The Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War-53

By Mujtaba Al-Husseini
Translated from Arabic by: Muhammad Hussein Zavar-Kaaba
Machine Translation edited by Mandana Karimi

2026-10-25


The Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War-53

By Mujtaba Al-Husseini
Translated from Arabic by: Muhammad Hussein Zavar-Kaaba
Machine Translation edited by Mandana Karimi

 

***

 

All Iraqi forces established a new defensive line behind the Karkheh Kur River. Around this defensive line, on the flat ground between the Maysan River and the Karkheh Kur, mines, time bombs, and napalm barrels were planted to prevent the Iranians from launching an attack in the area.
In late January, after withdrawing from the Bostan area, the 20th Brigade became the shock reserve of the 5th Division. Our regiment was transferred to Susangerd and an area located seven kilometers behind the village of Ahmadabad and was stationed in old abandoned trenches belonging to the mechanized brigade. We spent two nights in that safe area, and after 50 days of fatigue and discomfort, our regiment enjoyed peace and security. A few days later, a new commander named Major "Sabah" - who was a Turk from Kirkuk - took over the command instead of Lieutenant Colonel "Abdul Karim". There I took 8 days off and went home with Major "Khosro", the regimental support officer, who accompanied me to Baghdad in his elegant car. He was one of the Kurdish officers.

 

The February Wars and the Fear of Special Missions

In late February 1982, the 20th Brigade withdrew from the "Hooralhoveyzeh" area and deployed in the operational area south of Ahvaz. Our regiment was deployed as a reserve and strike force in positions behind the front line. We had to be on constant alert to carry out combat missions, especially supporting forces that were under attack by Iranian forces and also to carry out attacks in operational areas. This situation was very tiring for us, because on the one hand we were on constant alert and on the other hand we had no fixed location. Now, before I describe the events of the February wars in the Bostan area and its surroundings, it is better for me to briefly review the internal situation in Iraq at that time.

The events that took place in the last months of 1981 were painful and disastrous for the Iraqi Baathist regime, because Iranian forces had achieved great victories in the most important axes in just two months. During this period, Iraqi forces suffered great material and moral losses, while Iranian forces, which had faced bitter defeats in early 1981 during the Bani Sadr regime, were able to regain their self-confidence by liberating the cities of Abadan and Bostan. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from those important areas undermined Saddam's arrogant statement that "if the Iranian government does not accept us, we will impose other conditions on them at the same time as we occupy other parts of Iranian territory" - which had been made after the start of the war in early 1981. The events of the last months of 1981 overshadowed the military situation on the fronts as well as the political-propaganda situation in Iraq, because until this date, Iraqi mass media had been beating the drums of war and victory and were proud of the siege of Abadan and the capture of the city of Bostan, but from then on, they called on Iraqi soldiers to maintain the spirit of victory and steadfastness against the attacks of Iranian forces. High-ranking Baathist officials, led by Saddam Hussein, also emphasized the need to preserve the gains of the early war, that is, to preserve those areas that had been captured by the Iraqi army at the end of the war. In the military field, the government also mobilized more forces to increase the army's combat power. For this purpose, several periods of retired personnel were called up for service again. In addition, the government began to form the Jaysh al-Shaabi forces, which it called "Special Mission Forces." The formation of these forces was in fact a response to the Iranian initiative in forming the Popular Mobilization Forces, which had proven their effectiveness in the success of recent operations. Therefore, the Baath regime's party organizations and organs devoted all their resources to forming special forces brigades. Initially, the Iraqi party and security organs used their efforts to encourage workers, farmers, students, and party cadres to join the volunteer forces. All these efforts were focused on the disadvantaged segments of society and deprived cities, especially the central and southern provinces, as well as the poor areas of Baghdad such as the "Al-Thawra" and "Al-Shu'ala" areas.

The public's acceptance of this initiative was very weak due to their lack of belief in war and their lack of confidence in the government, but in order to achieve this goal, the government used methods of baiting and intimidation and entrusted the implementation of these sinister intentions to the security services and Jaysh al-Shaabi. The role of the mass media in this case was also very extensive and widespread. They began to compose national and epic songs and hymns, and every day they showed scenes of their military training, which was carried out in the presence of Saddam or "Taha Yasin Ramadan", his deputy and commander of the Jaysh al-Shaabi forces, on the television screen.

After several weeks, despite the regime's extensive propaganda and the efforts of the security and party apparatuses, no satisfactory results were achieved. Therefore, the government sought to force people, both partisan and non-partisan, to join the ranks of the Popular Army and the special forces. This method was first implemented by the head of the regime, Saddam Hussein. He ordered the high-ranking members of the Baath Party to gather at one of the party headquarters in Baghdad. In his speeches, Saddam highlighted the role of the party and various segments of the people in the war and emphasized the need for party members to participate in the fronts and maintain the victories achieved. At the end of his speech, he invited those present at the gathering to voluntarily join the special forces.

This action of Saddam had a disastrous outcome for him, as most of the attendees refused to join the front, provoking his intense anger. Therefore, Saddam publicly insulted them with vulgar words and ordered his special guards to insultingly remove those who refused to join the front from the meeting hall and arrest them. They were dismissed from government and party positions and were even deprived of some civil rights. He also threatened the participants in the meeting not to reveal the events of the meeting to the people and influence them. He said in this regard: "Whoever tells the people anything about this, I will mutilate him with my own hands." And one of his famous sentences in this meeting is that he said: "We do not store rotten dates."

The events of that meeting were recorded on videotapes and distributed among the military and civilian branches of the party to intimidate them and force them to join the special forces. The results of that meeting had a wide resonance among the people and members of the Baath Party, and greatly frightened them. This caused them to join the special forces by force.

In provincial centers, people were forced to join these forces in despicable and humiliating ways. For example, in Babylon province, members of the Security Organization and Jaysh al-Shaabi called people to a meeting in the governor's office building. They placed women on the right side of the meeting hall and men on the left. After the governor's speech, they told the men present at the meeting: "Those who are ready to join the special forces should sit in their seats, and those who are not willing to do so should move to the right side of the hall, where the women are sitting."

A strange silence fell over the hall. Everyone froze in fear. A few minutes later, a list of all those present at the meeting as volunteers to join the special forces was prepared and sent by telegram to the wise leadership!
Elsewhere, an even more ridiculous thing happened. The authorities in that area gathered the people who were to be forced to join the special forces in a hall with two large doors.

 

To be continued …

 



 
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