The 358th Night of Memory – 1

Compiled by: Leila Rostami
Translated by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

2024-10-31

The 358^th of the show of the Night of Memory entitled "Resistance and Standing" was held in Sooreh Hall of the Art Center of the Islamic Revolution on 7^th of Tir 1403 (June 27, 2024). In this show, Mr. Ali Saghaffi a war veteran and a freed POW of the Iraqi impose war against Iran recounted his memoirs. In continuation of the show two of the attendees also narrated memoirs form the sacred defense. Davood Salehi hosted the Night of Memory.

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The first narrator of the Night of Memory was Mr. Saghaffi a war veteran and a close friend of the late Hijjatoleslam Seyed Ali Akbar Aboutorabi. He said, "I was hit by shrapnel in Operation Valfajr One. I was in the hospital for six months. After discharging from the hospital, I was at home for 20 days and even did not go out. It was as if someone was waiting to come to me. Finally, a car came to district of Imamzadeh Yahya and the end of Bahar Alley at one pm. The driver said: "Haj Hammet sent a message and come quickly." It was evening when we boarded the car and arrived at Sarpol-e Zahab the next day. We were three. Haj Hemmat came after 20 minutes. I, Akbar Hamzeh, Mr. Mojtaba Tehrani and Hemmat himself got into the car and went to Dasht-e Zahab. At the end of the Dasht-e Zahab was a height called Salmaneh. We climbed it. We had a vision there. In front of it, there were the two heights of Shakh-e Shaldari and Tilehkouh, and the Sartang Gorge was in the middle of it. When we reached the top of Salmaneh Height, because we were part of the operations intelligence forces and the operation intelligence was not in charge until then, martyr Hemmat said: "This gorge is very important, because Iraq has attacked from here, this gorge should be under your control." I said to Hemmat: "If this gorge is mine tonight, what should I do tomorrow night?" Hammett said: "Well, you should also control Shakh-e Shaldari." He drew a line on the map in the middle of Tilehkouh and said: "Half belongs to Mr. Tehrani, and half belongs to Mr. Hamzeh." Mr. Tehrani has been martyred, but Mr. Hamzeh was one of the guys of the town of Sahneh in Kermanshah province and one of the IRGC commanders who has now retired. We conducted a reconnaissance operation for three months. Haj Hemmat said: "The Imam said to go forward from all fronts and identify them so that they will be confused." The middle front that went to Baghdad was entrusted to the Division of Hazrat Rasool (SAWA), which was one of the line breakers.

In continuation, the narrator said, Iraq had left its reserve force in Baghdad and said that if an operation is carried out from the north, we will go to the north; If there is an operation from the south, we will go to the south with the same precautionary force. For three months, we went to reconnaissance every night until one morning, Haj Hemmat came with a Land Rover. The division had 2 Land Rovers at that time. Haj Hemmat had ordered to give us one of the Land Rovers, because we had to cross the Dasht-e Zahab and reach there. The Iraqis did not doubt the Land Rover car, that for example, it is an operational car! They said it was for the Water and Sewage Department. He gave us the smaller Land Rover and the bigger one was inside the division.

That day, Haj Hemmat came with the bigger Land Rover. Because the smaller one had an accident and had been badly damaged. He also put two gallons of gasoline in his car. "We will move from here and go as far as the operation is underway" he said. All operations have been exposed so far, we want this operation not to be exposed. We also filled the car's tank so that we don't have to stop somewhere else for doing this, so that later they say the next day that they have arrived, and an operation is going to be carried out. We passed through the fronts like Ilam and Soomar; Then we crossed Abbas Plain and Naderi Bridge until we reached Dokouheh at 1.5 pm.

