The Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War-54

By Mujtaba Al-Husseini
Translated from Arabic by: Muhammad Hussein Zavar-Kaaba
Machine Translation edited by Mandana Karimi

2026-11-1

The Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War-54

By Mujtaba Al-Husseini
Translated from Arabic by: Muhammad Hussein Zavar-Kaaba
Machine Translation edited by Mandana Karimi

***

On one of the doors was written the name of Saddam and on the other the name of Imam Khomeini. Then they announced that volunteers who wanted to join the special forces should exit through the door with Saddam's name written on it, and those who did not, through the door with the Imam's name written on it. Of course, no one dared to exit through the door with the Imam's name written on it, because from the perspective of the Aflaqi Baathists, this action meant liking the Imam and approving him, while at the same time not approving the infidel Saddam. Therefore, they were forced to exit through the door of Saddam Hussein, and as soon as they exited, their names were written down as volunteers by some people standing outside the hall.

Various other methods were also used to force people to join the special forces. Such as threats of dismissal from government offices and imprisonment in the prisons of the Security Organization and organizations affiliated with the Baath Party. I myself witnessed innocent people fleeing at night to join the special forces, who were being pursued.

At that time, the gullible members of the party, who had seen the alleged film and learned of the execution of the commander of the Jaysh al-Shaabi, "Sheib", subordinate to the province of "Amara", by Saddam Hussein himself, were in a state of increasing fear and terror.[1]

With the completion of the work related to the formation of Special Forces brigades, a new stage of propaganda began. The Baathists evaluated the number of volunteer brigades in each province based on the political and religious background of each province. In this regard, they propagated that the province of "Diwaniyah" had the most volunteers and ranked first among all the provinces due to the political and combative background of its people who had revolted against British colonialism in 1920. Similarly, the province of Najaf was ranked second due to the presence of a seminary and a religious authority there. The central and southern provinces had each sent one volunteer brigade to the fronts, but the province of Baghdad had formed several brigades, most of them from deprived and Shiite areas of the capital. The number of volunteers from other provinces with a Sunni majority was very small because the people of those provinces, namely Ramadi, Mosul, and Tikrit, were not persecuted and the regime did not hate them.

I still remember how Iraqi television showed scenes of special forces, including women and intellectuals, undergoing training, in order to impress people and force them to join these forces.
After the special forces' military training course, which lasted 45 days, ended, the Baath regime decided to send them directly to the fronts.

On the anniversary of the founding of Jaish al-Shaabi[2] [2], that is, on the night of February 8, 1982, the Baathists decided to launch a massive attack on the city of Bostan and its suburbs using Special Forces and retook the city. The commanders of the special forces pledged to capture the city and present it as a gift to Saddam. The plan of the operation was for several brigades of special forces, supported by army units, to advance towards the city from the Chazzabeh Strait axis located in the "Shib" area opposite the city of Bostan, while at the same time the 5th and 6th army divisions would launch their attacks from the Nissan River and Karkheh Kur axis in the southwest of Bostan.

Since February 1, 1982, I had been living at home using a paid leave. On February 8, 1982, news of our forces' attack to retake the city of Bostan and its surroundings was released. That night, I saw scenes of the 20th Brigade's armored vehicles being transported on television. It became clear to me that the 3rd Regiment had also participated in this operation. On February 11, 1982, my leave days ended and I set off on my way back to the front. Along the way, especially on the Nasiriyah and Basra roads, I saw dozens of cars carrying coffins covered with the Iraqi flag. This indicated two things: first, that those coffins belonged to military personnel, and second, that very heavy fighting had taken place.

At eight o'clock in the evening, I entered the regiment's headquarters behind the front. This headquarters was located in the "Juffair" area. The ground was muddy due to heavy rain. After walking along a winding path, I entered the shelters. There, I saw dozens of soldiers who had been left alone. I asked them about the regiment. They said: "Our unit has been heading to the Bostan area since the night of February 8th/12th of Bahman to participate in the operation to recapture this city."

That night I had planned to join my unit, but since there was no vehicle there, after a short rest I went to the headquarters of the 20th Brigade to arrange for my dispatch. At the brigade headquarters I met a group of junior officers. I had dinner with them. I asked one of them to provide me with a vehicle and take me to the regiment. The officer said to me: “Why are you in such a hurry? It is better for you to spend the night here and join the regiment in the morning.”
I said: “My leave ended last night and I must report to the regiment. Otherwise I will be court-martialed.”

According to Iraqi army rules, any officer who is absent for even a day is considered a deserter and will be court-martialed. Therefore, I insisted on getting to the unit that night. At exactly ten o'clock at night, they provided me with a truck to take me to the regiment. After traveling for more than an hour, I reached the Karkheh Kur area, but in that complete darkness and extreme cold, I was unable to find the unit headquarters. We advanced a little in that area. A number of soldiers warned us not to advance any further, as we were getting close to the front lines. It was eleven thirty at night when I decided to turn back a little so that I could rest in one of the shelters - belonging to any unit - in the morning. While returning along the same route, I saw a faint light near the road. I stopped and got out of the car. I had gone a few steps forward when suddenly someone shouted in the darkness: "Stop! Who are you?"

I said, “I am a medical officer, a member of the 20th Brigade.”

He asked, “What is your name?”

I said, “Doctor...”

He said, “Please come. We are the administrative staff of the battalion.”

I had found the regimental headquarters. I said goodbye to the driver of the car and thanked him. Then I set off towards the dim light. I reached a small tent. Inside the tent, I met Captain “Khosro”, the administrative officer, and Major “Ibrahim”, the commander of the headquarters company. After paying my military respects, I asked them to let me sleep there.

The next morning, while eating breakfast, Major “Ibrahim” told me that, except for the first regiment, which was heading to Chazzabeh, the other regiments of the 20th Brigade had entered the operation from the Karkheh-e-Kur axis. He added, “Doctor! You are lucky, because you were staying at home when the attack began.”

At nine in the morning, I boarded a military vehicle and headed for the front line. I traveled more than twenty kilometers from the western side of the city of Howeyzeh until I reached the strategic defensive line south of the Maysan River. There, I saw vehicles carrying supplies and ammunition, as well as ambulances, placed in deep holes. After a short break, one of the nurses told me about the attack. He said: “On the night of February 8, our forces, having neutralized the mines, which were located in front of this defensive line, advanced at night towards the plain between the defensive line, but they did not encounter any Iranian forces until they reached the river bank. There, fierce clashes broke out between these forces and the Iranians stationed on the other side of the river. The Iranian forces prevented our forces from crossing the river, causing the 2nd Regiment to suffer heavy casualties. "But our regiment took a route further away from the river and did not engage with Iranian forces. Therefore, it did not suffer any casualties."

I asked him, “Then why are these armored vehicles left here?”

He replied, “The attack was carried out only by infantry, and our forces are now stationed in that plain south of the Maysan River and are under constant fire from Iranian forces.”

To be continued …

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