Reviewing Two Articles of Book of "Three Views"

Issues of Memory and Oral History of the War/Holy Defense

Dr. Davood Zameni
Translated by Ruhollah Golmoradi

2019-6-26

The second session of review of the book "Three Views to Issues in Three Areas of "Culture", "Narrative" and "Research" of " War / Holy Defense" was held in the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought on June 1, 2019. During the session, Mr. Davood Zameni, cultural and art deputy of the General Administration of Provinces and Parliamentary Affairs of Hozeh Honari made some remarks about the book, which will be followed for using by the interested.

In the name of God

Two essays of "Relationship between War / Holy Defense Historiography and Historicism on the War" and "Authenticity of Memories of War / Holy Defense " in the book Three Views, edited by Mrs. Faranak Jamshidi, is in fact distinguished form of the article entitled "Another View at Memory, Memory Writing and Oral History of War / Holy Defense" which has been published previously by Mr. Alireza Kamari, in the Month Book of History and Geography on 2011.[1]

In my opinion, these two articles are among the most important articles of Three Views, and I try to focus on explanation and review of these two articles during my lecture time and to avoid reviewing other articles of the book. In my critique of these two articles, I have used the model presented by Neil Browne and Keeley in the book of Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking. In their book, they provide a framework for critically analyzing a work which applying this framework leads to deepening understanding of the work. So, applying the above model, I dealt with the two papers of Mr. Kamari by arising 11 questions. These questions are:
1. What is the main issue of these two articles and what is the result or claim presented by the author?
2. What are reasons of Mr. Kamari's arguments in these two articles?
3. Which words or phrases in these two articles are ambiguous or important?
4. What are value contradictions and value assumptions in these two articles?
5. What are descriptive assumptions in these two papers?
6. Are there any fallacies in these two articles?
7. How much decisive are evidence presented in these two papers?
8. Are there any alternative causes?
9. Have correct data been presented in these two papers?
10. What important information has not been presented in these two articles?
11. What reasonable result / claims could be extracted from these two papers?

In my opinion, the author's question, or in other words the main motive for writing these two articles is "To maturate wisdom of memory and history researchers of the war or the holy defense." The method and approach of Mr. Kamari in the two papers is similar to the method that Kant used in "What is Enlightenment?" Kant in answering the question of what is enlightenment, stated: "Enlightenment is departure of man from infancy and immaturity which he/she has imposed on him/herself. Immorality is inability to use your understanding without others guidance. This immorality is self-imposed, if its cause is not because of foolishness but for lack of will and courage to apply your understanding without other guidance. The motto of Enlightenment is: Be brave about using your own understanding. Mr. Kamari, pointing out that stream of memory-research and oral history in our time is captured by four traps: 1) the dominance of narrative culture and oral traditions, 2) the dominance of school of Akhbari, Ashʿarism and Fatalism, 3) preferring emotions and feeling to thought, and 4) disregarding new theories, raises the alarm, according to him, memories and oral history practitioners should take it very seriously.
Mr. Kamari assumes that if an audience asks him what is your opinion about memory and its relation to history? He cannot escape and take a Socratic way. In this article, he clearly explains his view in 16 clauses in answering the question "What is memory?":
1. memory is originally a subjective phenomenon for him (p. 91).
2. The home of memory and remembrance is memory (p. 91).
3. The intersection of conceptive power and imaginary power in cognitive and extrasensory in encountering internal and external phenomena locates sperm of memory in womb of mind (p. 91).
4. Memory is recorded in container of mind and then becomes the example and subject of memory, and in this location, memory enters an identity relation with memory.
5. Human being memories are the only memory-oriented being in this world.
6. Human memories are single entities that are different from others.
7. Memory is a matter without form as long as it is in mind. But when it is expressed, it is robed in narrative.
8. Whenever memory is expressed (whether in speech, writing, and or image) wears a new robe of narrative. Therefore, in the world no two memories with fully identity relation are thinkable.
9. Birth of memory occurs basically and often in form of language of speech and then writing (p. 93).
10. Memory to be born in any form, explicitly or implicitly, is carrier of mind filings of its narrator. In this regard, there is no pure memory in this world.
11. Birth of memory from womb of mind can be also voluntarily and willing, either forced by necessity or even reluctance of external variables.
12. As soon as a memory to be born, like a child, becomes up-to-date in periods and time and space occasions that occur in the future.
13. The audience always gets access with two intermediaries to main essence of memory or incident contained in the memory: first one is thought or narration of memory narrator of the second event; second is filter of mind of him/herself audience or reader of the text.
14. Memories always carry elements of cultural environment of memory owner.
15. Every disclosure of an event or incident that turns into memory, involves concealment, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.
16. Memories can be categorized in several ways. For example, in terms of belonging and keeping of mind in preserving them, memories are in a range of live and new memories to washy and smudgy memories, and even dead memories.

