrative is not written to glorify the past, but to sustain human conscience.

 

Conclusion

Between imagination and truth lies a boundary that is delicate yet decisive.
Imagination, when serving meaning and ethics, frees history from stagnation and breathes life into it; yet that same force, when stripped of conscience and method, becomes a delusion that contaminates memory and conceals reality[21].

In the trajectory of Iranian memoir-writing, we have witnessed both faces:

Memoirs that, through a human and sincere language, recount the experience of suffering and hope, becoming a lamp for understanding the past. And, in contrast, narratives that seek to praise, purify, or erase—turning history into a stage for myth-making.

The distinction between these two does not lie in stylistic form, but in intention and method. The utopian narrator seeks to illuminate truth in the light of aspiration, whereas the nowhere-land narrator seeks to hide truth in its shadow. From the perspective of the philosophy of history, imagination cannot be eliminated, for imagination is precisely the force that makes narrative possible.
What must be restrained is the delusion of substitution—the moment when a person mistakes their imagination for absolute truth. Here, ethics intervenes:

Ethics safeguards the boundary between what we know and what we wish to know.

Thus, the utopia of truth becomes possible only when imagination is joined with honesty, precision, and human sensitivity. History must be neither emptied of imagination nor stripped of conscience; for truth emerges at the very moment when human imagination attains self-awareness and responsibility.

In other words, the passage from the nowhere-land of illusion to the utopia of truth is a journey from feeling to thought, from personal narrative to collective understanding, and from memory to consciousness.
This is the point at which history ceases to be a ledger of events and becomes a mirror of the human being—a mirror in which the past continues to breathe and the future acquires meaning.

 


[1] Paul Ricoeur (2005–2013).

[2] Ricoeur, Paul. La Mémoire, lHistoire, lOubli (Memory, History, Forgetting).
 

[3]Ricoeur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 4–5, 85–88.
Available at: https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/738780/mod_resource/content/2/Ricoeur%20-%20Memory%2C%20History%2C%20Forgetting.pdf

[4] Hayden White (1928–2018).
 

[5] White, Hayden. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality.” Critical Inquiry 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1980): 5–27.
Available at: https://religion.ua.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Value-of-Narrative.pdf

[6] Suhrawardi, Shihab al-Din. Ḥikmat al-Ishraq (The Philosophy of Illumination). Edited and translated by Seyyed Jafar Sajjadi. Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 2018, pp. 90–93, section “Fi Taqsimat al-ʿAwalim,” al-Shif 45.

[7] Roland Barthes.
 

[8] Barthes, Roland. “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.” New Literary History 6, no. 2 (Winter 1975): 237–272.
Available at: https://www.uv.es/fores/Barthes_Structural_Narrative.pdf

[9] Blaise Pascal. Pensées.
Brunschvicg edition, trans. Reza Mashayekhi. Tehran: Ibn Sina Press, 1972, Fragment 44.
Also: Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Translated by A. J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin Classics, 1966, Fragment 44.

[10] Ernst Bloch (1885–1977).
 

[11] Bloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986, pp. 3–5.

[12] Ruth Levitas.
 

[13] Levitas, Ruth. The Concept of Utopia. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 1–3.

[14] Maurice Halbwachs (1925–1992)

[15] Concept of mémoire collective (collective memory).

[16] Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 35.
Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2781705

[17] Kamari, Alireza. Yad-e Mana (Enduring Memory). Tehran: Sooreh Mehr Press, 2002.

[18] Eric Hobsbawm.
 

[19] Hobsbawm, Eric. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 2. Translated by Mohammad Nabavi. Tehran: Bigah Press, 2024.

[20] Ricoeur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 357–359, especially p. 358.

[21]  Author’s Note: For my methodological recommendations on addressing the hazards inherent in personal recollection and oral history, see my article:
“Essential Principles and Methodologies for Compiling Oral History,” available at:
https://www.oral-history.ir/?page=post&id=12859



 
Number of Visits: 19



http://oral-history.ir/?page=post&id=12914