Excerpts from Oral Memories of Hajj Qasem Soleimani
Selected by Fatemeh Beheshti
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi
2024-01-09
Closing the Abu Ghraib Strait
Operation Fath ol-Mobin[1] lasted ten days. We were in conflict with the Iraqis in Dasht-e Abbas. Kamarsorkh was in our hands and we controlled the area with the embankment we had built next to Imamzadeh. The Iraqis also retreated towards Abu Ghraib Strait. One of our companies survived. Most of the people were either wounded or died a martyr.
After several days of fighting, we were very tired on the seventh day of the war. We could no longer move. Seven days of fighting with limited resources with the enemy's armored army and Katyushas, while we only had one artillery barrage commanded by AJA (Islamic Republic of Iran Army), which was stationed in an oil well and its carry did not reach Abu Ghraib Strait. The war with the armed enemy had really exhausted us. There was a black ring of gunpowder on the forehead lines and in the crook of the guy’s neck.
It was twelve o'clock at night and I could no longer move due to fatigue. I was sleeping behind the supplies trench for a few moments when one and half past midnight, the brother Mr. [Gholam Hossein] Bashardoost arrived and woke me up. He had searched for a while to find me. Hassan Bagheri was waiting for me by the side of Dasht-e Abbas Road. God bless Hassan. He played a valuable role in the operations, especially Tariq al-Quds, Thamen al-Aemeh and Beit ol-Maqaddas. In my idea, Hassan was [Mohammad] Beheshti in the war. To put it more correctly, he was Imam Khomeini of the war. Hassan was sitting in the car. Mohammad Ali Iranmanesh was also there. He said to me, “Mr. Mohsen Rezaei told me that you must close Abu Ghraib Strait tonight.” They had a map of Abu Ghraib Strait to justify me to close the strait and prevent the enemy from entering the Fath ol-Mobin area. There was a possibility that the Iraqis would come to the heights of “Tineh”, “Raqabieh”, and Eyn-e Khowsh by crossing the Doviraj river through the “Chamsari” plain, and all our efforts would be wasted.
It was almost one in the midnight and we had no facilities. The three battalions that were conflicting for almost a whole week were exhausted. However, we had to close Abu Ghraib Strait so that both the escape route would be closed and it cannot strengthen its forces by adding troops. We had not seen Abu Ghraib Strait. Hassan showed Abu Ghraib Strait on the map. At that time, our forces were at the height of 202, and it was twelve kilometers far from Abu Ghraib Strait. That is, in a place, the heights of Tineh and Ein-e khowsh crossed, and the asphalt road passed through them to Chamsari plain, crossed Doviraj river, and it moved toward Iraqi border. This strait was called Abu Ghraib.
I went to the guys on the 202nd height. From the battalion that had entered into action there on the first day, only one hundred of the three hundred people were left. Two hundred people were either martyred or wounded, or left the scene in any way, and we didn’t know what to do to attack the enemy? It was not possible to attack an armed enemy with this hundred people.
We did a trick. Our trick was to tell the guys of our staff— we didn't even have a general staff at that time - to the same guys who were doing tasks of the headquarters to collect all the cars you have so that they can go to the enemy from the oil well with their lights on. There were also a number of the construction jihad’s cars and donations, and Mr. Torkan, then governor of Ilam, who was responsible for building an embankment in Dasht-e Abbas, had a number of cars. We moved ten or twelve dump trucks towards the enemy, all with their lights on. That is, we pretended to bring forces and equipment. There was a long line of cars that when they moved, the enemy supposed a fresh force were going toward it and it might lower the Iraqis' morale. This operation made Iraqis afraid. They either ran away or stopped resisting.