In my opinion, Mr. Kamari in spite of important claims he presents in these two articles, even uses, in a way that I will refer to later, words, phrases, and metaphors, that great philosophers have brought like these metaphors in their works, but he do not tell us whether basis of the claims is rational arguments? Is result of the experimental psychologist exploration? Is it a combination of philosophers and psychologists? Is it derived from the recent theories of studies of noology and philosophy of mind? Or is it a collaging of concepts, definitions and contemporary theories? The main question that in my idea is felt missing in this article is that basically what man remember when he/she bring something into memory? This is a completely structural and phenomenological discussion on memory. This is the same main problem and contradiction of traditional and modern philosophy, which puts "reality" against "story" or, according to Plato, "fantasy." Plato discusses about memory through metaphor of "wax and wax image". He explains why some memories are brighter and some are more blurred. He tells us that these attributes also depend on nature and characteristics of the wax (that would be loose or stiff), and on also attribute of the external agent or image that reflects its image on the wax.
Aristotle emphasizes another characteristic of memory, which Plato apparently did not address it, and that is issue of "time". From Aristotle's point of view, thought is always accompanied by flow of "memory" about temporal interval that separates present from the past. Of course, the twentieth-century philosophers, such as Paul Ricœur, do not accept Plato's view and criticized it seriously. Ricœur believes that founding "memory theory" only based on theory of picture is wrong. Because having supposed theory of picture, we have entered discussion a kind of materiality that itself makes ambiguity and we do not know what is essence of what has left its stamp and trace on wax of "present" and what is common part and similarity between what has remained and what is cause of the remained?

There is a debate in Islamic philosophy that is related to theory of memory. Some Islamic philosophers, such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, following Aristotle, maintain matter [Hayoola] (matter without idea) in discussion of matter and idea. But other philosophers such as Sheikh Ishraq and Allama Shaykh Tusi disbelieve first matter. In other words, in eyes of these philosophers, an essence which has no actuality it cannot be basically demonstrated. Some philosophers have also considered matter (Hayoola) to be an absent thing that reason has casted a shadow on it. So, in discussion of matter and idea in "memory", the question is raised that what is "matter of memory"? Is it possible to imagine matter of memory without idea?
Mr. Kamari has addressed this issue in a part of his article (p. 91); where he points out: Memory is essentially a mental being that is located in memory as a result of recording and placement of external and internal facts (by cognitive-perceptual basics or five senses or extrasensory apperceptions, such as dreams and revelations).
I wish Mr. Kamari would also discuss whether memory could be innate? Innate perceptions or the priori in both in Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy are important topics that have a long history in epistemology. Some scholars in Islamic philosophy such as Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabataba'i consider acceptance of innate perceptions as the best solution to moral relativism. Of course, in his books about memories, Mr. Kamari has discussed "What" and nature of memory both in terms of ontology and epistemology in detail, but since my critique is focused on these two articles, I suppose that he explained it briefly and even in rewriting the additions that could make the article richer than its original form haven't been added. Mr. Kamari in definition of memory assumes that memory of humans are different (p. 91, para. 3); though they have superficial similarities and commonalities to one another (something like monads in philosophy of Leibniz). He presents two reasons for this claim: First, external realities have uneven mental influences on individuals. Secondly, understanding and accepting all facts is dependent on and based on perception of knower, so what is known is the same knower. Or, in other words, the real thing is the one that knower understands it.

This argument by Mr. Kamari is similar to Berkeley's argument about "existence" and "perception". In Berkeley's view, existence is equal to perception. Berkeley's idealism means what in the name of outside world which is source of memories, regardless of mind or perception of man, doesn't exist or is meaningless. Therefore, it can be said that Mr. Kamari also believes that if there is no human being, discussion on memory / nature of memory / relation of memory with language / relation of memory with history and issues like these is essentially meaningless.
Mr. Kamari, in another part of this article, has discussed "pathology of memory", with emphasis on memoirs of the war / holy defense. In brief, we can summarize the author's assumptions about pathology of memory in the following statements:
1. Memoirs of the war / holy defense, according to him, have been not and are not free from interventions of publisher.
2. Memoires are more authentic than memories because of writing language and immediate implication of text to reference of narrative.
3. Memory has a space between poetry and story in the holy defense literature.
4. Memory can be turned into oral history in writing process.
5. To the extent that memory approaches story, its historical credibility is reduced.
6. Holy Defense memories require a coherent and scientific manual of style that the following five subjects are cleared in it:
A. To determine scientific criteria for identifying memory havers and accessing their memories;
B. To determine updated criteria for compiling and publishing memories,
C. To determine updated criteria for making explicit manner of encountering interviewer with memory holder,
D. To determine updated criteria for protecting material and moral rights of the publisher, editor and narrative authority,
E. To determine scope of publisher's intervention in compiling memories.
Another issue that I consider to be very important in these two articles is vocabulary and metaphors that Mr. Kamari employs to express his purpose. He has used two metaphors in this article, which in my opinion could be discussed much: the metaphor of "flattening memory" and the other metaphor of "ideologizing memory".
These two metaphors are precisely metaphors used by Paul Ricœur in book of Memory, History, and Forgetting. I'm not sure whether Mr. Kamari during writing his article in 2011 had referred to this book or, accidently, the same damage that Paul Ricœur referred to them in his study of memory and history in France, elsewhere in the world, are remarked under name of Research Department of Hozeh Honari's Office for Literature and Art of Resistance by a person named Alireza Kamari (although in history, especially history of science, this is not unprecedented).

