Acceptance of UN Resolution and End of War
Faezeh Sasanikhah
Translated by M. B. Khoshnevisan
2022-07-19
In Tir of 1367 (July 1988), I had been sitting with the guys of the operational plan including Ahmad Rabiee, Shahriar Chahar Setad, Faramarz Ebrahimi, and Mahmoud Rahmanian in Abadan frontline. After the class, we suddenly saw that the 14 o'clock news announced that the Imam accepted the resolution. Accepting the resolution was very painful for us. Everyone had been sitting in front of the TV and crying as if a Zaker or eulogist was reciting the zekr of calamity. I had canceled all the classes I had; because I didn't know how to answer the students' questions; because everyone was asking, "How did the Imam accept the resolution?"
I got up and went inside the bastion of Haji Asadi and Haji Yadollahi. They were also crying and saying that they don't know what happened, but in any case, we should try so that no one violates the order and disobeys. I said: "God willing, no one will do this; although it is painful and raises questions, it does not cause opposition."
All Majlis (parliament) lawmakers and the Friday prayer leaders had left and come to the front. A group of fresh forces had also arrived so that the fronts would not be empty.
When one of the Majlis lawmakers named Rouhani who was a clergy and the representative of the town of Sepidan saw me, asked about the situation of the front and said, “What is the opinion of the guys about the resolution?” I also explained for him and had a heart-to-heart with him a little. While I was crying, I said, “Of course we have to ask you what happened? The Imam, who was so resistant and did not accept the resolution for a year, how did he accept the resolution now?" Mr. Rouhani did not answer me in front of others; but then he pulled my hand and while we were walking, he said, “A meeting was held with the presence of all the senior commanders of the army, the IRGC, all the representatives of the Assembly of Experts and the Majlis, and the Imam's letter was read, in which the Imam had written the reasons for accepting the resolution. Among the reasons, it was mentioned that, for example, "The Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army, in order to continue the war, wants so many warplanes and so many armored tools and... from me, the IRGC Commander of the Corps and the Deputy of the Commander-In-Chief have also determined these things for me, which means that we do not want to fight. When they say we don't want to fight, I have to accept the resolution”. When this letter was read, those present in the meeting started crying and loudly and worriedly said that this letter is not appropriate to be broadcasted in the media. If this letter was broadcasted in the media, some people are waiting for such an excuse to say that Iran has lost the war, and all sides pressure Iran to compensate for eight years of war. Therefore, after a long meeting and exchange of views, finally the commanders of the army, the IRGC and Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani himself, as the deputy of the Commander-in-Chief, decided to inform the Imam that if this letter is broadcast through the media, it will be harmful to the society and convince the Imam to accept the resolution with a simpler letter, without mentioning the reason. Certainly, the first person who should have gone to meet the Imam was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. In any case, with all the insistence, the Imam accepted with the condition that at least this letter will remain in the Documents Center as an official document and that he should write a new letter to be broadcasted in the media”.
It was after this that the Imam wrote that famous letter in which the acceptance of the resolution was likened to "drinking a cup of poison" and it was broadcast in the media.
At any rate, after the acceptance of the resolution, meetings were held[1]at the headquarters of Al-Mahdi (AS) Division[2] and a group named "Ceasefire Preparation Group" was to be formed to prepare the forces so that when the ceasefire was announced, no violations took place anymore. I was appointed as the spokesperson of this group. Due to the dispersion of the units and battalions, I had to go among all the battalions that were related to Al-Mahdi (AS) Division and speak for the forces; first, I was discussing the issue of velayat-e Faqih or the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and that obedience to the guardian jurist is obligatory, and then obedience means that one day he orders you to fight, and one day the same guardian jurist has told you not to fight. We must always be on alert and once the ceasefire is declared, not a single bullet will be fired even for a sparrow, so that so that no excuse falls into the hands of the enemy and they say that we have violated the ceasefire.
For several days, I went everywhere and continued this discussion. Meetings were held in some units and barracks and questions were asked to which I had to answer implicitly that "I don't know what the reason was”; and that it has been proven for the Imam that the continuation of the war is not in the best interests of the Islamic Revolution."[3]
[1] It was said that all divisions and brigades hold similar meeting. (Narrator)
[2] At that time, the Al-Mahdi (AS) Brigade had turned into a division
[3] Mr. Mehraban: Memoirs of Gholamali Mehraban Jahromi, compiled by Vahid Karegar Jahromi, Shiraz, Eighth Sky, 1392 (2013), P. 401.
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