Part of memories of Seyed Masoud Jazayeri

The Pearl of Majnoon

Selected by Fatemeh Beheshti
Translated by M. B. Khoshnevisan

2024-03-10

The Operation Kheibar was a big and difficult operation in terms of strategic, tactical and amphibious location, and especially in terms of the tools and equipment that we had to use during the operation. Mehdi and I were together from the very beginning. Even from our very secret identifications with disguises; boats and the guides who didn't know what we came for inside Hoor Reed and not breathing so that our identification would be perfect and accurate. It was the first time that we went to such a place and see such water. Water that is stagnant in one place and flows in another place and nothing is predictable. Mehdi and I were of the opinion that the operation should be carried out with the necessary tools, and unfortunately Khaibar did not have the necessary tools. Khaibar could have been a big and 100% successful operation. Iraq had no idea that we wanted to occupy this region. It had guessed this from the type of tools and our war. Because of this, Iraqi forces was very surprised when they saw that we had come and had come even for that great victory; in order to reach Nashwa and the important roads of Basra and in the next rise to reach Basra itself. Occupying the islands was a sure springboard for the next phases, and we didn't have the tools. In this war, whoever was faster would succeed. We had to rely on the land, on the land of the Talaiyeh front, which had to be opened, and from there we would provide supplies for the Khaibar front; Of course, the Talaiyeh front was not opened eventually; as a result, we had to preserve the islands.

The operation was such that we had to cross a few kilometers of water, then leave Hoor and enter the island. After purging, we would go to Nashwa and the targets that had been specified. We had to bring most of these forces into the island on the first night to go for purging. A part of these forces had to come by boat, and another part on the day before the operation, and another part before the darkness of the night; that people had to be heliborne by helicopters.

Hamid moved along with the forces of the first phase of Balam to block the Suwaib canal, the canal that led to a bridge called Shahitat - the connecting point of the island with Nashwa - that bridge had to be seized so that the Iraqis could not enter the island. Hamid quickly achieved his goals and from there he kept reporting that we entered the island. We contacted Hamid. He said that the Shahitat Bridge was in his hands. He said: "If you want to bring forces, there is no problem, you can bring them."

it was night. We had to go by helicopter and it was not possible. The helicopters were their first time and the movements were incredibly slow. The forces were scattered and disembarked in different places and sometimes far from each other. The helicopters also lost their way at night. The sound was too loud. Some of them were seeing a helicopter for the first time and they had not received heliborne training until that moment. We gathered and organized the forces to go towards the goals that Hamid had provided. We had to connect the two islands with a bridge in the shortest possible time, and at the same time, we had to make sure that there was no one left on the island. The Talaiyeh conflict had also started.

When we arrived, we saw that the Iraqi defense had not been disabled yet, so we went and disabled it. Half an hour later, an armored column attacked us and we stood in front of them with a few people who were there and destroyed them and captured a few people. If they went towards the bridge and left the island, maybe there would be a problem for Hamid.

I quickly called all the forces. I brought them to the pads and the initial clash began. By morning, we brought all the battalions to the island. And I also went to Hamid. I saw that he has established a very good military arrangement on the channel and the Suwaib bridge. I went back and determined the task of the other battalions, where to go and how to reach the other bases inside the island. There are reports coming from the island that there are still resistances. They were neutralized by morning and the island fell into our hands. Now it was us and a lot of booty and nearly 2000 captives. We could not send them back by helicopter. Iraqi planes had come to the area and were hunting the helicopters. We had to take them out of the island with several boats.

I contacted Hamid, and told him to be ready for the next targets. We were informed that the Talaiyeh faced a serious problem and the operation could not proceed there. Now we had to stop until the position of our left front was determined. It became night. We organized the facilities and asked the guys to take a rest.

We were close to Hamid, about one kilometer, and we were supposed to cross the bridge he had seized. Our movement depended on the opening of the Talaiyeh; that means we had to advance together. There was no meaning to leave now that the Talaiyeh had not been opened. On the other hand, there was some coordination from our right side, which diverted the Iraqis, but they pressed so much that our right side also had problems. The Iraqis were preparing themselves for a big war. We waited for the guys to go to Talaiyeh and perform the operation at night, and we also went to Nashwa. The Talaiyeh lock remained closed. They asked us to go to Talaiyeh from the same island; because the island was connected to the back of Talaiyeh. We had to cover a long distance. Besides the Hamid (Shehitat) bridge, there was another bridge where the Iraqis used to bring in troops. Iraq had nothing to do with the islands. The Iraqis went through several bridges and strengthened Talaiyeh and realized that we had water behind us and had no support from behind. He put all his efforts and fire on Talaiyeh and now we had to go to the same Talaiyeh about which I told you. We were not joined in Talaiyeh with other guys. We had to go behind Talaiyeh, near those bridges where the Iraqis were providing logistical support to Talaiyeh. Most of the Iraqi forces were on the other side of the bridge. We stayed in the islands and the next morning the main battle started inside the islands.