Ricœur believes that "memory is essentially individual" and "memory of each person is different from memory of another person." In his view, memory of a conscience cannot be transferred to another conscience, and in this sense, memory has a completely individual feature. Memory has three functions according to Ricœur: 1) it is personal, 2) understanding concept of distance and depth of time is possible through memory, and 3) memory establishes connectivity sense.
Ricœur, quoted by Maurice Halbwachs, (French sociologist who wrote a book entitled On Collective Memory, published after his death in 1944), reminds us the fact that despite personal feature of memory, as soon as a memory is shared it gets a social status. So if I as a typical person can describe my memories it's because it is retelling a "social act". Some of our memories or heard from others or learned in family, such as celebrations, commemorations, and memorial are possibilities that compresses collective memories.
In addition, there are institutions that have a longer life span than people. Therefore, collective memory of institutions that I belong to them extends my individual memory.
In his discussion of memories, in addition to an epistemological principle, Ricoeur injects an ethical principle into definition of memory. He believes that thinking about the past in the present as a representation of an event / incident / fact or an image that has already been raised is not attained but the reminding is "debt of present time for the past"; that is, present is in debt for the past. There are still crimps from the past in the present. Therefore, the present is not self-contained and these crimps smell the past. That's why we are dealing with permanence of the past in the present. Past is not something that is no longer, it's over, and no longer comes back. But past is what continues to pass through in the present time.

For this reason, Ricoeur uses the term "crimp"; memory means something from past that is present mysteriously like a crimp in the present time.
Ricoeur borrows from Freud's two papers to describe issue of present debt for the past and compare act of memory with mourning. Explaining this issue is out of scope of this lecture. But Ricoeur, where he speaks of "manipulating memory" and "ideologizing memory", means the coordinated manipulation of memory and forgetting by authorities or flattening crimps that have been remained from the past to the present. This is precisely the same argument that Mr. Kamari mentions in his article and point it out through metaphor of "flattening memory".
Manipulation or flattening memory may be conducted by memory haver, by memory compiler, or by the publisher when memory becomes a narrative. Sometimes memory flattening is done through changing names by a political regime, such as renaming streets. Sometimes memory flattening is conducted alongside destruction of a building and replacing a new building on its ruins. In another article, Mr. Kamari, Secret of the Grave, has further elaborated on this discussion in other way.
Another important argument that Mr. Kamari refers to in this very short and elegant article and did not open it so much is "relation between memory and forgetting." On page 94 he says in the last paragraph: any kind of "statement" and "actualized" in the world of narrative / memory probably could be "unexpressed" or "mysteries" and "destroyed" too. That is, every narrative proposition, as it reveals, conceals.
We can never narrate an event / incident or subject in all aspects. Each narrative from memory during censorship / not being seen or forgetting is also possible: either consciously or unconsciously. Principally forgetfulness is a choice. Nietzsche is a major philosopher discussing forgetfulness. Nietzsche speaks of memory as an element that blocks planning and does not allow us to think the future in one of his writings, "Untimely Meditations". In short, Nietzsche says: We must forget the past to build the future.