Haj Hammet said: "We are here for prayer and lunch and then we will move to our destination. Everyone come to the headquarters." We were six: Haj Hemmat himself, Abbas Karimi, Mojtabi Tehrani, Akbar Hamzeh, I and Saeed Soleimani. Two or three of my brothers were there. I told Haj Hemmat that I want to go and see them. He said: "Go, be here at 3 o'clock." The rest went to the headquarters. I came back at 3 o'clock. We got in the car and headed towards Ahvaz. On the way, an 11-12-year-old girl was passing a small herd of sheep on the road. A trailer had crashed with one of the sheep. Without being afraid, the little girl grabbed the sheep's legs and while she was not strong enough, she pulled the sheep and ran away from the cars that were speeding along the Andimeshk-Ahvaz road. Haj Hemmat was a gentle and very sensitive person. We should have stopped and helped that child; but he did not stop so that the operation would not be exposed. There, the task was to ensure that Haj Hemmat and his companions were not seen in a place where the Iraqis might hear of the operation. Because by then, most of the operations had been disclosed. I was very sad and cried many times for that little girl and the scene that happened, and we didn't go to help her.

In continuation, the narrator said, "We finally arrived in Ahvaz. We went out of Ahvaz and the car turned right after 40 kilometers towards Hamid Barracks. We understood that the operation was in the area of Talaiyeh. Until then, we didn't know what was going on! We went a few kilometers, the Khatami Outpost was in the direction of Khorramshahr, the Talaiyeh Outpost was in the direction of Abadan, and Soosangerd was on our side. We were at the Khatami Outpost. Haj Hemmat said: "Sit here, I will go and come back." He went somewhere and came back after an hour and said: "I went to the headquarters." There will be an operation here in one month, even I and Mr. Aziz Jafari, who is the commander of the headquarters, do not have the right to leave here in another month. The headquarters also shows everything with a video. This point has been identified for a year and a half. At this point, no matter what Iraq reacted to, we did not say anything, no matter what we reacted to, it did not say anything. By the way, the area is very quiet. Now the operation will be carried out one month later."

Then Haj Hemmat said that there was a brigade named "Ya Zeinab" that belonged to the southerners. The southerners know Arabic and may see the goings-on and tell their families, father and mother, and it will reach the ears of the Iraqis. For this reason, they removed the "Ya Zainab" Brigade from there and handed over the same spot to the Al-Ghadeer Brigade. We were supposed to get our supplies from Al Ghadeer Brigade. We found out what our duty and ruling was. We stayed there. We went to the headquarters during the day and they showed us videos showing what the area was like! Two or three nights before the operation, Haj Hemmat asked me to go for reconnaissance. I was going for identification when I saw Mr. Jafari standing at Hoor Al-Howeizah. He said: "Where?" I said, "I'm in the reconnaissance group." He said: "No, no one has the right to go for reconnaissance." You go back and tell them that we were supposed to watch the film, no one can go to the reconnaissance until the night of the operation."

There was a room in the middle of the Khatami Outpost measuring 1.5 in 3 meters, which was apparently the flag room. The outposts have a flag room which is almost in the middle of the yard. An iron is attached to it to raise the flag. I turned around and saw two army guards standing in front of the flag room door very openly. The room had no door. I went to look inside and saw two army generals sitting on the ground. One of them was apparently Hassani Saadi. 4 divisions were supposed to operate there; 2 army divisions and two IRGC divisions. The coordination of the four divisions was under the supervision of the army. Those two people were kneeling in front of Hemmat. Haj Hammet had an antenna in his hand; from these car antennas to which the radio is connected. The map was in front of him. Those two people were sitting in front of him. Haj Hemmat said his content. There was a blanket under Haj Hemmat's feet, and a piece of moquette under their feet. That environment, no matter what form it had, was the best form, and anyone who went to the path that he considered best for himself for the sake of God. They were twice as old as Haj Hemmat, but they had sat in front of him with sincerity and humbleness.

