Oral History Interview with Mohsen Rezaie – Part 3

Iran’s strategy after Khoramshahr conquest was to use military power for political ends. That is, a strategic region should be conquered and then political endeavors be practiced to convince Saddam’s supporters to dismiss him. In this part of interview with former commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), we have discussed the recreation of military power, in the process of a long and attritional war.

Mohammad Doroodian: We did not have any victory after Khoramshahr conquest. The other obtained successes were tactical and operational. If we are not able to transform a victory to a political goal, i.e. Saddam’s collapse, it cannot be called a military victory. It is a tactical and operational victory and cannot have decisive effects for determining the war destiny.

Mohsen Rezaie: Do you mean Imam Khomeini should order us to advance up to Baghdad?

Mohammad Doroodian: So Hashemi has expressed the right view.

Mohsen Rezaie: Hashemi had an operation in mind for which no limitation could be imagined. We carried out tens of operations and he told those were his operations.

Mohammad Doroodian: Upon the framework of correlation between revolution and war, the right way to collapse Saddam was not taken, if we intended so. Could we ever pose any social movement in Iraq against its regime during war? This was not possible upon these clues. We were in lack of proper military power too. When did Intifada start in Iraq? It happened when Americans smashed Iraqi military power. So if we could crush military power of Iraq, some events would have happened inside Iraq. But that never occurred.

Gholamali Rashid: We could do that in Kheybar operation.

Mohammad Doroodian: Iraqi units and ours were not equal in Kheybar.
Gholamali Rashid: Success could be achieved based on the operation plans.
Mohammad Doroodian: Would Basra collapse, if we had conquered that road? In that case, would the Iraqi third army leave the field and Saddam would collapse?
Gholamali Rashid: Yes, it would go to another place and resist.
Mohsen Rezaie: They would be disordered and Iraq would lose its credit as Iraq. That road was very important in that operation. I referred firstly that, Saddam’s army would not pass Karkheh River, until they had not captured that throat [road] in Khuzestan, and if they did, they had to return to the posterior part of the river. That road was like a throat which bore much importance.

Mohammad Doroodian: What is the value of a military victory if it does not lead to a political end and do not secure a political goal?

Mohsen Rezaie: We should see what has been that political goal. Was it Saddam’s overthrow?
Mohammad Doroodian: So what was it? What was the political goal of war after Khoramshahr conquest?
Mohsen Rezaie: In terms of militarism, you are not considered successful before reaching the determined specific goals. But it is not so in politics.
Mohammad Doroodian: What was our political goal in war? Was it securing our demands, Saddam’s collapse or being accepted by Iraqi people? Military victory should be related to these, somehow.
Mohsen Rezaie: But Imam Khomeini never referred to Saddam’s overthrow in political debates.
Mohammad Doroodian: So what were our political ends after Khoramshahr conquest?
Mohsen Rezaie: They were those three conditions referred by Imam Khomeini. This has been discussed in diplomatic point of view. Sometimes you are talking propagandistically, and sometimes you tell the truth in diplomacy or negotiations. Political victory is realized when you want to make real what is put on the table, diplomatically. What we put on diplomacy table was returning to international borders, recognizing the international pre-war borders and convening a committee to determine the offender, not to trail him.
There were the possibility to reach these and we did our best. Simultaneously we would take next steps and go forward to the point of collapsing Saddam. So if Imam referred to Saddam’s collapse, he did not mean that we would not go forward if we could. We would certainly go if we were able. It did not mean also that we had planned for that. What we had on the table was returning to international borders, recognizing the international pre-war borders, convening a committee to determine the offender and a committee to evaluate the losses. If we could reach these, there was the possibility that Imam would tell “I had told Saddam’s collapse should be realized”. This does not mean that we had captured that place for sure, to advance to Baghdad. When the UN resolution 598 was issued, our diplomacy completely changed. Country officials accepted the resolution conditionally, and asserted that the declaration of UN secretary-general should be issued. This would clear some two-edged paragraphs.
This was because Imam was fully aware of all diplomatic debates and he would order for nullifying them if he would have thought they would not suffice. He never told that. So we should find out what is meant by political victory? That is, instead of considering Saddam’s collapse as certain and claiming that it has for sure been the only war goal which had not been realized, we should analyze the details. If we had acquired the primary political victories, victories that would have started and ended in a specific periods, possibly Imam considering the proper situations, would say, “Go on, why are you going to stop?” On the other hand, discovering the bad situations, he would order to stop. Thereupon, when the resolution 598 was accepted he repeatedly said, it was not tactical. Imam repeatedly insisted in different occasions that our measures are not taken tactically.
We were seeking Imam’s approval to attack Basra, because Saddam has not yet declared his approval to ceasefire. When we sent this request to Imam through Ayatollah Khamenei, who had come to the war fronts, Ahmad Agha [Imam Khomeini’s son] had written some sentences in answer, which was published in Negin magazine too. Imam had told, “The issue is not related to pre or post resolution. This does not relate to Saddam’s approval or not”. Ahmad Agha’s message read as:

“Dear Hojatoleslam Khamenei; I took your message to Imam that Islam combatants are ready to operate. But Imam ordered, in no way attack Iraqi soil. If they bombed you and you made your mind, you are allowed to bomb them too. Your forces should be ready to take proper measures, if they attacked and occupied any part. You also declare to them, as I have declared before, that accepting the resolution is not tactical. Saddam has not announced his agreement to ceasefire yet. Any attack will violate it. This is not related to pre or post ceasefire”. It is so strange that Imam after accepting the resolution announces it is not tactical. Why? He himself answered this question. “They are seeking an excuse to blame Iran for accepting the resolution tactically and to use this excuse to attack Iran”.

Our operation in Mersad was successful. We were successful in Khoramshahr too. Imam knew the likelihood of victory, considering all those forces that had come to the war fronts, but he did not allow us to attack Basra. All these show that Imam wished Saddam to be collapsed, but never posed this and never obliged officials to realize it. He did not ask Mr. Hashemi and Ayatollah Khamenei to do that. On the other hand, Imam was fully aware of the details of the negotiations of government officials going to foreign countries. We had not obtained what we put on the table of negotiations. Besides, Saddam collapsed.
I went to Imam 48 hours after acceptance of resolution. He told me “There is no need to worry. During the revolution in many occasions it happened that we planned to acquire a success in a way, but we were not successful. Later we found out God had overcome us in a way that we had not thought of”. He then said, “In Kuwait accident, I wished to go to an Islamic country. When they told me, you are going to be exiled to Kuwait; I was very happy and thanked God. I was taken to Kuwait borders, I prayed there. After prayer, they told the orders have changed and you should return to Baghdad and from there you should go to Paris. It made me sad. But now I have found that it was God’s will. If I had gone to Kuwait they would kill me and revolution would never succeed”.
I mean we should not think Imam was not after Saddam’s collapse, but this was not put on the table and was not asked the officials. This is an ideal he would follow if he had an opportunity. Imam had this in his mind and ideals. But what was planned and designed was to recognize international borders, to introduce Iraq as the offender and the one who had started the war. It was very important for Imam that in the future if anybody wants to blame us for Iraqi victims; we tell him it was them who attacked us. Iraqi people were our brothers and we did not intend to kill them but it was Iraq who started the offence. These were very important for Imam and he did not oblige officials to plan for more than this. Planning for operations, during which some differences might appear, we just had the realization of these goals in mind. We planned for that, but Mr. Hashemi believed it was not right to enter the whole country to the war.
Gholamali Rashid: Did Imam’s decisions to enter Iraqi soil after Khoramshahr conquest, comply with these discussions?
Mohsen Rezaie: Mr. Zahirnejad and I believed that we could not defend there. So we contended to go up to Arvand River then.
Gholamali Rashid: Imam wanted the same, to go and conquer there. You yourself told Imam wanted you to stay up to that point or to go forward up to a specific point.
Mohsen Rezaie: Yes, but he did not tell us where. He wanted us to reach our goals. He wanted our military goals to reach us to our political ends.

Translator: Asghar Aboutorab