Of course, there are many criticisms of Nietzsche's idea. Even Post- Nietzschean philosophers do not accept his recommendation highly. Ricoeur also believes that memory is always committed to the truth when he talks about the present responsibility for the past. So, in epistemology of memory, he enters ethics. Forgetting should not be meant here "eliminating reality," but it is in the sense of "changing" it. We need to forget some things that happened in the past. This act is like "forgiveness" action. Forgiveness means that we do not define ourselves as righteous subjects, for example, on the war / holy defense. In the war studies, if we consistently find ourselves as righteous and the enemy always as enemy, we will certainly not be able to sound silent accounts of the incident. Silent narrations mean narrative of victims of the war. "Memory of commanders" differs from the war with "memory of victims". The problem here is not forgetting facts, but changing its meaning. Function of forgiveness is not to eliminate events, but on the contrary one cannot talk about asking for forgiveness if disasters would be forgotten. There must be a difference between reality of events and memories and their load as an event on one hand and indebtedness as a historical dimension on the other.
Overemphasizing of Mr. Kamari in the war / holy defense duality in this article is because of that in his view when memory becomes history it can heal "memory wounds". However, from his point of view, impregnating "memory" with "emotion" is known as a damage for oral history. But the point is that by which way one can purify memory of emotion? How to make a memory pure?
In different parts of Mr. Kamari's article engage the reader's mind in a way that he does not find an answer to ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions that the author is expected to answer. My critique of these two articles is in fact an response to the plea that Mr. Kamari himself (at the end of p. 90) requested from interested audience to contemplate, question, criticize and expurgate, object and reform content and the contained of this article, from a little to long, so perhaps from summit of votes we can get help in drawing the future perspectives of memory (and oral history) of the war and holy defense and its issues.
In the article "Relationship between the War Memories and Historiography of War," we encounter two categories of propositions: a set of propositions that are not belonged to the author, and Mr. Kamari has presented them as witness for his claim, such as triple answers given to the question whether reality of the event independent of mind in history (objectivity in history) is identifiable? These answers are borrowed shortly from Stanford's An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Regarding nature of history, objectivity in history, philosophy of history, and critical studies of history, there are many opinions that have been presented by Mr. Kamari briefly and he does not explain his preferred approach for us. Here I have not enough time to mention these opinions.
But, in my opinion, some assumptions or claims of Mr. Kamari who are mentioned in "Relation of Memory with History" in this article are notable. I have extracted the most important claims in relation of memory with history in this article as follows:

1. History is bringing to present the past, but memory by conveying "present" to the "past" occupies mind with subject of the passed or the past.
2. Memory is fluid existence between literature and history.
3. Memories forms are: a) oral memory; b) memoir; c) memory;
4. If memory has a fluid existing between literature and history, then we have two types of memories: a) literary memory; b) historical memory.
5. Memories of the war can be studied from three perspectives: from the view that memories contain historical data about the war / holy defense are subject of science of "historical studies of war". From the perspective that memories are reflecting mind of actors of the war, they are subject of science of "anthropology studies of war," and since memories are a source full of language, intellectual and behavioral information of the war actors, they are subject of science of "linguistic studies of war".
I again compare this discussion of Mr. Kamari (relation of memory with history) with Paul Ricœur discussions. If we assume that history is a set of data, some of which are correct and some are wrong, then at this stage of historical discussion we are faced with issue of falsifiability of data. Here is talk of documented history, that is, about archive. Then memory becomes history when it becomes "archive". At the archive stage, history faces issue of memory. Archive is recorded memories. But history is not based on recording memories, but is formed based on reading archive and selecting parts of archive. Archive is start point of historical measure. So historian is the one who spend his time in archives.
At this stage of work of history, referred to as "documented history," Ricœur believes that Popper falsifiability criteria can be used. For example, if we talk about a historical massacre, we can debate about authenticity or falseness of this historical data. But when we arrive at the second stage of writing history, applying Popper criteria is not an easy task. At this point, historian tries to explain the data he/she has collected. That is, to establish a connection among them.
Of course, concept of "historical causality" differs from concept of causality in other sciences. According to Max Weber, when we raise question of "why" in history, we deal with both "structures" and "agencies". Therefore, studying motivation of agencies in historical studies is very important.
When a historian discovered (or explained) causes, the third stage begins, that is, how to express the events? If we have a "short-term" look at history to describe an event, we will mainly focus on highlighting role of agencies. But if we have a "long-term" look at history, structures will be important in narrative language. Historian cannot take a critical look at historical events at the same time he writes history. But if historian can distance himself from historical event, it will be possible to recount the event in other way. Other way explanation of the same event is function of history in secondary sense and this is an important exercise for memory. "Act of memory" is here because of a possibility provided by historian. Therefore, memory has two types of relations with history: 1) Knowledge relationship; 2) action relationship. Practical relationship of memories with the past is an action that not only words but also minds do.
If historian does not adhere to the ethics that Ricœur argued, he may provide grounds for "infringing memory". Infringing memory is rooted in wounds and injuries and damages that past memories left for us. For this reason, I believe that the more important articles of "Three Views" are the two articles that I reviewed and criticized. Because ideas that Mr. Kamari raised in these essays, assumptions that he used, metaphors he invented, epistemological paradoxes of these articles, and the unspoken words that have not been addressed in these articles, all suggest that these articles could be cause of further discussions in field of epistemology of memory and relation of memory with history, and hope that he would go beyond summary position in the later works and to address these issues diffusely and to resolve some of theoretical issues of memory scholars. I think now I can understand the reason for choosing this statement from Søren Kierkegaard at the beginning of Kamari's article that said: "It is futile to recall a past that cannot be transformed to the present; there is nothing else to say.