The narrator continued: There was a dog with a pup. One night inside the outpost, a car hit the mother dog and she was killed. I jokingly called Abbas Karimi and said: "Haj Abbas! Haj Abbas! The mommy of Ziba died." We named that pup Ziba. Haj Hemmat heard my voice and said: "Mr. Saghaffi!" I went forward. He said: "You are responsible for the road." Go and take over the forces from Hasanpour." We had 70 intelligence forces. A person named Issa was from Soosangerd and an Arab. 60 Iraqi forces were under the supervision of Issa and all of them were under the supervision of Mr. Hasanpour. Mr. Hasanpour was in charge of operations information in Najaf Headquarters. I took over 60 people and we returned. "Now go for reconnaissance", Hemmat said. I took 7 people from the forces. The troops were given one gun and 20 bullets and they were always upset. Because it was a border and a war zone, and we were careful not to transfer the weapons here and there, and there would be an abuse! They said, "Give us plenty of ammunition, because if we get stuck, we will have to fight to the last bullet. If they catch us alive, they will kill us 100%. They will also kill our families. We have to destroy ourselves in such a way that no trace of us remains." I said: "Give them as much ammunition as they like. Give them 20 magazines". They tied the magazines to themselves and 7 people sat in the boat. There were four of us who boarded the boat; a total of 11 people. On the way, we met fishermen. Wherever we met fishermen, 4 of us lowered our heads, but those 7 people kept their heads up so as not to say that 11 people came and 7 people returned! Because Saddam had set a reward for whoever caught an Iranian guard. He had said that I would give him a house in Baghdad and 10,000 dinars. We saw fishermen twice. They greeted with each other. A part of Hoor al-Howeizeh belonged to Iran and a part to Iraq. The Iraqi part had a thick-necked person. When we reached the fishermen, after asking them which tribe they were from, they would greet each other and they would answer that they were from such and such a tribe and called the name of the "thick-necked". Then they would say, for example, be happy, be safe. In one or two places, the prow of the boat got caught in the fishing nets, which were opened. Along the way, we saw 2 companies[1] of troops and crossed until we reached an oil dock. In the video, we had been shown that 60 soldiers should sleep inside this pier one night before the operation, so that the next night when the main forces came, they would attack the line and they would shoot from Majnoon, which cannot be seen from there, and shoot arbitrarily and fire RPGs so that the enemy was confused in the line and other guys stormed the enemy.

Mr. Saghaffi continued, “I saw the environment, but my opinion was that even 3 intelligence forces could not hide here for 24 hours or go to the bathroom! Or open the can! Because the canning door sparkles in the sun and it is clear from miles away what is going on here and what is happening. After all, whoever passes by in a car and strikes an object, if he pays attention, he will understand that there is power here; 36 untrained Basijis for this work. I wrote a letter to Haj Hemmat and gave it to one of our guys named Mr. Farahani and said: "Take this letter and tell Haj Hemmat that even 3 Basij forces cannot hide here for 24 hours; how can 36 people hide?! That is, do not send troops here tomorrow night. They were supposed to send the forces tomorrow night and deploy them there and push us back, and the attack would be carried out for the next night. The distance between the wharf and the land was 1.5 km. A road was built in Hoor al-Howeizeh to the dock. It was surrounded by water. The three of us moved to the land. I told Mr. Farahani: "If they ever catch you, you don't throw the letter into the water, you eat it." We moved. We saw that they had cut two parts of the road to the size of 6 meters and created an empty space where two Chinook helicopters could land next to each other, albeit with difficulty. Here we entered the water and saw that the water was up to our chests and we were under severe pressure from our left side to our right side. We passed with difficulty so as not to turn from the road. It was an eight-meter road. We reached the land. On the left side was a trench that was shown in the video, where our guys had been hiding. That trench was 50 meters away from that road.

Finally, we went and saw that they were not in the right place! The dock was not fit for 36 people. The trench also had no roof. I had read a report that after the Ramadan operation, Saddam had ordered to remove the roofs of all the empty bunkers left over from the past so that Iranian patrol forces could not hide inside them. I had read this report before, but I didn't notice to bring it up. In the video, they said that the bunker had a roof. We went and saw that the bunker had no roof. Now the guys have also left and we could not tell them to stop, and go and see the trench and come back. One has to be very sensitive and do this, which we did not do at that time. We were supposed to go and identify a bridge and come back so that we could guide the guys to that bridge on the night of the operation. We traveled a total of 17 kilometers; that is, we bypassed Hoor al-Howeizeh to go toward that dock.

To be continued…