Secondly, the martyr “Hamid Arabnejad” was supposed to lead us with a loader and he caused the first conflict. That night, we were following each other with a distance of about twenty meters. At 8:30 in the morning, we started moving towards the Iraqis, but there was no sign of them. At the beginning of the night, we shot each other, and little by little, the shooting gave way to silence. Early in the morning, that there was no noise. We climbed to the hill and saw that there were no Iraqis. Hamid Arabnejad, who died a martyr in Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, was an expert and worked hard to preserve and stabilize the city of Mahabad, moved forward with a loader. Because the Iraqis might have been ambushed on the near hill and we would be attacked unawareness, I sent Hamid forward with a loader and the guys moved behind him. The Iraqis had calibrated weapons and RPG, and Arabnejad action was very dangerous. It was decided that Hamid Cherik (means guerilla) and Tahami would move with the next company behind Hamid Arabnejad. With this plan, at least the loader would be hit and the rest of us could take a defensive arrangement and do conflict. The loader went and we moved behind him. Wherever we went, we saw they were not Iraqis.[2]
Hamid Cherik, vanguard and fearless
Hamid went missing for a while at the end of Operation Fath ol-Mobin. Later, we heard from himself that he had been captured, and according to his own words, because of the contract he had with Imam Zaman (AS), he also saved him.
He used to say, “I was injured by a shrapnel or RPG, and lost consciousness. I woke up at 11 a.m. in the next day and found myself surrounded by ten to twenty Iraqis. I pretended to die and prayed that, O Imam Zaman! Everything I did was for God's sake and for promotion of Islam; save me yourself. The Iraqis came to me and even kicked me, but they left because they thought I was dead. Ten minutes later, two Iraqi soldiers approached. Again, I was cautious and pretended to die. But these two Iraqi brothers with a lump in their throat called me a soldier of Imam Khomeini and when they checked my pockets, they took out Turbah, Quran, and a picture of Imam. They cursed Saddam and said this is soldier of Ali and Muhammad. I had a premonition that this is grace of Imam Zaman, and I made a move that showed them I was alive. They took me to their trench and fed me. Some Iraqis who can speak Farsi said that they were forcibly brought to the front. Their doctor examined and bandaged me. My body was full of quivers and it was painful. They put me on a tank to take me back, but I had asked God to die a martyr, but not to be captured. Therefore, at one point, when the tank crew dismounted and I saw there was no one around the tank, I took advantage of the opportunity and crawled a little and ran towards our trenches. When I saw the guys, I prostrated and thanked God. They took me to Ahvaz Hospital by helicopter.”
Hamid was very nimble. He had a strange courage. As soon as he knew that there is a need for initiative or risk in a corner of the front line, the first person who was willing to take the task of leading the troops and go into action was Hamid Iranmanesh.
Hamid had the characteristic that he was always leader of the battalion. If he was the battalion commander, he would have gone with the first platoon, and by the way, he would have gone with the first team of the platoon, not, for example, with its third team. He would go ahead, demine and open the path for the guys.
In Operation Beit ol-Maqaddas, when he called and said that he broke the line and captured the trenches, he had a conflict both on the right and the left, and he was almost to reach General [Ali Akbar] Khoshi; But the distance was long. There was a reed that had to be cleared. A few Iraqi strongholds had been left. He had to cross a canal and go to the enemy embankment. The area was very unsafe. The guys had been faltered. Hamid had told them to move forward, but no one had moved. In order to exhilarate the guys, Hamid told them that they should be afraid. The attack is the same; all’s fair in love and war. He himself, first of all, crossed the canal, and so, the guys dared and follow him. They bypassed the enemy's embankments, and Hamid destroyed the trenches behind the embankment with his own guerrilla method by throwing grenades. There were only a few trenches left to clear the front line when the fleeing Iraqis opened fire on him. He was shot four times in the stomach. The guys bandaged his stomach with his own Keffiyeh to prevent bleeding; But Hamid didn’t perish. No matter how hard it was, he stands up and says you go, don't wait for me. Finally, he recited his Shahada.[3]
[1] Operation Fath ol-Mobin took place on March 22, 1982, and continued for 7 days. Finally, it ended with victory of soldiers of Islamic Republic of Iran.
[2] Source: Akbari Mozdabadi, Ali (2019) Book of Zulfiqar; Excerpts from Oral Memories of Hajj Qasem Soleimani, Yazhra Publication, page 38.
[3] Ibid, p. 43.
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