The Iraqis came to the islands with ease and the whole Kheibar Operation was concentrated on a limited and unobstructed territory, and insufficient in logistics and fire support and supplies. With a distance of 50-60 km, we could not have fire support. The Iraqis were fully aware of our weakness. They came and concentrated almost from the south facing the islands - on the other side of the Suwaib canal - then they went to Talaiyeh and joined their forces and their counterattack started from here.

Their counterattack failed on the first day. A world of fire centered on the island and we were tied up and alone. There was water around the island and a swamp in the middle, and everyone had to cross the road, and the road was long, and anyone, whether on foot or on board, would be the target of a tank's direct fire if they passed through it.

On the second day, they put a lot of pressure on Hamid and Shahitat Bridge. They wanted to take back the bridge from Hamid and his forces and he did not allow. We also regularly injected him with energy; from the same forces that we had brought to take to Nashwa. We reconstructed and organized the rest of the forces on the island and distributed them to the places where they were needed. The bridge was taken back from Hamid several times and he took it back again. It was the third or fourth day that Iraq poured a lot of fire on it from Talaiyeh, so that Haj Hemmat and several other commanders had to come to the island to meet us. There was no difference between commander and non-commander. Everyone would pick up any weapon and fight. Mehdi took a machine gun and I an RPG 7, so that we can go and fight as people. It was certain for us that the seizure of the island was certain and we would not give up.

We were still busy in the early morning when the news came that Iraq had left the Hamid bridge and was advancing toward the island. Mehdi quickly sent one of the heads of the division (martyr Yaghchian) to go to Hamid. As soon as he went, we were informed that he was martyred on the road, 200 meters ahead of us. I said to Mehdi: "This is useless. One of us must go to Hamid."

Hamid regularly reported his situation with firmness and calmness and asked for troops and ammunition, and most of all he wanted mortars. He said: "Don't forget the 60mm mortar."

We used to send weapons to the extent of the ration that was his quota; RPGs, Kalashnikov guns, 60mm mortars. Finally, we had to ration the ammunition. There was no way to bring ammunition. The enemy planes were also monitoring every movement and hunting them, and no ammunition and supplies reached us. Every force that went back, we took all his bullets to the front line and distributed them among the guys. It was at this time that I said to Mehdi: "I'm going to see Hamid."

We were not far from Hamid. I walked on foot. The fire was so fierce that no force could make it safely to the line. He laughed until he saw me. "What's up?" I said.

The fire had become more intense. He didn't want me to be there. He tried to take me and hide me somewhere in Hoor. The distance with the Iraqis was small. They hit with RPGs, rifle grenades, machine guns, and any other weapon you can think of. I said: "It is not necessary, dear Hamid. I have come to be with you, not to hide."

There were so many Iraqis that if you threw a stone, it would surely hit one of them. They had come with large forces and strong fire to clear the back of the canal. One corner of the bridge was still in their hands, they wouldn't let anyone pass through there. I saw that the line cannot be maintained, and staying is much more difficult than leaving, and leaving also means losing the whole island, and this was not possible, that is, it did not fit in my mind.

Hamid came on the embankment and sat next to me. we were talking. Sometimes we looked back and saw the Iraqis and the fire, or our own guys. they had run out of ammunition, they were holding their line with every possible means. The bullets were fired only when they were sure that they would hit the target.

A Toyota van full of power was coming towards us - all of them were looking at us and waving their hands - in front of our eyes, a mortar hit the van and blew it up and set it on fire, blood boiled and gushed and poured from everywhere like a red waterfall the earth. They were the forces that were coming to help Hamid. Hamid bit his lip and stared at the blood. When he wanted to speak, I said: "God... He knows everything..."

I put my head down and said: "Certainly... there is good in it."

We decided to take some defensive positions behind us so that if we lost there too... and oh if we lost there; the entire canal would have fallen into their hands, and then the bridge and the island. The tanks would reach the island and the island would become a real hell of fire. We always looked behind our line to see when the aid was coming, or when there was news of someone being martyred or injured.

I contacted Mehdi, I said: "Take whatever loaders you know to the place where we have been sitting exactly. Tell them to dig up the road quickly, build an embankment, because we don’t have much time."

Neither any troops could arrive, nor we had any fire to counter them and nor any means for getting ammunition to the line. I decided to stay. I felt that there was no way back... when a 60mm mortar hit us... and I saw Hamid fell down ... a shrapnel hit his throat and... blood boiled from his head on the ground and...

 
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